

The Praxis of Freedom in Society and Politics
Foundational Elements for a Political Theory of Emancipation

Peter Morgan

Thesis Director: Professor Matteo Gianni
Department of Political Science & International Relations
University of Geneva
Switzerland

September 2019

Acknowledgments

This thesis would never have been possible without professor Matteo Gianni. The only person I have ever known who has understood, recognized, attended to, and cared for so many dimensions of freedom. This could only happen when a human relation is an end in itself.

Deeply interested in his students' ideas, his seminars tried to create a community of learners. Never seen a moment when he would treat someone as unequal in any way, even when in terms of knowledge, there is inequality. One on one, with kindness and generosity, he has never ceased infusing me with confidence, supporting, challenging, and inspiring me, and showing me it is always possible to create a humane world already within this one. Our discussions would continue in my mind and in my readings after our meetings.

This work -in fact, any decent graduate student life- would have been impossible without him.

I am very grateful for my mom & my friends particularly Silvia, Deborah, Jérôme, Grégoire, Cyril, Jagoda and Eva; as well as for the advice and help of M. Metin Turker and Mme. Eva Kiss.

I am thankful to my friend Dr. Jean-Pierre Rieder and to Me. Bernard Nuzzo without whom the practical conditions for doing any kind work would have been impossible.

I have written this thesis in the marvelous company of my playful -adopted dog- friend Noa. Uncorrupted by the neoliberal zeitgeist, she's still free.

And she takes me to her world of tenderness where I have always wanted to be.

*I only wanted to live according to the promptings which
came from my true self. Why was that so very difficult?*

Hermann Hesse

Abstract

For Sartre, Badiou, Unger, Hardt and Negri the majority of humanity is still unfree. This work explicates why then shifts the focus on the conditions for emancipation. Both, the why and the how lead to a conception of freedom-in-situation, deployed through the 3 dimensions of personal commitment, emancipatory and revolutionary politics as well as the Common. And attempting to resist its own inertia, the practico-inert, as well as historical counter-finality. Thus this work hopes to lay down some foundational elements for a political theory of emancipation. Starting from the here and now of neoliberalism, we seek a revolutionary subjectivity made of universal singularities: the Multitude. With its diverse, situated and thus context-alienated moralities, this revolutionary constituent power is guided by a set of general principles that attempt to unite all the emancipatory forces of the radical left through revolutionary politics and towards the goal of a new social order that concretize freedom in the Common.

Key concepts:

Freedom, praxis, subjectivity, contradictions, commitment, practico-inert, counter-finality, neoliberalism, the Multitude, the Common, revolutionary & emancipatory politics, the human condition, morality in history.

Contents

Preface	p.1-5	
The path to the particular questions guiding this research.		
Method	p.6-13	
The contrast between the analytical and the dialectical method		
The reason for choice of dialectical rather than the analytical.		
The dialectic between theory-practice.		
Freedom as a dialectic.		
Instantiations.		
Introduction:		
Why Freedom?	p.14-28	
On the need for a precise multidimensional concept of freedom in political practice and political theory.		
This study in the context of contemporary political theory.....		p.14-21
How does the conception of freedom defended offer differs from those in contemporary political theory, what are its peculiarities, and what does it offer that is absent in contemporary theory.....		p.18-19
Freedom and morality of history.....		p.19-21
Freedom in practical politics.....		p.22-23
Why a conception of freedom is important to politics? What does our conception offer to practical politics?		
Preface and introduction summary.....		p.24-25
Overview of the content of the proposed multidimensional concept of freedom.....		p.25-27
Part I. Neoliberalism.		
Freedom Corrupted	p.28-35	
A critique of the current dominant conception of freedom in society and practical politics.		
Parts II, III & IV. A multidimensional conception of freedom.		
Part II. freedom as commitment	p.36-48	
The agent and her context.....		p.36-37
Freedom as ontological commitment.....		p.37-38
Freedom as ethical commitment	p.38-48	
Freedom between ontology and ethics.....		p.38-41
Freedom as ethical commitment in 3 sources		
Ontological Intersubjectivity.....		p.41-43
The agent and the contradictions in her circumstance.....		p.43-46
The agent and the contradictions in the human condition.....		p.46-48

Part III. Freedom as praxis.....p.49-62

In the emancipatory or revolutionary politics of the Multitude.

Part IV. Freedom in the Common.....p.63-70

Beyond the corporate-state, an overview of alternatives that protect and prosper freedom in space-time.

Conclusion.....p.71-74

Freedom and the political.

Freedom and human nature.

Bibliography.....p.75-78

Annex: the main authors of this thesis exemplify the militants-thinkers practice of political theory.....p.79

I. Preface

We live in counter-revolutionary times. The contemporary disastrous state of affairs for the radical left reminds us of the young Marx times in the 1840's. In this situation, we propose as a point of departure a philosophical reflection on the meaning of freedom. A conception upon which we can build a radical and total emancipation. Second, an analysis of contemporary society with its conception of freedom and the hegemony of a tiny minority to which it has given rise. Third, how to build on this proposed conception of freedom in order to tear down this hegemony. Fourth, how to organize a libertarian society.

This study can be read as an incomplete tentative examination of these 4 issues.

Few values or ideas gather as much support and confusion as freedom. However, contemporary political theory lacks a multidimensional conception of freedom which could be used to understand the whole of the existing social and political field, and why and how to radically change it. This work attempts to plant the seeds for such theory. In surveying the relevant political theory literature of the past few decades, we have concluded that a multidimensional conception of freedom is lacking. Such conception would provide a vision -particularly in the aftermath of the 2007-8 systemic crisis- through which one can analyze politics and social change as well as the social movements, protests, and occupations of public places that followed that crisis, what they represented, what they meant and why they failed. In short, a vision of a new social order, of what life could be, based on a multi-dimensional conception of freedom adapted to XXI century's problems would:

1. Explicit and analyze the implicit and yet dominant conception of freedom at the basis of the hegemonic neoliberal project in democracies and beyond.
2. Shows the contradictions and defects in the system resulting from such conception of freedom. Also why bringing to light this implicit common conception defended and used to create contemporary societies is important.
3. Propose a multidimensional conception of freedom-in-situation, deployed not only at the personal level, but also in dyadic relationships and beyond.
4. Inquire about how this conception of freedom is deployed in groups, social movements and struggles. Why such resistance, movements and assemblies represent not only real democracy, but also a far more elaborate freedom than the neoliberal conception of freedom.
5. Offer a real affirmative alternative to neoliberalism. That is, offer, a social order where freedom is a real possibility for all, concrete in space, alive over time, beyond the resistance to a particular issue or the occupation of a given square. Because we must remember that even when these movements succeed in obtaining a concession or some change, even when they caused the fall of a dictator, they ultimately failed -at least in the short term- to bring forth the society they hoped, that which they tried to emulate in their movement, debates, values, methods, and goals.

The question I have started with, and later abandoned, was how can we reconcile a personal project of self-construction, of life as an adventure in the world, with a social and political project of collective emancipation, of liberation of all of humanity?

The two sides of this question, self-construction and collective emancipation, are oftentimes in tension. In fact, in our neoliberal system, they are nearly impossible to coexist. However, reconciling and developing them together is possible in another social order.

Emancipation for all humanity is a social, moral and political is not merely an idea, it is also project that here differs from previous emancipatory projects in that it does not defend a single cause or group but is rather inclusive of all humanity. It also differs in that it does not see a violent revolutionary moment with the destruction of the state and the seizure of political power as a prerequisite for collective emancipation. Instead, this project combines a revolution in consciousness, in thoughts and feelings, with social transformation. It is a piecemeal revolution in the structures of society and of culture that supports antagonistic reformism in addition to resistance, democratic anti and extra institutional politics, and projects of libertarian self-government through the Common. As a political project, it attends to organization and decision making, but it develops these in ways only compatible with the ends it seeks which is a society free from all forms of authority, hierarchy, oppression and domination. Lenin's model of organization and decision making is efficacious, but denatures the goal of revolution; a free society. In contrast, what we aim for aligns means and ends, and is far harder to achieve; the praxis of bottom up politics with its horizontality, consensus, cooperation, and solidarity. Such praxis is an end in itself as much as a means in so far as these experiments of democratic life prepares the grounds, minds and sensibilities, for a social reality too far away from what exists, our system here and now. These practices help the members of groups, movements and societies in their individual projects of self-construction. Because in such project, they must deal with mutilation¹ and mummification². (Unger, 2014).

Self-construction is an existential and moral project of a being who is contingent that is it to say whose existence is not necessary; ever one of us possibly could never have existed. Such being is thus unfounded, her existence is 'contingente', 'gratuite', 'là pour rien', 'de trop'. (Sartre, 1943. p.120) The idea of self-construction is that that contingent being whose existence precedes her essence, who is thrown into the world undefined, is nevertheless (the only being) capable of defining herself, and only through her actions.

1. Mutilation is the necessity of choosing one course of life over all possible others that are available to a human being at birth. In taking a particular path in order to become someone in particular, we renounce all the other selves that we could become. Yet there is never enough evidence for such a grave choice of one version of the self over all others. But it must be made. Since if we do not make it then it will be made for us. The only question therefore is whether we make it implicitly and in confusion or explicitly and consciously. Even in the latter, the better case, it is experienced as a kind of mutilation. (Unger, 2014. p.397-405). While this thesis does not discuss work/labor, it is hoped that in a future free society, where the strict division of labor is gone, the polymorphic worker would then be less mutilated. Meanwhile, sympathy, that is, imagining the movements of the cut of limbs through others' lives (so different from mine -not only in work, but also class, culture, traditions...etc. and yet lives I could have had in other circumstances) is one way to deal with my inescapable mutilation.

2. Mummification is the formation of a "shell of routine and compromise" through both our "habitual surrender to the routines of social circumstance as well as the hardened version of our self: the character". The mummy is therefore made through the accumulation of the routines of our social roles and the unexamined "habits of mind and behaviors". Within this mummy "we die many small deaths" (Unger, 2014. p.194 & p.405-409) when our aim should be to die only once. Putting the self in situations of intense vulnerability is one way to prevent mummification. Mummies are not only unfree, but feel no need to be free; they pursue neither emancipation nor revolution. It is thus the task of left militants-thinkers to prevent the mummification processes in society.

Being is thus a project, rather than an inherited identity. She is neither defined by her accident of birth nor encapsulated by her given circumstance. She has a choice of becoming, and her choice of a particular self within a moral framework in total solitude³ and total responsibility defines her being ontologically as freedom.

Nevertheless, before freedom even matures and begins this life work of self-construction, that being faces, upon her birth, the whole weight of history. This is the practico-inert⁴. Freedom is therefore always in situation. A being's circumstance of class, family, religion, nation, culture, political regime and so on, all challenge her freedom. Because freedom is always concrete. Even what she has chosen hitherto freely then comes back later to haunt her as practico-inert :

"Nous concevons sans difficulté qu'un homme, encore que sa situation le conditionne totalement, puisse être un centre d'indétermination irréductible. Ce secteur d'imprévisibilité qui se découpe ainsi dans le champ social, c'est ce que nous nommons la liberté et la personne n'est rien d'autre que sa liberté. Cette liberté, il ne faut pas l'envisager comme un pouvoir métaphysique de la «nature» humaine et ce n'est pas non plus la licence de faire ce qu'on veut, ni je ne sais quel refuge intérieur qui nous resterait jusque dans les chaînes. On ne fait pas ce qu'on veut et cependant on est responsable de ce qu'on est: voilà le fait; l'homme qui s'explique simultanément partant de causes est pourtant seul à porter le poids de soi-même. En ce sens, la liberté pourrait passer pour une malédiction, elle *est* une malédiction. Mais c'est aussi l'unique source de la grandeur humaine."

(Sartre, 1948. p.27).

What then are the conditions of possibility to wrestle back her freedom each time it gets frozen into inert social structures, not as a pure abstraction, an unlimited will or power, but as a creation within these constraints?

Taking responsibility into what one is born into so that one can reappropriate it, attribute to it their personal meaning, eventually transform it with others, through commitment to a vision of how human life should be, in love and work, through resistance to all forms of domination, and struggles with all those seeking emancipation, through everyday connections and the construction of a mode of social organization that approximates, if not embodies, her ideal of how human life should be. Of humanity as an end.

The reconciliation of the moral or existential project of self-construction with the political project of human emancipation may ultimately occur in the collective history of humanity, beyond the biographical time of our ephemeral lives. But for it to ever take place, it must begin within personal lives. Sartre's morality of personal commitment, his morality of history and his morality of hope converge here: We have only one life, and the facts, the empirical grounds, upon which we decide to commit it in one way or another are never sufficient relative to the gravity of this commitment. Morality then is freedom in commitment within a context, despite uncertainties, likely struggles, and against the odds of a success in the short or medium term (of say, the emancipation of the Multitude from wage slavery, or saving the planet from destruction). A commitment to some universal ideal in a particular situation. A universal always in creation. It is a commitment to life beyond my own life. A commitment to persevere in face of failures, and (the almost) certainty of dying before seeing the

3. You are the only decider about what matters most to you. This point is central to understand the early Sartre conception of freedom (individual). No philosophy or religion or person can give you an answer. And whatever answer you take from these sources (or elsewhere) is the one you have sought and picked (among many sources and many possible answers), subject to your understanding and to your interpretation. See Sartre, 1946.

4. By this, Sartre means everything that was freely chosen by the subject that then comes back to limit her own freedom (Sartre, 2005. p.671) as well as "l'activité des autres en tant qu'elle est soutenue et déviée par l'inertie inorganique." (Sartre, 1985. p.547)

result of one's commitment for collective emancipation.

In Sartre's morality of history, commitment as ethics starts from the facts of the historical conjecture of the particular world where the agent happens to find herself. Today, for instance, it could be the enormous and widening divisions between humanity, between a tiny oligarchy and billions of people in misery. From there, the agent takes a position for freedom in situation, in support of the weak, the victim, the oppressed such that in her particular struggles here and there. Her universal ideal of human emancipation is concretized everyday in a particular situation. Since freedom is only in situation, the point of departure is always a particular problem, never a universal value since this can only be apprehended in action. This is why, for Sartre, all the moral questions have come to signify the political question and the latter is (for him) to be found at the level of 'action des masses'. (Beauvoir, 1981. p.41) and its goal is to create a moral society. For this reason for which he supported the Maos in France. (Sartre, 1976. p-38-47). In political actions against exploitation such as in mass strikes, occupations of factories and sequestrations of managers by workers, we find this: "affirmation concrète de la liberté du travail : cela montre que cette aspiration à la liberté n'a rien d'idéaliste et qu'elle trouve toujours sa source dans les conditions concrètes et matérielles de la production, ce qui n'empêche qu'elle représente en chaque cas pour les travailleurs un effort pour constituer une société morale, c'est-à-dire où l'homme, désaliéné, puisse se trouver lui-même dans ses vrais rapports avec le groupe." (Sartre, 1976. p.46).

The reconciliation between the 2 parts of my question remains almost impossible today within a human life⁵ unless both -the personal and the political- projects designates a dimension of freedom⁶, and each dimension is a complementary to the other. This is how I will take them to be in this work.

It is impossible because the moral project of self-construction requires particular kinds of social structures, some form of social organization without domination, a collective life, a community in order for it to unfold. Such community is still absent; with some exceptions (which are under pressure). For the consensual conception of freedom today opposes and limits that of each individual by the other's rather than seeing them as complementary, enlarging, affirming and consolidating each other's freedom as would be in a real free community. One purpose of this work is to show the latter conception has been a real possibility in history. Also, it is found today in various movements, groups, revolutionary and emancipatory politics. But they are ephemeral. The idea of freedom in the Common attempts to overcome this evanescence. Because as long as this real possibility of social freedom is not existent for a person, their project of self-construction is unlikely.

The new problem has thus eliminated the reconciliation of the two. It has become what is meant by freedom as multidimensional concept? What makes a person (un)free? What makes a group praxis or a social movement free? What is social freedom? What kind of community enhances that of each of its member's freedom, rather than managing each one's freedom as a separate individual unit pitted against one another?

5.Though it probably is possible within the collective life of humanity, that is, in historical time. But this impossibility of reconciliation of both projects in a human life makes self-reconstruction the wrong point of departure.

6.For instance, the personal dimension as a commitment. And the social or political dimension of freedom as emancipatory or revolutionary politics.

To state the same idea in other words, we start not from 2 separate projects, but immediately outside the prison of the rigidified self (the mummy). Life as series of adventures in the world. We try to transform society (freedom as commitment), and we fail. But it is only through these failures, we transform ourselves, and we discover ourselves greater and we give reality the transcendence of our agency over any particular context. This transformation of the self may be argued as a transformation of the world. But regardless whether it is or not, it seems to be the way our individual existence is not an isolated event, but can be -through the commitment we have chosen to some particular problem- related to and in a fraternity with many others before us and after we are gone who were or will committed to that same particular problem, and to human emancipation in general.

"Sartre is capable of holding two apparently contradictory opinions simultaneously, and that there is no need to posit a volte-face over time to explain such divergences. What appears to common-sense, analytic, binary reason as paradox, self-contradiction or aporia may be recognized as the heterogeneity of different levels of truth and meaning potentially susceptible to totalization in the light of dialectical reason." (Howells, 1988. p.94-95)

Method:

The dominant analytic method consists in breaking down complex structures and conceptions into their components through reason. For instance, the analytic⁷ reasoning, in attempting to answer a question, may analyze it carefully, oppose the available answers to each others and choose one. The analytic method is valuable as Sartre himself has noted in *Questions de Méthode*, having contributed to the liberation of humans from traditional authorities. However, it has a number of shortcomings:

1. It seeks a set of timeless features to characterize a phenomenon; holding these as necessary and sufficient conditions⁸.
2. It is unable to hold contradictions. It uses 'either', 'or' rather than 'both', 'and' as in the dialectical method which is able to hold several contradictory views/theories when it sees there is some truth in each.
3. It studies the phenomena from outside; the researcher influence by her milieu and the objects of her study is unaccounted for : "l'erreur des « philosophes » avait été de croire qu'on pouvait directement appliquer la méthode universelle (et analytique) à la société où l'on vit alors que justement ils y vivaient et qu'elle les conditionnait historiquement en sorte que les préjugés de son idéologie se glissaient dans leur recherche positive et leur volonté même de les combattre. Là raison de cette erreurest claire : ils étaient des intellectuels organiques travaillant pour la classe même qui les avait produits et leur universalité n'était autre que la fausse universalité de la classe bourgeoise qui se prenait pour la classe universelle. Aussi quand ils cherchaient l'homme, ils n'atteignaient que le bourgeois. La véritable recherche intellectuelle, si elle veut délivrer la vérité des mythes qui l'obscurcissent, implique un passage de l'enquête par la singularité de l'enquêteur. Celui-ci a besoin de se situer dans l'univers social pour saisir et détruire en lui et hors de lui les limites que l'idéologie prescrit au savoir. C'est au niveau de la situation que la dialectique [...] peut agir, la pensée de l'intellectuel doit se retourner sans cesse sur elle-même pour se saisir toujours comme universalité singulière, c'est-à-dire singularisée secrètement par les préjugés de classe inculqués dès l'enfance alors même qu'elle croit s'en être débarrassée et avoir rejoint l'universel." (Sartre, 1972. p.47-48). So we do not believe it is possible to have a position of abstract universality or to be neutral on the moral, political and social questions we study. Our views necessary influence our objects of study, what we choose to look at, and how. And if we attempt to suppress them, they will still come out, perhaps in a more distorted form. It is better to acknowledge this situation, even if we cannot transform it; at least keep it out in the open. And if possible, to weed out the prejudices before arguing for what remains of our

7. An example showing the strength and weakness of analytical reasoning is Cassegrin's thesis on anarchism (2015). He proceeds by contrasting anarchism to all other ideologies in order to seek a single distinctive feature of anarchism. He eliminates one by one the aspects that we find in anarchism and other ideologies like a conception of human nature, of social justice...etc. The result is defining anarchism wholly through the single negative aspect of anti-authority. While we agree that anti-authority is fundamental to anarchism, it cannot on its own define anarchism. What defines an ideology is never a single concept or value, but rather a dynamic interaction of several concepts together. It would have been good if the social and political fields were as simple, distinct and clear as analytical reasoning shows them. But human affairs are unfortunately anything but clear, distinct and simple. Our theoretical work must reflect this complexity.

8. In contrast to the dynamism of the dialectical method, in which the change or transformation of one part immediately influences all the related parts.

believes.

4. Its logic of atomization makes it hardly adequate to study interlocked, intersecting, overlapping concepts such as race-class-patriarchy-imperialism or social freedom or exploitation-domination or highly contested concepts like revolution. For Sartre, analytical reason 's'applique aux relations en extériorité' while dialectical reason "tire son intelligibilité des totalités et [...] régit le rapport des tous à leurs parties et des totalités entre elles à l'intérieur d'une intégration toujours plus serrée."(Sartre, 1985. P. 175)

Some general features of the analytical method such as conceptual clarity, systematic rigor and deconstestation as well as the argumentative process remain valuable for this study.

Others such as the emphasize on the importance of reason is defended so long as reason is seen as a goal to aim for in human affairs. But the presupposition that reason guides human affairs; that reasoning is how society or politics actually work is rejected. For humans rarely ever determine their goals with reason. But rather use reason as means to the ends they have decided through desires, passions, impulses, hopes and so on. In other words, we agree with Hume that reason is the slave of passions, (Russell, 1992) though we disagree with him that it ought to be so. Our theories should aim at a more reasonable social and political order, but (unfortunately) they cannot assume a central⁹ role for reason in designing or attempting to realize such order. Because, as a glimpse in the news would confirm, reason does not determine human goals even though it has other important roles in ethics and politics, like clarifying ends, and resolving or at least negotiating conflictual ends or desires.

It is this idea about the roles of reason and passions that lead us to take a considerable distance from ideal theories which often are based on the assumption of humans as rational agents who choose through reason. Ideal theory work may be useful for instance as thought experiments, but overall less crucial to social organization than non ideal theories; in particular if you believe that we should start from our current objective situation rather than from a hypothetical situation such as in Rawls' theory of justice.

Others features of the analytical method such as seeking a fixed meaning independent of context or failing to acknowledge the dependence of the meaning of a concept on other concepts or refusing indeterminacy are also rejected.¹⁰ Attempting to be as parsimonious as possible is one thing; sacrificing the complexity of something to keep my account of it logically coherent is another. Thus I use the analytical tools and method only when they fit my purposes. But whenever possible, I prefer the dialectical method which attempts to grasp parts in relation to each other and to the whole. The dialectical method comes from Hegel through Marx to Sartre, our main thinker-militant for this study. In fact, Sartre's epistemology is founded on the 'truth of quantum physics' (Sartre, 1985) that the scientist is part of his experimental system. The consequences of this are paramount. For they lead us to discard idealistic illusions (such as a context-independent universal rationality) and take into

9. Recognition of reason as a universal is, however, essential -but only in theory as a background moral aspiration. In practice, you should suppose its role is and will be too marginal relative to the more fallible and all too human impulses, desires and passions...etc. When you are riding a bike in Paris, you assume reason as a universal human attribute, and you hope for (more) reason, but anticipate everything unreasonable; so you act as if reason is (almost) non-existent. Otherwise, big trouble! And so should our attitude be in practical politics, and in thinking about it. This is because human reason is often subdued by their instinctive animality. Personally, the moral approach we take towards this is dialectical: to recognize the universal in a human being, that is her transcendental being, we must recognize her through her animality. To see her as a universal reason is to see an abstraction; to dehumanize her. On the other hand, seeing her just as an organism responding to needs, instincts and desires is belittling her to subhumanity.

10. For the difference between indeterminacy as sometimes an unavoidable part of our concepts and ambiguity which is possible to overcome, see Freeden, 2005. For a general critique of the analytical method, see Freeden, 1998.

account our ideological colors as theorists. Because we are also full of contradictions, like everyone else. No one can easily escape or overcome this situation, including philosophers. So the right attitude towards this situation is neither to ignore it nor to deny it, but to work with these contradictions; to use their tension as a fecund source. The dialectical method precisely takes such work as its goal. In addition, this realism leads the thinker to experiments, to praxis, to being involved as the only way to understand what she is studying (just like the scientist). And this is also a distinction of the dialectical method for Sartre (and for Marx) which does not see theory and practice as separate. Surely, reflections on the practice illuminate it and may lead to improvement or at least to avoiding past mistakes. For theory seeks patterns. And thinking is able to capture far wider of these patterns than the limited possible experiences of a single short fragile human life. But practice with its variety of experiences is a condition for theoretical breakthrough; indeed existence with its concrete problems, is the raw material of thought. This is where the philosophy of existence joins Marxism as a way of studying humans situated within classes, structures, institutions, society and historical movement, but still never completely determined by them: "le principe méthodologique qui fait commencer la certitude avec la réflexion ne contredit nullement le principe anthropologique qui définit la personne concrète par sa matérialité. La réflexion, pour nous, ne se réduit pas à la simple immanence du subjectivisme idéaliste : elle n'est un départ que si elle nous rejette aussitôt parmi les choses et les hommes, dans le monde...ce réalisme implique nécessairement un point de départ réflexif, le dévoilement d'une situation se fait dans et par la praxis qui la change." (Sartre, 1985. p.30). For Sartre, practice-theory develop dialectically.

Let us now illustrate why the dialectical method is preferred in this work.

The conception of freedom proposed in this thesis can only be understood through the dialectical method. For instance, a free agent facing persecution from the state may join others facing similar situation in a group to rebel against the state. We see the dialectic of a freedom oppressed that finds itself alive in a commitment to a form of emancipatory politics. Then within the group, freedom is enlarged as each member supports or helps others, but freedom may often disintegrate if the group is dissolved once it has achieved its goal or through some other actions by the state (violent dispersion, elections, imprisonment, murder). For Sartre, it is impossible to understand freedom without the dialectical method. Because one is not free without commitment and yet commitment turns into practico-inert (unfreedom)."

To take another example, is the aim of revolution a transformation of consciousness or a radical change in the structures of society? Rimbaud and Marx exemplified this debate. "'Changez la vie' disait Rimbaud. 'Changez le monde' disait Marx." (Sartre, 1952. P. 383.) The dialectical method resists the temptation to solve the question by affirming that veracity exists just on one side, i.e. choose whether the revolutionary should change life or change society. It rather focuses on developing the strengths and weaknesses of each thesis through their clash,

11. "La liberté est un développement dialectique complet et nous avons vu comment elle s'aliène ou s'enlise ou se laisse voler par les pièges de l'Autre." (Sartre, 1985. p.564). *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* instantiates this dialectic of freedom. But it was during an interview that Sartre put this dialectic in the simplest of terms; speaking of his own freedom as commitment: "La liberté se transformant en engagement et l'engagement se transformant en practico-inerte : c'est ce que j'ai voulu, c'est ce que je n'ai pas voulu, c'est ce que je dois vouloir : tout cela revient au même. Sans doute finit-on par devenir un bloc de ciment un peu avant de mourir. Mais je ne pense pas qu'il y ait d'autre solution : si vraiment on s'engage dans une entreprise, on devient de plus en plus celui qui est défini par ce qu'il a fait, on est pris par de plus en plus de côtés différents par des générations qui changent. Il y a une certaine personnalité Sartre qui existe pour les autres, qui varie, qui change et qui cependant me conditionne parce que je dois l'assumer. Car je dois aussi bien assumer ce que je suis pour des amis du Mali ou de Cuba que ce que je suis pour le Nouveau Roman par exemple. Je dois toujours tout prendre. Du moment que la liberté, c'est l'engagement, la finalité de l'engagement, c'est la disparition de la liberté. Seulement, entre-temps, se sera accomplie une vie." (Sartre, 2005. p.671)

rather than choosing one as right and throwing away the other as wrong. This method thus recognizes the strengths that may be present even in the weaker thesis, and may opt for a final synthesis between them or keep them in tension with each other, using them as a real contradiction present to illuminate the revolutionary processes and perhaps yet other contradictions.

In his *Carnets de la drôle de guerre*, Sartre starts reflecting on the relationship between morality and history: "L'histoire implique la morale (sans conversion universelle, pas de sens à l'évolution ou aux revolutions). La morale implique l'Histoire (pas de moralité possible sans action systématique sur la situation)." (Sartre, 1995, P.487). A problem he will take later on as we will see. One of the difficulties that the dialectical method addresses is that morality and history not only constitute and presuppose each other, as Sartre notes. But also oppose each other, as when some ideal or universal value is suppressed in a historical conjecture by some authority. And yet such repressed value could come in a different form, merge with another value or it could develop underground. Or this situation could lead to a tension with the force repressing it. Such tension may lead both forces to develop new strategies in parallel, to become even more radical. It could lead to a clash where one side annihilate the other or to a synthesis where the authority becomes less repressive allowing that ideal to develop freely. Indeed, it is one of the characteristics of a winning ideology to allow some form of constestation against it. In the so-called liberal democracies, such protest is allowed so long as it does not go after the real foundation of unjust society. When this happens all the tolerance and liberal values are quickly forgotten and repression is back with vengeance.

So dialectical reasoning show us how divergence of views may coexist, how things may not be mutually exclusive, but even in opposition, they may help developing each others. Later in this work we see that acknowledging the contradictions in one's personal situation and attempting to overcome them is at the basis of freedom as commitment. Similarly, attempting to live the contradictions inherent to the human condition, are discussed as another source of freedom as commitment.

For instance in *Black Orpheus* (Sartre, 1949), Sartre shows how a historical dialectical movement may unfold by the clash of the ideas and forces between white supremacy/racism and negritude as a celebration of black culture. He takes white supremacy as the thesis and negritude as the antithesis. However, he says that this negative moment of negritude -in its resistance- is not an end in itself. Negritude as racial pride is a means to counter the violence of white supremacy. But it is not sufficient to counter racism with negritude, but rather use it as a bridge to some higher ideal. Because the aim is the realization of a human being in raceless society where negritude destroys itself and white supremacy in this dialectical movement, creating integral humanity.¹² (Sartre, 2015) For even in world with no racism at all, it will still be absurd to distinguish humans by race. This concept is a concept that should disappear. The same goes for gender and class...etc.¹³ Which means that our politics should only work in the direction of creating a world that recognizes and gives an essential place to the attribute of transcendence in every agent. A politics that resists any world which denies this ability of going beyond context, social role and identity.

In others words, the ultimate aim is to abolish all inherited, externally defined (not by the subject herself)

12. This concept comes much later in Sartre's *Morality*; notably in the Rome lecture of 1964 (Sartre, 2015) to which we will return.

13. But for these to disappear (and to recognize the suffering from their existence), we must first recognize them.

identities. Affirming identities of each is important as recognition. But this recognition of difference and of identities should only be the beginning rather than the end of an emancipatory politics. This work is therefore opposed to the views that make identities and their recognition in their difference the end of politics. For instance, recognizing the proletarian identity in Marx's time is important as a beginning, in order to recognize their exploitation and alienation as well as their potential as revolutionary subjectivity. But the end is the destruction of the social order that make such alienated and hierarchical identities (proletariat and bourgeoisie for that matter) possible. And in the destruction of that social order to abolish all unfree, assigned, imposed, suffered identities (beyond the class identities of proletariat and bourgeoisie). The end is also the creation of a social order where *each agent has the possibility to define their own identity, and where no identity dominates another*. It is in this recognition of inherited identities then the destruction of the order that makes them and the creation of a new one where identities are future projects that we have a politics of emancipation.

Thus dialectical method can be generalized as follows. In the theory and praxis of freedom, there is a first moment of affirmation of the identity. This is when the subject says: 'this is who I am'. Identity recognition again is essential. But this is merely the beginning of a quest of freedom to overcome it. Because then comes the question of whether this particular recognized identity is really who they think they are and want to be or just what they have been made into, and through no choice of their own, by society, education and circumstance. Thus the next moment in freedom is a relation of mutual recognition where inquiry, research, and the open endedness of self-construction are possible. This process may then lead the agent to discover that they are capable of far more than they thought themselves capable of, and to have their identity based on their projects. Their identity becoming their own creation. And yet for this to happen some form of recognition¹⁴ is an essential a priori. It is for each subject to figure out how to carry that open ended work. One proposal (we make later in this work) is that of commitment (ethical freedom), whereby a project is defined and carried to face the contradictions of the self and/or of the human conditions. Another is revolutionary or emancipatory politics, whereby the agent cooperates with others who share a common goal. Thus contributing to making a vision of the world she has a reality. Whatever the project that the agent chooses, there is a discovery of the self through praxis. The third moment is one of synthesis between the inherited self and the created self, between the conditioned and the free.

Make no mistake, by aiming for a politics and for societies that go beyond these concepts, I am not advocating erasing differences between humans, such as speaking the same language or believing the same things. Rather, my point is not to be defined or classified by whatever is inherited, not to be attributed a role or a station from the outside, but rather to define oneself by the project, the choices, and the desires of the agent. Self-construction. These differences, therefore, should exist politically as a specializations and experiments at the level of humanity.

Beyond negritude, we could think of countless other examples of the dialectics in history. In fact, all of history may be seen as "le combat rigoureux entre la liberté et le pratico-inerte" (Sartre, 2015. p.38). For instance, in the

14. The supreme form of recognition is in love, where the radical and unconditional acceptance of the other as she is makes it possible for her to explore, to take risks, to change and even undergo transformative experiences in the adventures of self-discovery and self-construction; being grounded in the world through love. The loved (and the lover in what can only be a reciprocity), within this safe zone of unconditionality, becomes freer to be what she can or desires to become. What we hope for is a society where diluted forms of love are developed and widely diffused.

national liberation movements against colonial powers, colonialism would be the thesis and the movement towards independence to becoming a nation-state is the antithesis. But the negative moment of national liberation is insufficient as an end, because an independent nation-state is merely a lesser evil than a colony subjugated to an Empire. The aim is an emancipation for all humanity and not parts of humanity defined through opposition to other parts. So the liberation movement should not stop there, but carry on its struggle against oppression within (in society; caste system, patriarchy...etc.) and beyond its borders (for instance in solidarity with other emancipatory movements in the world). This makes that movement a crossing into a humanity that should not remain so arbitrarily divided; where states and nationalities are no more.

Another reason for choosing the dialectical method is the dominance of the analytical in our field which leads many to overlook other methods that may be useful to their work, even if only as a supplement to the analytical method.

It is useful to simplify complex problems to their components in order to better understand them. But doing so may change the nature of the problem. Sometimes, a better understanding comes from keeping the complexity intact, and looking at the opposing internal dimensions of a problem as a whole. This applies for instance to a problem as complex as poverty. Someone may define poverty as a billionaire that always wants more. Another may reply that it is the opposite, poverty is not having enough of the basic necessities of life. Both are correct in their definition, because each is looking at an important dimension of life, the spiritual or moral and the biological or material. Greed and need.

And both kinds of poverty should be understood by political theorists in their attempt to find ways to address poverty. But the point is that keeping these 2 kinds together brings an understanding that tackling poverty as just one of them does not. In other words, some of the ways for overcoming material poverty make a person poor spiritually or morally (for instance if that person overcomes poverty through a job that is boring and does not engage their capabilities. Or through a job that exploits others.) Hence, it is not sufficient to tackle the problem of material poverty on its own (in order to address it adequately; in the sense we aim for in this work), but along with other kinds of poverty. As a consequence, some complex problems must be tackled in their complexity, without dividing them into kinds or components, and assigning each part a different solution or a field of expertise to deal with it.

The attempt of the social sciences to emulate the natural sciences does have some benefits. The point is that it also has important problems. Because the complexity of a natural science problem does not begin to approximate that of a human society where general laws, theorems, regularities, equations, algorithms almost never apply. Further to the point, sometimes the essential in an individual life or a social group reside in something so ephemeral, so unpredictable, that it is impossible to capture that essential analytically. Improvisation, surprise and innovation are the signs of life. In a word, the difficulty we face in theorizing about human life and society is precisely freedom, as opposed to determinism, habit or tradition: a revolution in society and politics or love within a personal life or a moral invention, as Sartre would call a choice of moral behavior in a given situation.¹⁵ All these are ruptures, hard to capture in theory with their wide ranging effects,

¹⁵.He meant that no philosophy or religion could answer what is the moral thing to do in a given situation. Hence, invention is the key to morality. We will discuss later the example Sartre gives of one of his students asking for advice.

and yet so essential that even if our theory has everything else and misses them, it would have missed so much. This is why a philosopher like Badiou makes these exceptional occurrences the center of his work. In political theory, the supreme value -for an individual or a group- could be found in moments that escape our studies. Being aware of this could at least help us, if such moment escape us, to take this fact into account when trying to understand patterns, rules, and norms.

The dialectical method acknowledges that some of the fundamental attributes of the human condition that should be taken into account for any normative work are contradictory. For instance, the solitary and social dimensions in all of us. In attempting to change a society, we need to understand the conception this society has of what a human being is. And since the analytical conception is, on its own, inadequate to guide us, it must be changed as well. For when it starts with universal rights (prior to our historical situation, prior to politics), it conceives a certain immutable quality of every human regardless of her particularities and her circumstance.¹⁶ It is understandable why some want to place such rights above and beyond history and all human intervention. But it simply does not work. Having the UN Charter as a foundation for the society of nations does nothing to prevent anyone (including the little weak dictators and other non-state actors) to violate every article of it. Instead, one should have the aim (distant as it is) as universality, not the point of departure. And make it clear that this universality has nothing of an inevitable; it is always a process in the making, always on the line in history. In our projects, policies, and treaties it will become or not. Certainly this analytical conception has had a good consequences since it contributed to the collapse of castes and the feudal values and thus abolished an abhorrently repressive system. But then the bourgeoisie never realized that since it has destroyed the ancient myths justifying cruelty and has taken power, it no longer represents the universal cause of emancipation (i.e. emancipation of all), but has become the main reactionary force preventing the continuation of its unfolding: "Après cent cinquante ans [221 since Sartre wrote this in 1948], l'esprit d'analyse reste la doctrine officielle de la démocratie bourgeoise, seulement il est devenu arme défensive. La bourgeoisie a tout intérêt à s'aveugler sur les classes comme autrefois sur la réalité synthétique des institutions d'Ancien Régime. Elle persiste à ne voir que des hommes, à proclamer l'identité de la nature humaine à travers toutes les variétés de situation : mais c'est contre le prolétariat qu'elle le proclame. Un ouvrier, pour elle, est d'abord un homme --un homme comme les autres. Si la Constitution accorde à cet homme le droit de vote et la liberté d'opinion, il manifeste sa nature humaine autant qu'un bourgeois[...] on se constitue bourgeois en faisant choix, une fois pour toutes, d'une certaine vision du monde analytique qu'on tente d'imposer à tous les hommes et qui exclut la perception des réalités collectives. Ainsi, la défense bourgeoise est bien en un sens permanente, et elle ne fait qu'un avec la

16."il y eut une nature immuable de l'homme. L'homme était l'homme comme le cercle était le cercle : une fois pour toutes; l'individu, qu'il fût transporté sur le trône ou plongé dans la misère, demeurerait foncièrement identique à lui-même parce qu'il était conçu sur le modèle de l'atome d'oxygène, qui peut se combiner avec l'hydrogène pour faire de l'eau, avec l'azote pour faire de l'air, sans que sa structure interne en soit changée. Ces principes ont présidé à la Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme. Dans la société que conçoit l'esprit d'analyse, l'individu, particule solide et indécomposable, véhicule de la nature humaine, réside comme un petit pois dans une boîte de petits pois : il est tout rond, fermé sur soi, incommunicable. Tous les hommes sont égaux : il faut entendre qu'ils participent tous également à l'essence d'homme. Tous les hommes sont frères : la fraternité est un lien passif entre molécules distinctes, qui tient la place d'une solidarité d'action ou de classe que l'esprit d'analyse ne peut même pas concevoir. C'est une relation tout extérieure et purement sentimentale qui masque la simple juxtaposition des individus dans la société analytique. Tous les hommes sont libres : libres d'être hommes, cela va sans dire. Ce qui signifie que l'action du politique doit être toute négative : il n'a pas à faire la nature humaine; il suffit qu'il écarte les obstacles qui pourraient l'empêcher de s'épanouir. Ainsi, désireuse de ruiner le droit divin, le droit de la naissance et du sang, le droit d'ainesse, tous ces droits qui se fondaient sur l'idée qu'il y a des différences de nature entre les hommes, la bourgeoisie a confondu sa cause avec celle de l'analyse et construit à son usage le mythe de l'universel." (Sartre, 1948. p.17-18)

bourgeoisie elle-même." But this universality is not often presented as reactionary force imposed on everyone. To the contrary, as figures like Bill Gates (the most philanthropic person in history) show, it is a cunning defense of the status quo that is not manifest as such, but rather "à l'intérieur du monde qu'elle s'est construit, il y a place pour des vertus d'insouciance, d'altruisme et même de générosité." The problem is that this altruism on its own cannot reconstitute a society of free and equal beings in relations of reciprocity with each others. And yet it is only in such society would every human being would be properly universal as the votaries of the analytical method would want: "seulement les bienfaits bourgeois sont des actes individuels qui s'adressent à la nature humaine universelle en tant qu'elle s'incarne dans un individu. En ce sens, ils ont autant d'efficacité qu'une habile propagande, car le titulaire des bienfaits est contraint de les recevoir comme on les lui propose, c'est-à-dire en se pensant comme une créature humaine isolée en face d'une autre créature humaine. La charité bourgeoise entretient le mythe de la fraternité." (Sartre, 1948 p.18-19) Hence, the point of rejecting the analytical method as the definitive one, and using the dialectical method to change both society and theory: "nous nous rangeons du côté de ceux qui veulent changer à la fois la condition sociale de l'homme et la conception qu'il a de lui-même." (Sartre, 1948. p.16). Instead of the analytical conception of a human being, Sartre proposes 'une conception totalitaire' (Sartre, 1948. p.17) which has nothing to do with Arendt use of the term since Sartre is talking about an individual and not a state or any kind of structure. Such totalitarian conception has a synthetic view of reality in that its principle is that the whole, whatever is it, remains different from the sum of its parts: "Pour nous, ce que les hommes ont en commun, ce n'est pas une nature, c'est une condition métaphysique : et par là, nous entendons l'ensemble des contraintes qui les limitent a priori, la nécessité de naître et de mourir, celle d'être fini et d'exister dans le monde au milieu d'autres hommes. Pour le reste, ils constituent des totalités indécomposables, dont les idées, les humeurs et les actes sont des structures secondaires et dépendantes, et dont le caractère essentiel est d'être situées et ils diffèrent entre eux comme leurs situations diffèrent entre elles. L'unité de ces tous signifiants est le sens qu'ils manifestent." (Sartre, 1948. p.22) In taking this totalitarian or more comprehensive view, the dialectical method attacks the distinction between the 'is' and the 'ought'. Such distinction between the descriptive and the prescriptive makes sense whenever we are making a localized or episodic evaluations, but begins to collapse as our view becomes more comprehensive. A view of how to live must be inspired by a conception of who we are, and what we can become. And a conception of who we are must have implications for our view of how to live.

Introduction:

The study of freedom in the context of contemporary political theory:

Thinking about freedom in this work differs from contemporary political theory. The reason for this is that I follow an alternative model of the practice of political theory. To ground this model, a short inquiry about the nature and purpose of political theory.

One way to read political theory is to imagine the field as divided into 2 camps. One of theorists for whom our task is to change the world which means a fundamental transformation of social organization, the economy, politics, and international relations. And another camp for whom we must merely try and prevent the world from getting worse which is to say keeping it pretty much as it is which is to say on the model of a liberal parliamentary democracy -with private property, the market economy, profit, contractual relations, and the rule of law- and trying to reform it, to humanize it or to halt its degradation.

This classic dichotomy has been a source of conflict including that between Sartre and Camus¹⁷. Almost all the theorists we read at university courses belong to the latter camp. While all the main militants-theorists of this thesis (Sartre, Hardt, Negri, Unger and Badiou) belong to the former. They are thus a collection of outcasts. Furthermore, the 2 camps do not talk to each others. Naturally, as one can imagine they would not have nice things to tell. Being worlds apart, perhaps they would spent most of the time trying to clarify the meaning of the questions. Beyond these speculations, as a result of this unbridgeable chasm and the absence of links between these worlds, attempting to situate this work in relation to mainstream political theory has been challenging due to the absence of engagement between these 2 camps or secondary literature relating this marginal group with even the most studied theorists today.

I will present the work of these outcasts mainly as it relate to the question of freedom. Unfortunately, it will be far beyond the scope of this work to criticize their work, and show its contradictions, difficulties as well as the evolution of their positions over time, even on this very question.

For instance, Hardt and Negri reject socialism entirely. They do so because for them all socialism is of the centralized authoritarian statist variety. Also, Badiou¹⁸ sometimes oversimplify. For instance, he sees just one liberalism¹⁹; economic liberalism. And as he considers it the philosophy of capitalism, he takes it as the enemy. But such problems, incoherences and contradictions are found in every thinker. For instance, Rousseau had his libertarian²⁰ (*Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*) and authoritarian (*Social Contract*) moments. The same for Marx where only his early works like *The Philosophical and Economic Manuscripts* as well as some other later

17. For a detailed account of this conflict between them, see Aronson, 2004.

18. Badiou's politics is also focused in subjectivity and is just as revolutionary as Sartre's and Negri's with some crucial differences that relates to his complex philosophical system. Badiou distinguishes facts which describe the world as it is and events which are something of the miraculous in that they interrupt and transform, but are so rare. For him the profit seeking individual becomes a subject only once she has recognized an event, and has fidelity to it. In other words, subjectivity is a consequence, not a creator, of an event. For a review of Badiou's politics, see Hewlett, 2006, 2007.

19. I include thinkers as Russell, Dewey, and Humboldt in this study partly to show the great diversity of liberalisms and that many liberals have been anti-capitalist. Also, because these liberals' conceptions of freedom are relevant to ours. Thus liberalism and its idea of freedom cannot be used, as neoliberals do, to justify neoliberalism -- unless corrupted beyond recognition. For instance, Adam Smith had an ethical approach to economics which favored state intervention only when it was to the advantage of workers. For a review of this reading of Smith, see Werhane, 2006.

20. I use libertarian in its original 19th century meaning; an anti-statist socialist. Coined by the anarcho-communist poet Joseph Déjacque in his journal *La Libertaire, Journal du mouvement social*, the term has become equivalent to anarchist in the 19th century, and has thus indicated total opposition to private property. Libertarian is used nowadays to indicate the exact opposite; a right-wing proprietarian. See McKay, 2014. p.138. In this thesis, I will use libertarian as an umbrella term for all the *anti-authoritarian left-wing*, be they anarcho-communists, anarcho-syndicalists, social anarchists, libertarian socialists...etc.

writings like those on the Paris Commune are libertarian. Idem for the anarchists Proudhon, Bakunin, and Bookchin. The concern for these issues are warranted, but more in studies focused on the work of these thinkers. The purpose here is more to take whatever we see relevant and useful in their work (and ignore the rest) in order to advance our understanding of freedom. This is too partial, for sure. And it is one of the weaknesses of this thesis, but it is inevitable to keep its scope limited. In short, while we do not overlook the weaknesses in their work, we do not discuss them here in order to solely focus on their contribution to concrete freedom.

Unger notes that the right and left today promote shallow freedom and shallow equality respectively. He rejects both views. So do Hardt and Negri.²¹ The 'shallow' denotes precisely the acceptance of the current institutional framework, and working within it. Adding, that in the case of the left (he refers to statist social democrats), it prioritizes equality. And the right (he refers to political conservatives in general), prioritizes freedom. Both of the shallow kind.

In political theory, the typical votaries of shallow equality are the egalitarian theoreticians of justice. Having rejected all institutional transformation, and the current institutions supporting an extremely inegalitarian system, what remains is "the humanization of the inevitable"²²:the current structures of the market economy and the so-called democratic politics are to be made less savage. For this humanizing process, they fall back on after the fact corrective, redistributive and compensatory mechanisms of money transfer, taxation, and social entitlement programs. This focus on 'resources outcome rather than institutional arrangements' and 'equality rather than empowerment or greatness' (Unger, 2001) is from the perspective of freedom proposed here, indefensible. It lacks equality of respect and opportunity which are inherent to deep freedom. At the level of personal freedom, it lacks the key which the empowerment of the agent to be autonomous, to inquire and to create; opening up opportunities for her self-construction. It rather merely gives her the crumbs of the masters and keeps her alive in hard toil, wage slavery, job insecurity, and dependency on the state's compensatory redistribution which could be, and have been, weakened or annulled easily by some predatory capitalists taking power through elections. At the level of social freedom, money is an extremely weak social cement. It cannot build sympathy towards the least favored. It frustrates the giver and humiliates the receiver. It fails to hold a society together, especially a modern diverse society with less of the ethnic and culture homogeneity that had once made people sympathize with those who were (deemed) just like them. But in a large cosmopolitan country, they perceive high tax as an obligation to pay to those they do not know, and who seem so different from them. Such resentment can have serious electoral implications when populist right-wing figures use it for their agendas.

At best compensation and redistribution are insufficient. Only a form of direct engagement, through care and volunteering for instance, can lessen the apprehensions or fears of the other, and create the bonds of sympathy towards those who seem so different. And this is a prerequisite for a free society. Because such a society cannot be one divided into classes that ignore each other's lives, with each class having its interest and lobbying for them, and caring only for itself; competing against one another for resources and tearing the social and democratic fabric apart. A conception of the common -good, art, project, wounds and disasters- is indispensable

²¹ Negri and Hardt, 2017. p.xx

²² See Ch.1 in Roberto Unger and Cornel West, 1998. They are in agreement with Alain Badiou for whom « le triomphe du capitalisme mondialisé » also means « le déracinement total de l'idée même d'un autre chemin possible. » (Badiou, 2016b. P.22)

for a free society. Meetings open to all, common projects, recognition, friendships across all those real -and yet so illusionary- dividing lines are necessary to be free in a society. As Victor Hugo had reminded us, 'c'est par la fraternité qu'on sauve la liberté.' (Hugo, 1880-1889. p. 460) The work of going to meet with the other, listen to her pain, try to understand her thoughts and feelings, to hear her stories and see from her perspective. This work is an everyday work for everyone. It is laborious and demanding, but rewarding. And it is necessary to live in a free society, especially when it is multicultural. Money redistribution can never replace this work. Furthermore, compensatory redistribution alienates those who pay for people and things they do know little or nothing about. It concentrates too much power and bureaucracy in the state when it is precisely the opposite -that is, engagement from below in politics as we will see at the section on freedom as praxis- that makes us free. Through such praxis and experimentation with ideas and projects, we get to better know each others and the world, but also ourselves. We get to make informed decisions and try alternatives for future structures in the kind of society we want and choose together to inhabit. Based on this knowledge, we get to build²³ together step by step the structures and institutions that suits us, that respect and nourish our freedom. Instead of this, what mostly happens today is that we tacitly accept the subjection to some contract we have never seen nor signed, and a whole edifice of existing structures that keep us ruled by the dead (like the framers of the constitution).

Unger rejects deep equality which is prioritizing the equality of circumstance or outcome (Unger, 2014. p.317). Deep equality converges with shallow equality in according primacy to equality of circumstance, but diverges from it in rejecting the institutional arrangements of the market economy.

For him, only equality of respect and of opportunity should be guaranteed, but these are inherent to deep freedom. As for the market economy, he argues there are so many versions of it. Rejecting the current one does not lead him to reject all possible forms of market economy. (Unger, 2001. p.480-491)

What he proposes is deep freedom which combines an effort to lift up ordinary humanity with a program of institutional experimentation and reconstruction. In other words, it is a mixture of revolutionary reforms that brings immediate improvement in the lives of individuals and groups here and now as well as a long term project of radical transformation in the quality of the structures. (unger, 2014. p.290-340) Unger rejects contemporary progressives common assumption that all of the heresies that can be developed and applied against the universal orthodoxy should be local heresies. And according to this view, the local heresies are created from elements of the universal orthodoxy and variations of deviations required by the egalitarian commitments of the progressives and suitable only to the local context. Unger rejects this assumption. For him, a universal orthodoxy (and he is thinking of the dominant neoliberalism) can only be effectively combated and successfully replaced by universalizing heresies; such as liberalism and socialism were in the XIX century. In this, Unger shares the view of thinkers like J.S. Mill or Karl Marx --whose ideas he otherwise disagrees with-- that the content of the heresies, the believes about alternatives, should not in principle be restricted to any particular place. Mill and Marx have not presented their proposals to Britain and Germany, respectively, but to the world.

Unger's perspective is at odds with Miller's for whom political the heresies can only be local. That is the theorist must be guided by political feasibility, and should never propose something that cannot command

23. We deal with this in the section on freedom in the Common.

sufficient political support to be adopted. (Miller, 2008. p.29-48)

But the question is not whether political theory should be Utopian or for the earthlings. For political philosophy exists by and grow through these kind of contradictions, as we discussed in methods. Thus, we do not progress attempting choosing one side or the other. The question is how to combine both parts, because both are real; and both have grounds in the human condition. The issue is not whether we recognize the context and make our political theory based on it for there is no escape from that. Contexts should be our points of departure, but not our goals. Because we often need to smash these contexts. Similarly, the point is not whether we should think of utopias, but how we do it. If utopia is possible world far from what exists then thinking about it is a part of this field, provided we argue for mechanisms to get from here to there, to the world as it could and should be, for we must do that if we have any longing for peace and justice that the majority of humanity lacks today.

The whole point of political theory is carrying the work of the context-smashing imagination from philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and history into politics; it is breaking the frozen status-quo of the structures for the sake of a better future for the human family as a whole. And doing so by living in a certain way in the present; a way of beings who refuse to be defined by the context in which they find themselves, by their social roles, and by the rules established by the dead.

Political theory should be an area of imagination for a universal project of emancipation. Diverse experiments, transformative play and revolutionary thought connected to specific needs and aspirations can be carried into series of local concrete projects. These can test, refine, and revise aspects of this universal project. In other words, political theory aims at bringing into existence a vision, a set of thoughtful and coherent ideas of what collectivity can and could become and then to experiment these ideas at the different levels of organization (groups, associations, unions university... etc.). There will be then a constant dialectic in this process between the ideas and experiments on one hand and the ultimate vision on the other hand which may and should lead to changes in the vision. Because first we do not know enough about human nature to sketch a complete and coherent vision. (Foucault & Chomsky, 2006. p.2-45). Second because there is a very high likelihood of defects in any vision. Third, because there is no single vision that can accommodate every principle and value ; that can exhaust the infinite self and infinite humanity. And fourth because a detailed vision is not enough flexible to adapt to the diversity of groups and societies and is thus likely to be oppressive.

In the the vast and widening space between the world as it is and the world as it should be, political theory has many functions in these territories. Some of us work close to what exist, others too far from what exist. And yet others refuse both ideal theories and feasibility (closeness to what exist) as a criterium for realism. They are torn apart between a world where they do not belong, but exists. And the world they hope to bring forth, and that is yet to exist, but you can see glimpses of it here and there.

The thinkers-militants in this work are in that 3rd group. They are extreme realists who do not confuse feasibility with conformity. They see that a fundamental change will have to overcome so much and is not going to be easily achieved but they have not despaired of the possibility of radical transformation to a more humane and just world.

As we get closer to a better world, political theory preoccupation and problems will change. So to the extent we have some success, the problems will become narrower in scope, though perhaps deeper. Political thought is a dialectic between vision and goals. In its attempt to imagine alternative and better ways of organizing social life, it does not overlook the reality of the world here and now. To the contrary it must understand it and explicate it, but a part of this understanding comes through a vision of what it should or could become as well as through the political perturbation to the current state of affairs and the incursions into the regions of the adjacent possible. As Unger remarks, understanding a state of affairs is knowing what it might become under certain provocation or change. (Unger, 2001, p.253) This is exactly another way to state Sartre's dialectic between praxis and the practico-inert in history. And Marx's claim* that philosophers have hitherto attempted to understand the world, the task is to change it. (Engels, 1976. p.65) He is correct because without at least attempting to change it, we cannot develop any deep understanding. It is not just by learning and thinking and discussing that you understand such complex matters ; it also through getting in trouble, protesting, contesting, civil disobedience. It is through struggling with structures, with traditions and ideologies, states' bureaucracies, laws, and social customs that you enlarge and correct your understanding. Engagement with social movements and civil society is required to understand what exists and develop ideas about what should change and your own vision. We will return to this in freedom as commitment and as politics of emancipation. This becomes clearer when reading Unger whose political adventures and disappointments in Brazil have been essential in the development of the depth of his social, legal and political thought . In the real world, profound changes in structures usually only happens in response to severe crises; war or economic collapse. (Unger, 2001. p.313) For the political theorist, this deeper understanding and revolutionary change need not wait for a crisis. They can and should happen through her imagination, which replaces crises, anticipates them and thus hopefully contributes to averting their materialization. It is true that ideas alone cannot change the world, but it also impossible to change the world without ideas. And developing these ideas comes through reflection, research, analysis, deliberations...etc. These procedures increase our understanding and thus constitute a way to diminish the probability that our intervention make things worse than before. Other ways to decrease that probability is humility, the diversity of input, and the experimental approach to politics. Such caution -pending more understanding and knowledge- is de rigueur when the consequences of our action are decisive, the degree of uncertainty is too high, and the experience of the subject (or group) is limited.

Now, what does the conception of freedom defended offer that is absent in contemporary political theory?

The conception of freedom I defend here differs from contemporary political theory in the following ways:

I. It sees freedom simultaneously as possible only within history, and as struggling against history.

As Engels noted, "les hommes font leur histoire eux-mêmes mais dans un milieu donné qui les conditionne." (Sartre, 1985, p. 60) In other words, it rejects determinism, but insists on the weight of history for any future project, and on what counter-finality which are the monstrous unintended consequences, in history, of repetitive actions that reifies human agents and frustrate their goals. (Sartre, 1985. p102)

II. It sees social conditioning and the practico-inert in a constant dialectical struggle with freedom and praxis. As humans, we are also made by the movement of history (i.e. those particular events that led to the present)

since it determines our situation at birth (in a particular era, class, nation, religion, and culture) which in turn determines the conditions of possibilities for each of us. But neither this situation in which we find ourselves, nor our rigidified form of the self, the character, are necessarily a destiny. They are not so precisely because of freedom.

III. This work sees freedom as a multidimensional concept, contested at every level by diverse ideologies. In fact, its meaning differs from one ideology to another because of its relation to other concepts (such as equality), and whether it is a core or a peripheral concept within an ideology. (Freedon, 1996)

IV. It attempts to ground freedom in an ontological conception of consciousness as intersubjective. (Sartre, 1991). This will be discussed later.

V. It sees freedom and responsibility as directly proportional. The more you have one, the more you have of the other. And vice versa. Hence, Sartre's 'condamné à être libre' (Sartre, 1946). It follows that the moral responsibility one carries for a decision, choice or action is proportional to their degree of freedom.

The multidimensional conception neither starts nor ends with the individual. But, according to the dialectical method, is circular. From consciousness with its social and individualistic tendencies to dyadic relations to groups and movements and societies, and humanity.. At each level, a dimension of freedom faces obstacles as well as support, dangers and possibilities, setbacks or progress.

VI. Just as freedom is contested conceptually between ideologies, it is contested in relationships, social life, policies and so on. For instance, in the practical politics of neoliberalism, freedom is disfigured as it is turned into seriality. In such a situation, a free community is not possible. Instead, we have social atoms that occupies social stations, either because they have no desire but to occupy a place or because such station had been prescribed to them. This happens in serialization, a Sartrean notion we will return to.

This project could be read through this lens: how our understanding and conception of freedom translates into a social and political reality. And in reverse, how society and practical politics offer conceptual and argumentative problems of freedom that political theory could work through.

Freedom and morality of history:

I hope this work contributes in the rehabilitation of a morality of history (which is beyond our scope here). A morality that is neither neither cynical in its realism nor naive in quickly universalizing. Because understanding concrete freedom leads to neither of these, but rather to a commitment without hope. Since the latter is a result of actions. Now, how could a work on freedom open a way for a morality of history? Since freedom is the source and basis of a moral life, in grounding freedom in situation²⁴, this work grounds ethics in history. For Sartre, the concrete situation always leads to history. This is not to say that history makes ethics, but rather that any ethical choice has to be thought, made and evaluated within the possibilities available in the particular present worldwide historical conjecture (not in the particular tradition, religion, society or culture) rather than with a reference to an absolute good or some universal value. In other words, the moral comes out of the political.

24. A situation most often chosen by others, not the self.

Let us take the example of Sartre decision to be a 'compagnon de route' of the communists to illustrate this morality of history. Sartre is often condemned for his four year communist adventure as a 'compagnon de route' of the French communist party which was ossified, following the authoritarian state socialism of the East. But the choice he has made can only be evaluated in the particular situation which has made neutrality -between an imperial capitalist America and an repressive ossified USSR- impossible for him. Because he had tried the alternatives, including trying and failing to sustain a political party -he had founded- to the left of the French communist party; le Rassemblement Démocratique Révolutionnaire (RDR). He also had to take sides because his aim was freeing the proletariat. And all the workers then considered the Communist Party as their representative so there was no possible way of being involved in the politics of emancipation²⁵ without supporting that party. He also had to take sides, and this was the precipitating event, when the French State arbitrarily arrested the communist party leader in its widening and unjust persecution of communism. Nevertheless, despite all these factors, he still took a critical stand towards the party, never adhering to it. But accompanying it in its struggle while criticizing it. If these were the known facts, (but keeping in mind all the unknown facts then, when the decision was made in 1952, which may be known now) and if in addition we must take a stand, and not taking a stand is also a choice (which Sartre considered as an escape from freedom, 'lâcheté'), and if he chose freely then that particular choice is a moral one, assuming he takes responsibility for it. This example shows what is meant by a morality of history.²⁶ As we will see in the freedom as a commitment has to start from the givens of the situation, and not start from an ideal or from the world as we wish. Some anarchists found their conception of freedom on their ethics. This leads them to overlook some serious potential and real conflicts, because the dominant ethics around them is too different, too divergent from theirs. Other anarchists found their ethics on a conception of freedom. The latter are close to the conception we defend here. Freedom as a commitment, as emancipatory and revolutionary politics, and in the Common, which does not fall into the problem of overlooking the conflicts based on divergent conceptions of ethics. This is because there is no moral value prior to freedom-in-situation, but also because the ethics that comes out of it is carved out within the current society, with its inequalities, struggles, contradictions...etc.; not an ethics for parallel system to it. It is not an utopia. It is not an imagined community with absolute freedom and absolute love that is disconnected from this world. This is why the construction of my thesis goes progressively from neoliberal freedom through commitment and resistance to injustice in emancipatory politics to the Common. It cannot start from the latter.

We adhere neither to determinism nor to freedom as an abstraction, but always to freedom-in-situation. Throughout this work, in whatever dimension of freedom, I am thinking of freedom-grappling with the practico-inert all the way, defining the self and humanity in this contest, like the worker Sartre describes: "Si la société fait la personne, la personne, par un retournement analogue à celui qu'Auguste Comte nommait le passage à la subjectivité, fait la société. Sans son avenir, une société n'est qu'un amas de matériel, mais son avenir n'est rien que le projet de soi-même que font, par delà l'état de choses présent, les

25. The proletariat being at the time the only subjectivity for emancipatory politics. This was to change soon with anti-colonial struggles.

26. A morality Sartre developed in the early and mid sixties and delivered through two lectures in Rome (See, Sartre, 2015) and Cornell (he canceled his visit to the US to protest Kennedy's escalating bombing of Vietnamese) (See Sartre, 2005)

millions d'hommes qui la composent. L'homme n'est qu'une situation : un ouvrier n'est pas libre de penser ou de sentir comme un bourgeois; mais pour que cette situation soit un homme, tout un homme, il faut qu'elle soit vécue et dépassée vers un but particulier. En elle-même, elle reste indifférente tant qu'une liberté humaine ne la charge pas d'un certain sens : elle n'est ni tolérable, ni insupportable tant qu'une liberté ne s'y résigne pas, ne se rebelle pas contre elle, c'est-à-dire tant qu'un homme ne se choisit pas en elle, en choisissant sa signification. Et c'est alors seulement, à l'intérieur de ce choix libre, qu'elle se fait déterminante parce qu'elle est surdéterminée. Non, un ouvrier ne peut pas vivre en bourgeois; il faut, dans l'organisation sociale d'aujourd'hui, qu'il subisse jusqu'au bout sa condition de salarié; aucune évasion n'est possible, il n'y a pas de recours contre cela. Mais un homme n'existe pas à la manière de l'arbre ou du caillou : il faut qu'il se fasse ouvrier. Totalement conditionné par sa classe, son salaire, la nature de son travail, conditionné jusqu'à ses sentiments, jusqu'à ses pensées, c'est lui qui décide du sens de sa condition et de celle de ses camarades, c'est lui qui, librement, donne au prolétariat un avenir d'humiliation sans trêve ou de conquête et de victoire, selon qu'il se choisit résigné ou révolutionnaire. Et c'est de ce choix qu'il est responsable. Non point libre de ne pas choisir : il est engagé, il faut parier, L'abstention est un choix. Mais libre pour choisir d'un même mouvement son destin, le destin de tous les hommes et la valeur qu'il faut attribuer à l'humanité. Ainsi se choisit-il à la fois ouvrier et homme, tout en conférant une signification au prolétariat." (Sartre, 1948. p.27-28)

The hope is that in knowing more about the practico-inert, and the obstacles to freedom in history, we can anticipate better and deal better with these obstacles so we could become freer. Because what matters most, personally, is how to realize concrete freedom for all, here and now in ways that open up more concrete freedom for later. Neoliberalism is only discussed because, as a concentrated form of unaccountable power, it remains the gravest obstacle to a project of concrete freedom for ordinary humanity. Nationalism is another one, but it is beyond the scope of my thesis. In some instances it is a vicious reactionary (sometimes neofascist) way of resisting global governance with its unelected bureaucrats, and the extreme inequalities and disasters it has brought to the populations it continues to keep under the dictatorship of globalized financial Capital. Hence, Badiou's remark that if no alternative to neoliberalism is offered, we will inevitably have to contend with fascism (Badiou, 2017). For if the electorate come to believe that the state cannot eradicate inequalities and has no control over anything but the borders then they will concentrate on the candidates who promise them to protect the nation, the identity and culture, and to prevent the economic situation from getting worse through high immigration.

Sometimes neoliberalism and nationalism merge as we observe in the current Trump regime²⁷. They are compatible though constant in-fighting, incoherence, and firings are partly explained by the rivalry of these ideologies to suppress the other, and come to determine on its own the path of the regime.

This leads us to the question of why a conception of freedom is important to politics. And what does our conception offers to practical politics.

27. It is more appropriate calling it a regime than an administration since only one man commands and decides. And pleasing him -in whatever way- is the key for access and hold on positions of power.

Freedom in practical politics

"Dès 1760, des colons américains défendaient l'esclavage au nom de la liberté : si le colon, citoyen et pionnier, veut acheter un nègre, n'est-il pas libre ? Et, l'ayant acheté, n'est-il pas libre de s'en servir ? L'argument est resté. En 1947, le propriétaire d'une piscine refuse d'y admettre un capitaine juif, héros de la guerre. Le capitaine écrit aux journaux pour se plaindre. Les journaux publient sa protestation et concluent : « Admirable pays que l'Amérique. Le propriétaire de la piscine était libre d'en refuser l'accès à un Juif. Mais le Juif, citoyen des États-Unis, était libre de protester dans la presse. Et la presse, libre comme on sait, mentionne sans prendre parti le pour et le contre. Finalement, tout le monde est libre. » Le seul ennui c'est que le mot de liberté qui recouvre ces acceptions si différentes -et cent autres- soit employé sans qu'on croie devoir prévenir du sens qu'on lui donne en chaque cas." (Sartre, 1948. p330)

An idea of freedom forms the basis of many moral theories as well as most political theories, doctrines and democratic political regimes. Such an idea is often at once the source, the cause of action, laws, changes and policies as well as their the result or end goal they seek. So much so that it is impossible to understand someone's (or a group's, party's...etc.) given position on most social or political issues without knowing the underlying conception of freedom of these interlocutors, be they neutral, opponents or supporters of that position. Nevertheless, this effort of understanding the conception of freedom of -say the anti-immigrant's or the gun right voter's/militant's or her opponent's- that underlies or motivates or justify their position (on migration, gun rights...etc) is rarely taken seriously. In fact, such understanding is often absent. Instead of trying to understand how they get to a position (which may lead to their conception of freedom), people mostly care about the position in itself. In other words, they focus too much on the result than on the process; the reasoning behind coming to that position or result (of defending or attacking such and such policy). They care about whether they agree with them or not, but not the reasons that lead them to take that position. In fact, sometimes there is a deeper agreement between 2 people that do not hold the same position on a given issue than between 2 people who agree²⁸. For instance, I would agree with an international relations realist that the US military should have never invaded Iraq. But for totally different reasons. For that realist, the reasons are based on an evaluation of costs and dangers versus strategic importance and gains in terms of national security. As for me, I think they should not get involved because international law prohibits it, not to mention all the moral and humanitarian reasons.

One reason the effort of inquiring about the source of a position or an opinion is not undertaken is the existence of implicit conceptions of freedom that are taken for granted. For the political theorist, this is a problem that demands their intervention. For these conceptions should be made explicit. They should be brought in daylight, discussed, dissected and analyzed in order to begin communicating clearly between allies as well as across classes and indeed across all social and political divisions (ideologies, parties, movements, and so on). My argument here that this work is indispensable to make tangible progress, relief suffering, and resolve social conflicts.

28. This is the case for example when the reasons (moral, economic, pragmatic...etc) leading to the position are shared, but only a misunderstanding, distraction or a different interpretation of the question has led to the disagreement.

This is because these implicit conceptions have been either corrupted²⁹ (as in the case of the conservatives conception of freedom with a neoliberal wing and a nationalist or ethnocentric wing) or otherwise reduced to formal, though still important, basic and civil liberties as in the case of many other political forces like mainstream parties, and liberal egalitarian theorists. These theorists do not take the question of power seriously. And yet power, be it private or state, especially when concentrated is detrimental to freedom and equality.

Today, in the flawed democratic liberal democracies of the West, the problem is less civil liberties since these have been already achieved (though always threatened and under attack) then what they actually mean for each of us, and for all as a collective. And how this inquiry and debate into their meaning (which is still found wanting) may lead those engaged in it to realize for themselves that these civil liberties cannot be really meaningful unless the social, economic, educational and environmental rights accompany them. And that these rights should be thought for all humanity. Because by their nature they do not recognize class, state, and others boundaries just as the most serious problems humanity faces (epidemics, climate change, nuclear war, poverty) do not. So the solutions cannot be confined to only a part of humanity. Hence, any politics of liberation must be transnational. That is not

to say, of course, that no local , regional or national projects are valuable, but that they should always be linked to, compatible with, inspired by, supportive of, and synergistic with an international vision and goals. Most Americans thought they could be free and live in a free country when millions of their fellows were not, because of the color of their skin. And today, many think that we could be free by building walls and barriers around us and guarding them with guns so that we do not see that so many behind these walls are not free. What then is left of that freedom we have within the walls? What meaning can we give to it? Can we still continue to enjoy and value this freedom we are denying to so many though no fault of their own? Can we go on living free in a world of unfreedom?

These questions are inescapable in a personal and a collective quest for freedom. They are inescapable regardless of the past and our responsibility, of colonialism and its new forms, of leaders of the 'free world' allying with dictators and shipping weapons for them to fight proxy civil wars. Because freedom anywhere is affected by unfreedom somewhere. This is why we insist that an emancipation is for all humanity.

And when we begin to look at these inescapable questions, they lead to internationalism. It is not a good solution for Mélenchon to counter the EU disastrous bureaucracy with a retreat to the national (like LePen). Sovereignty-seeking leftists will always be beaten by their nationalist right-wing counterparts. Because they are more radical (in the other direction), they do benefit from support funds from many reactionaries (Putin, for instance, in this case), Because they are playing their favorite game, on their field, and with long experience to bear.

Within domestic politics, one should not therefore prioritize the acquired liberties more than those which are still not guaranteed and which affects a person daily life far more than civil rights. One should seek social liberties while still defending civil ones. There is no contradiction here. Because to really benefit from civil liberties, one must first acquire economic and social ones. For Sartre, this means contesting the "caractère

²⁹Corrupted from their original meaning as in liberalism early conception of freedom to which we will turn later.

abstrait des droits de la « démocratie » bourgeoise non pas qu'il [l'intellectuel] veuille les supprimer mais parce qu'il veut les compléter par les droits concrets de la démocratie socialiste, en conservant, dans toute démocratie, la vérité fonctionnelle de la liberté."(Sartre, 1972. p82). What use is freedom of expression to the hungry? What use is voting right for the homeless? This functional truth of freedom is the quantity of choices, of opportunities and their quality, and above all the fulfillment of basic needs including social and educational ones. A life not determined by the tyranny of these needs is central to the understanding of this material and practical multidimensional conception of freedom we defend. Therefore, they should always be prioritized over non essential needs and desires. What we have is often the opposite, the vital needs of most of humanity are often sacrificed in the name of the freedom (i.e. luxury) of a tiny minority.

A contribution this work hopes is bringing this problem of building everything on an implicit conception of freedom (that is itself questionable) to attention through 3 messages.

One, we ignore the contestability of conceptual meaning at our peril. Yes, the terms of political discourse are not exactly models of precision. There is no way to start a discussion or a political or policy debate with a precise meaning of a political concept or value. In part, because the moral outlook that differs between the participants is influencing their understanding of political concepts. However, it is part of a political theorist/philosopher work to show what clear definitions of these terms and conceptions are possible. And to further follow where each the different conceptions of a term leads in terms of practical politics; policies, law, projects, consequences, structures, amendments and so on. For we cannot overcome our vast divisions and extreme social and political polarization let alone hope to solve some of our social, economic and political troubles unless we know what the others (be they friends, neutrals, allies or opponents) are speaking about when they use a particular concept. If we do not know their meaning of use, if each is using the concept in their own way without knowing what their interlocutors mean by that same concept then debates are likely to be endlessly sterile, frustrating, and lead to dead ends at best. At worst, they will make enemies out of possible friends, allies or people between whom there may be a peaceful coexistence.

Second, once we start delving into the meaning of the concepts we use, and I only focus on one here, that of freedom, we begin to see not only the diversity of meanings we attribute to them, but also the emphasize we put on one aspect or another, how the meaning changes depending on its relation to other concepts, the ambiguities we may hold...etc. We begin to understand the logic (if there is any) behind someone's position on a particular question as we trace this position back to their understanding of a conception of freedom that is, as a value, pushes them to adopt such an opinion. It maybe then be even possible to show them that their position on a given issue is far off or incompatible from their avowed values. Or that they defend their position on the basis of freedom, but it has nothing to do with freedom (according to how they define); perhaps it has to do with another value. In fact, this is how Socrates proceeded. He would not attempt to convince anyone of anything. But through his dialectic, the method of knowledge through questioning and dialogue, he will bring his interlocutor to see the contradictions in their reasoning. He will bring them to see the problem on their own and admit they did not really know as they thought they did. So changing the position of someone from within

herself, as Socrates used to do, is far better than pushing around interlocutors in arguments.

Third, we discover that some of our conceptions as in that of freedom have been hollowed out or have become distorted beyond recognition from the conceptual and practical meaning given to them originally by, say the liberals and socialists (as well as anarchists) of the XVIII, XIX centuries. For all of these thinkers, the overriding objective was not property or profit or doing as one wishes. It was not equality, but a larger life for the ordinary man and woman, and the instrument was the institutional reconstruction of society. (Unger, 2014. p.294) The problem with the proposals of these liberals and socialists are twofold. Their conception of a larger life was based on an aristocratic view of self possession, and their institutional proposals were far too detailed, making them too dogmatic like blueprints, as if you must have the entire indivisible package or nothing at all. Today, political theory needs to go back and rescue their insights while avoiding these 2 flaws. By being more inclusive, seeking an emancipation for all humanity. And less dogmatic, avoiding blueprints altogether, and favoring musical notes instead. (Unger, 2014. p.294)

In the preface, we have started with how the initial question has led to this topic. In the introduction, we have attempted to situate this project in relation to contemporary liberal political theory. The divergence between the conception of freedom is contemporary liberal political theory and ours led us to inquire about the nature of the practice of a political theory. After that we have seen the peculiarities of the conception of freedom I propose and why it is important to have an explicit concept in our debates and policies. We have then briefly discussed how this conception is important for a morality of history; in our view, the most interesting one Sartre has elaborated, and the most relevant to freedom as commitment, to revolution and emancipatory politics. Finally, we have shown how the conception of freedom defended may contribute to practical politics and in which ways it is similar and in other ways different from that of the XIX century liberals and socialists.

Now before criticizing the distortion of freedom in neoliberalism and offering our alternative multidimensional conception of freedom, we will summarize the content, the substance, of this alternative conception of freedom I advocate here.

Overview of the content of the proposed multidimensional concept of freedom

This thesis proposes a conception of freedom deployed through 3 synergistic levels that make the core parts of this work. First, the ethical commitment an agent. Second, the praxis of emancipatory and revolutionary politics in social movements and various groups. Third, the Common. The focus at each level is on a particular dimension of freedom. Though these dimensions are different, in our view they can be mutually reinforcing. Thus freedom is deployed:

I. At the personal level. Freedom as an ethical commitment of the agent.

II. At the group and the Movement level. Freedom as praxis resisting the structures and institutions of power, in particular those the neoliberalism of the corporate-state.

This praxis therefore takes the form of emancipatory or revolutionary politics -depending on a given

country particular situation- where Freedom is deployed in resistance to oppression, hierarchy, and domination³⁰. Freedom in the insurrection of the *groupe-en-fusion*, in social struggles, in revolution and the emancipation from various repressive and anti-human practices, structures and relations. The aim is what Sartre, following Kant, calls the Kingdom of Ends where no human being is means anymore. (Sartre, 2005). In Sartre's morality of history, the goal is becoming human from a condition of sub-humanity. (Sartre, 2015)

Here, therefore, we deal with the problem of means and ends which is at the intersection of morality and politics. At this level, freedom is dealing with the organization, decision making which are necessary to transform society, to realize its vision of the world.

III. At the level of communities, communes and their eventual union into federations. Freedom in the Common. For Hardt and Negri, the common is what has open access and governed through democratic decision-making (Negri, Hardt, 2009, 2017), as opposed to private property monopoly over access and exclusive decision making, a situation detrimental to the vast majority of people's freedom. For them both private property and public property should be replaced by the common.

The previous dimension (II) is circumstantial, temporary, located, oriented towards a particular enemy, question or problem. While in thinking the common, we inquire whether this particular emergence of group freedom can be the basis of a universal. Can freedom go beyond groups and movements to a stable institutional form? Is it possible that beyond the current system we build a form of society that embodies freedom (in work, production, relationships, education...etc.) and also resists its own ossification, its slipping into the *practico-inert*? Can freedom be stable in time and in space and for a large society?

The idea of the Common attempts to be a concrete answer to these questions.

It is how that freedom conquered earlier from power, through some form of struggle, can be maintained once the external enemy or the cause that united a group or made a movement cohesive is gone, capitulated or destroyed.

There is a dialectical relation between subjectivity and social/political structures where subjectivity is formed, shaped, conditioned by structures. But also being transformed in resisting them.

The structures attempt to make and maintain subjectivities that perpetuate them.

The first level is about the becoming of an intersubjectivity that becomes free in a commitment, the second about a revolutionary subjectivity acting within a group action, seeking to free itself and others along through the the practice of politics. The third level is about building with others a humane society from below. Levels II and III are also about how the group, the movement and perhaps institutions could be built in such a way so that they could, in return, support and nourish that kind of revolutionary subjectivity that makes them. Again the dialectics! Just as a free society nurtures free individuals and is thus indispensable to personal freedom, only

30. Freedom as non-domination has seen a revival in the political theories of anarchism and republicanism (Pettit and Skinner). Since the latter admits private property and the state while the former rejects both, this work is far more aligned with the former theoretical framework. For a review of freedom as non-domination in anarchism and republicanism, and the contrast between them, see Kinna and Prichard, 2019.

free individuals can create such a society as a milieu in which the freedom (sustenance, development, stimulation, joy and creativity) of each is the condition for the freedom of all.

I think the complementarity between the 3 levels is a condition for a better understanding and a practice of freedom. One that precisely brings these dimensions together. An articulation of these 3 dimensions is today mostly either absent or implied conflictual. (as when the individual is seen as necessarily opposed to the collective). A central aim of this study is to argue and instantiate all sorts of ways where these dimensions are not conflictual, but synergistic. It is argued that the particular conception and practice of freedom defended here makes the lessening of conflict within a society, and the logical and ethical coherence between these 3 dimensions of freedom possible, and even likely.

Part I: Critique of Neoliberalism

The evisceration and corruption of freedom:

Beginning in the closing decades of the XX century, neoliberalism³¹ as an elite "class hegemony and as dominance of the US" (Duménil & Lévy, 2011. p.7) has embarked on "the destruction of the social order" of post-WWII to restore "the most violent features of capitalism." (Duménil & Lévy, 2004. p.1). What interests us here from the perspective of freedom is that the ideology of neoliberalism took freedom to be its alpha and omega, and yet its conception of freedom was imposed on the populations (by the forces of the state, contract, corporations, military, supra national institutions...etc.) Furthermore, it is a conception that has been an anathema to freedom for the vast majority of humankind. Now, every society has always made up an ideology to legitimate inequalities and privileges (Piketty, 2019. p.13). And neoliberalism has been used with great success to subvert the quest for freedom that had animated the civil rights as well as the social struggles of the 1960s all over the world to reverse the historical wins for a more decent, humane and fair society.³²

The total corruption of liberalism's conception of freedom is thus relatively recent, dating back to the 1970s. Till the mid XX century, liberalism's conception of freedom, as the liberal philosopher Dewey puts it, was concrete, emphasizing the liberation of the multitude from repression and material insecurity: "During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries it meant liberation from despotic dynastic rule. A century later it meant release of industrialists from inherited legal customs that hampered the rise of new forces of production. Today, it signifies liberation from material insecurity and from the coercions and repressions that prevent multitudes from participation in the vast cultural resources that are at hand." (Dewey, 1963. P. 48)

By the corruption of liberalism's conception of freedom I mean that it has maintained the conclusion of early liberals -namely limiting the state intervention in economic and social life- unchanged without going into the reasons that had led these early liberals to this conclusion, resulting in a total discrepancy between ends and means.

If we actually go through these reasons today, in such a different society than theirs, we will come to a very different conclusion³³ For in the XVIII and XIX centuries, when these theorists elaborated liberalism, the threats to freedom and the source of repression was mainly state power; the rulers then being then totally undemocratic. While the dangers of the state remain today, to the extent that a state like Sweden or even France is under some measure of democratic control³⁴, it is far less threatening than predatory unaccountable and

31. Also known as the Washington Consensus, the neoliberal doctrine is neither new nor liberal --in that its features are far from liberal tradition from the enlightenment to Dewey and Russell. (Chomsky, 1998. p.13)

32. As Kristin Ross notes the 3 targets to destroy for May 1968 in France were capitalism, American imperialism and Gaullism. (p.8) Adding that the "ruse of capital uses the aspirations and logic of militants against themselves, producing the exact result unwanted by the actors". (Ross, 2002. p.189)

33. The conclusion of early liberals, however, remains totally valid today in the case of dictatorships, absolute monarchies, and similar regimes.

34. After all such states allow dissent although -and this is also crucial to understand power- only within a very limited range. So the left and right are mostly similar; they agree on the rules of the game. But the left being a less effective but less cruel right. Within this extremely narrow spectrum, freedom is possible. Each party warms the place for the other one to take over, giving the population the sweet illusion that their vote actually matters, and keeping the system pretty much unchanged. Arguably, differences within a party are wider than between parties. (i.e. Blair is far closer to May and Cameron than he is to Corbyn). Wolin notes how this controlled politics where the central actor is corporate, the citizen dissent is tolerated as long as it remains within the established limits, with no real power leverage. (Wolin, 2008. p.196)

undemocratic forces like multinational corporations³⁵. Thus in limiting state power today (mainly the welfare part of the state) while freeing these extremely powerful supranational predators (which are treated by law like private citizens), neoliberalism has crushed all other freedoms. In the West, while the danger of authoritarian rifts is possible and in fact happening, the problem with the state goes beyond its concentration of power and violence. The problem is its mere existence. Because its very *raison d'être*, that which makes it an enemy, is the defense of extreme inequalities, in particular private property. As Adam Smith noted: "Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." (Smith, 1857. P. 299). The neoliberal state is thus one that has all of its democratic, welfare, and environmental protection elements reduced bit by bit to nil while its *raison d'être* and all of its dangers (protection private property, police repression, military adventures, surveillance) increase exponentially. Wilhem von Humboldt, one of the earliest liberals, writing *The Limits of State Action* in the 1780's and early 1790's, criticized the paternalist state encroaching on individual autonomy. He contrasted state constitution and national community, noting that; "it is strictly speaking the latter - the free cooperation of the members of the nation - which secures all those benefits for which men longed when they formed themselves into society". For Humboldt thought that "a community of enlightened men - fully instructed in their truest instances, and therefore mutually well-disposed and closely bound together" was "infinitely to be preferred to any State arrangements." (Marshall, 2008. p.153-5). However, writing in the XVIII century, he had no idea how capitalism would develop. He could not have predicted that multinational corporations; entities more powerful than most states with trillions of dollars in capital. His liberalism therefore is not concerned about the threat to freedom from the private power of these corporations, and their ultra rich owners. In fact, for him all private citizens were pretty much equal in power; having no idea that in our era, a huge corporation would have the rights of a citizen before the law. So when someone today insists on equal basic liberties, he insists that the judiciary treats individuals and corporations as equals which is absurd since almost no individuals can begin to match a corporation power and financial capacity to attack, hire the best lawyers and win in court. Hence contemporary liberalism, even with the best intentions, fails by its own standards to guarantee the rights of all. Because insisting on treating 2 extremely unequal individuals equally is injustice. Humboldt could not predict "that democracy with its model of equality of all citizens before the law and liberalism with its right of man over his own person both would be wrecked on the realities of capitalist economy. " (Rudolf Rocker, 1998. P.23) Therefore, in maintaining Humboldt conclusion of limiting state power -in a society so different from his- while ignoring the reasoning behind his conclusion, classical liberal conception of freedom has been corrupted into the neoliberal one. While neoliberalism is not a focus of this work, it remains the bitter enemy lurking behind. It also represents the anathema to all 3 dimension of the conception of freedom. From this perspective, it is useful to see my project through the lens of its opposite; the most powerful force today preventing a free humanity, the scourge of neoliberalism.

The worldwide hegemony of neoliberalism is fast approaching the half century mark. Since neoliberalism is incompatible with democracy³⁶ as its founding theoreticians know, their norm is freedom. If you look carefully

35. To which the state has become subservient.

36. On this, see for instance, Wendy Brown's *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism Stealth Revolution*, 2015.

to the writing of Hayek and Friedman, they never call for democracy to the contrary as we will see later. But the question is freedom for whom? The conception of freedom that neoliberalism calls for is a most distorted and pathological one. For neoliberals, freedom is that of "private property owners, businesses, multinational corporations, and financial capital." (Harvey, 2008). For Hayek, economic freedom is a prerequisite to personal and political freedom. (Hayek, 2001. p.13). His conception of freedom is restricted to the individual level. Similarly, Friedman conception of freedom is based on an economic freedom³⁷ that is for him an end in itself as well as a requirement for political freedom. (Friedman, 2002. p. 8). Economic freedom for him is that of that of a competitive free market. And Political freedom is the negative freedom of the atomic individual from state coercion. (Friedman, 2005. p. 15) For the Chicago School founders, freedom was only limited to that "of corporations to conduct their affairs as they wished." (Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). Freedom so defined leads neoliberals, to fear any popular forms of democracy and aim for a censitary suffrage. (Piketty, 2019. p.904), and following this logic, they have come to support dictators. Hayek, for instance, said he prefers "a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking in liberalism." This was in an interview on one of his visits to Chile to meet and support the Pinochet military dictatorship. (Biebricher, 2018. p.74) . Friedman was an advisor to Reagan and to the Chilean dictator in his neoliberal cuts to social spending and other savageries that followed the coup. (Klein, 2007. p.7; Biebricher, 2018. p.131). Despite the perfect experimental conditions in Chile , since no dissent whatsoever was allowed, the experiment failed miserably. But we have to realize that the actually existing neoliberalism diverges widely from its theoretical underpinnings that has been used to justify it. As Wolin shows, neoliberalism "was instrumental in proposing a strong controlling state" that he then shows how it developed into a totalitarian one. (Wolin, 2008). In fact actually existing neoliberalism is socialism for the elites, and predatory capitalism imposed on everyone else. For in theory, in the name of individual freedom, state intervention in the economy must cease. All market transactions are free, and those involved are responsible for the consequences of their choice. In practice, however, the state has been there all the way to bail out the banks and corporations after crises; using taxpayer money and adding the politics of austerity in some places. But the taxpayers were left to fend for themselves after crises and crashes; as happened in the last one a dozen years ago. The reason given by the ruling elites for the discrepancy helping the corporations and letting the population drown was that the banks and corporations are "too big to fail", a statement which is admitted as an axiom. (Badiou, 2016b. p.24)

Harvey, summarizes some of the grave issues with the neoliberal state. (Harvey, 2008. p67-70) One is the monopoly of power resulting from extreme competition whereby richer strong corporations drive out smaller and mid-sized ones from the market. The fate of the workers of these is not an issue of course. Two, market failure. Firms driven by the goal of maximizing profit do whatever it takes to reduce their costs. So they shed their liabilities outside the market. Harvey points out to the resulting pollution. A particularly serious consequence resulting in the destruction of the environment when firms dump waste and toxic materials in nature to avoid paying for properly disposing of them. Third, how powerful players on the market exploit their

37. He defines economic freedom as freedom to purchase whatever you want, rather than freedom of having the basic necessities of life. Contrast with Bakunin for whom the absence of economic freedom is a form of slavery: "the whole life of the worker is simply a continuous and dismaying succession of terms of serfdom – voluntary from the juridical point of view but compulsory in the economic sense – broken up by momentarily brief interludes of freedom accompanied by starvation; in other words, it is real slavery." (Bakunin, 1953. p.188)

better access to information even as neoliberalism in theory still supposes that everyone has the same access to information. This leads to more and more concentration of wealth and power. We could add, for instance, that today 26 individuals have more than 3.8 billion people, according to Oxfam (Lawson, et al., 2019). Fourth, the belief that technology solves any problem leads to technological development running amok, that is "creating new products and new ways of doing things that as yet have no market (new pharmaceutical products are produced for which new illnesses have to be invented)" (Harvey, 2008. p69). Recently, I have asked my Swiss doctor why my blood pressure is too high (stage I hypertension) according to the Association of American Cardiologists, but normal (not even prehypertension) according to him. He pointed out to the market pressure on the medical professionals and researchers in the US to lower the threshold for normal blood pressure in order to expand the market. Because many new drugs and high end technologies have been produced to treat high blood pressure, and these could be used on the patients only when they cross the threshold into high pressure. So it must be lowered in order to make more patients. Fifth, neoliberalism paints a rapacious human ego where nothing has a value, but everything has a price, transforming the market economy into a market society. (Sandel, 2013). I would go further. In effect, disposability as an aim of profit-making for Capital has gone beyond things to infect relationships. Such that others have also become disposable objects. The route to this degradation goes way back, even Marx wrote about it though things have gone much worse in the past decades: "Vint enfin un temps où tout ce que les hommes avaient regardé comme inaliénable devint objet d'échange, de trafic et pouvait s'aliéner. C'est le temps où les choses mêmes qui jusqu'alors étaient communiquées, mais jamais échangées; données mais jamais vendues; acquises, mais jamais achetées - vertu, amour, opinion, science, conscience, etc., - où tout enfin passa dans le commerce. C'est le temps de la corruption générale, de la vénalité universelle, ou, pour parler en termes d'économie politique, le temps où toute chose, morale ou physique, étant devenue valeur vénale, est portée au marché pour être appréciée à sa plus juste valeur" (Marx, 1847. p.7). Indeed, neoliberals go so far as denying that society exists (Thatcher) claiming only individuals are real. Harvey notes that in a neoliberal state, "while individuals are supposedly free to choose, they are not supposed to choose strong collective institutions.", snuffing out "the desire for a meaningful collective life." Harvey concludes that: "faced with social movements that seek collective interventions, therefore, the neoliberal state is itself forced to intervene, sometimes repressively, thus denying the very freedoms it is supposed to uphold. In this situation, however, it can marshal one secret weapon: international competition and globalization can be used to discipline movements opposed to the neoliberal agenda within individual states. If that fails, then the state must resort to persuasion, propaganda or, when necessary, raw force and police power to suppress opposition to neoliberalism. This was precisely Polanyi's fear: that the liberal (and by extension the neoliberal) utopian project could only ultimately be sustained by resort to authoritarianism. The freedom of the masses would be restricted in favour of the freedoms of the few" (Harvey, 2008. p.70). If we put all the consequences of neoliberalism together, we get the following. Profit above all, extreme competition, monopolies and centralization of power, market failures, the destruction of the environment, the internal police repression of dissidents and we add the free movement of capital and goods, the privatization of all public goods and disappearance of the common, financialization of the economy, the repeated crises, the monstrous inequalities it creates, the militarization of the domestic repression, and new imperial wars (like Iraq, Yemen and Libya) to maintain access to Oil and help

allied brutal regimes (like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and UAE) to quell any resistance to the consequences of neoliberalism in the Middle East.

The result situation where a large part of humanity is forbidden from existence. Today billions of people are still denied basic goods, rights and dignity. Still living in extreme conditions of scarcity and not allowed from even trying to escape the hell of unlivable swaths of this planet. But who made these places so? After all, it was not natural disasters, but human decisions and policies. And is it not a normal and human reaction to escape an unlivable situation?

The so-called migrants, millions of humans trying to live in dignity, are not a 'crisis' as the medias and the NGOs parroting the politicians repeat. Those 'prolétaires nomades' (Badiou, 2019) are not a cause, but rather an effect of a crisis of planet ravaged by neoliberal greed. The masters of humankind accept neither to acknowledge these facts, and help them out nor to treat the original problem, the planet they have devastated and continue to do so. Instead, they use the patina of democracy; turning the justice system into a criminal one by enacting laws to punish anyone who help those trying to escape the hell of war, poverty, and climate change. In such a situation of reciprocity modified by scarcity, freedom is not possible. The notion of scarcity is paramount in Sartre's Critique, because it shows how our planet, run by neoliberalism transforms our relations with each others as well as between groups and between nations, and so on.³⁸ Scarcity is not only that of material resources, but also of time, understanding, sympathy...etc. For Sartre, violence and wars are made possible by a particular view of human nature that make our society. The cultivation of fear of the other happens through soaking this conception (by all means available into the public conscious) of a competitive, predatory, and evil human nature from which we must protect ourselves. It says even though we maybe secure, there is not enough for everyone, not for these outsiders coming at us anyway, that we must defend ourselves, build walls, attack preemptively, do whatever it takes to protect ourselves from those others or we will loose our comforts, prosperity and freedom. It uses extremely dehumanizing words that turn into attitudes and violence. This Manichean ethics of good (by definition us) and evil (them), insiders (those who happen to be of the same color, religion and nationality) and outsiders can only work if our way of life makes everything disposable, to be bought and sold on the market; when what matters most is material possessions (neoliberalism). Because only material things can be taken by force (Russell, 2009. p.152)³⁹. This Manichean ethics can only grow in a society ravaged by the neoliberal idea of freedom. A society where profit for few comes before the vital needs of many, where everyone is for herself, and no one is responsible for the other. A society that holds that happiness in an individual project, that whatever bad happens to a person is their fault, and that the pecuniary goal determines the kind of relationships with the others. The horrific result is that we come to see the others at best as competitors for the same goods, jobs or whatever; at worst, as dangers to be quickly neutralized or eliminated. In such a ruthless society, outside of a small circle of family and friends, the choice comes down to be either a victim or a perpetrator. Even that small circle is not immune to the extreme egoism that invades the attitudes

38. "système de relations définies par la classe dominante en fonction de la rareté et du profit". (Sartre, 1972. p.34)

39. "The typical creative impulse is that of the artist; the typical possessive impulse is that of property. The best life is that in which creative impulses play the largest part and possessive impulses the smallest. The best institutions are those which produce the greatest possible creativeness and the least possessiveness compatible with self-preservation[...] it is preoccupation with possessions, more than anything else, that prevents men from living freely and nobly. The State and Property are the great embodiments of possessiveness; it is for this reason that they are against life, and that they issue in war." (Russell, 2009. p.152)

and feelings of the neoliberal homo economicus. Sartre notes that scarcity modifies the basic pure reciprocity with my fellow, turning him into a radical other, 'un contre-homme', holding a death menace since: "nous comprenons en gros ses fins (ce sont les nôtres), ses moyens (nous avons les mêmes), les structures dialectiques de ses actes; mais nous les comprenons comme si c'étaient les caractères d'une autre espèce, notre double démoniaque. Rien en effet -ni les grands fauves ni les microbes- ne peut être plus terrible pour l'homme qu'une espèce intelligente, carnassière, cruelle, qui saurait comprendre et déjouer l'intelligence humaine et dont la fin serait précisément la destruction de l'homme. Cette espèce, c'est évidemment la nôtre se saisissant par tout homme chez les autres dans le milieu de la rareté[...]. Le contre-homme en effet, poursuit la liquidation des hommes en partageant leurs fins et en adoptant leurs moyens; la rupture apparaît au moment où cette réciprocité trompeuse démasque le danger de mort qu'elle recouvre ou, si l'on préfère, l'impossibilité pour ces hommes engagés dans des liens réciproques de demeurer tous sur le sol qui les porte et les nourrit." (Sartre, 1985. p.208) Once this scarcity is interiorized, reciprocity is destroyed, and with it the very possibility of the bonds of fellowship with those who are seen as outside the group. For we no longer need scarcity anymore to see the Other as objectively inhuman since their very being has already become anti-human, and their very labor is seen as famine coming to us. Scarcity interiorized explains violence through this Manichean vision of life we find all around us in the world today: "Et n'allons pas imaginer que cette impossibilité intériorisée caractérise les individus subjectivement : tout au contraire, elle rend chacun objectivement dangereux pour l'Autre et elle met l'existence concrète de chacun en danger dans celle de l'Autre. Ainsi l'homme est objectivement constitué comme inhumain et cette inhumanité se traduit dans la praxis par la saisie du mal comme structure de l'Autre " (Sartre, 1985. p.208). Sartre takes the example of nomadic tribes that has been studied by ethnographers and historians. The result of these studies have contested historical materialism. Because they showed that the economic motive is not as essential, and that it is sometimes undetectable. For some of these tribes have such wealth of resources as all the Savannah is for them. But the question is not here, he adds, because scarcity does not have to be explicitly raised: "ce qu'il y a, c'est que, dans chacune de ces tribus, l'homme de la rareté rencontre, dans l'autre tribu, l'homme de la rareté sous l'aspect du contre-homme. Chacun est constitué de telle sorte par sa lutte contre le monde physique et contre les hommes (souvent à l'intérieur de son groupe) que l'apparition d'inconnus — en posant à la fois pour lui le lien d'intériorité et le lien d'extériorité absolue — lui fait découvrir l'homme sous la forme d'une espèce étrangère. La force de son agressivité, de sa haine réside dans le besoin mais il importe peu que ce besoin vienne d'être assouvi : sa renaissance perpétuelle et l'anxiété de chacun finissent par constituer, chaque fois qu'une tribu paraît, ses membres comme la famine venant à l'autre groupe sous forme d'une praxis humaine. Et, dans le combat, ce n'est pas le simple danger de rareté que chaque adversaire veut détruire en l'autre, mais c'est la praxis même en tant qu'elle est trahison de l'homme au profit du contre-homme. Nous considérons donc, au niveau même du besoin et par le besoin, que la rareté se vit pratiquement par l'action manichéiste et que l'éthique se manifeste comme impératif destructif : il faut détruire le mal. C'est à ce niveau également que l'on doit définir la violence comme structure de l'action humaine sous le règne du manichéisme et dans le cadre de la rareté" (Sartre, 1985. p.208-209). For Sartre, the reason we are unable to overcome scarcity despite science and technology is that social organization in a capitalist state turns us into series. His concept of seriality which refers to individuals as passive social atoms explains our political

impotence⁴⁰. Each pursuing her own goal along side the others but in isolation from them, rather than in coordination, cooperation, and solidarity. In seriality, which is our condition in neoliberalism, individuals are passive with regard to the external order; the structures that define and dominate them. Furthermore, individuals are objectified such as each is replaceable or interchangeable with any other. Sartre explicates this concept through a French factory where working conditions were so appalling that the workers called it 'Buchenwald' and yet for 12 years never made a strike because: "les forces atomisantes agissaient constamment sur les ouvriers et les sérialisaient. Un ensemble est dit sériel quand chacun de ses membres, bien que voisin de tous les autres, demeure seul et se définit par la pensée du voisin en tant que celui-ci pense comme les autres : c'est-à-dire que chacun est autre que soi et se comporte comme un autre qui, lui-même, est autre que soi. Les travailleurs énonçaient et affirmaient la pensée sérielle comme si c'était leur propre pensée, mais c'était en fait celle de la classe dominante qui s'imposait aux ouvriers du dehors[...] racisme (on ne peut rien faire avec les ouvriers immigrés), défiance envers l'environnement (les Vosgiens sont des paysans, ils ne nous comprendraient pas), misogynie (les femmes sont trop bêtes) etc." (Sartre, 1976. p.42-43).

In the neoliberal dogma, freedom is understood as independence of individual feelings, thoughts and actions from everyone else. This fails to acknowledge that some goals are collective, that is my own goal can only be realized when others share and realize that goal with me. For instance, building a good school is a collective endeavor. Of course, their answer would be to privatize the school system, and those who can afford it may send their children to a good school. What this seriality leads to is an inability to (even try to) understand each others let alone to create common goals and to act together; hence social dissolution and political impotence. This leads to the perpetuation of scarcity as a condition of existence, regardless of the real possibilities of avoiding it or surpassing it since these are not barely considered.

Neoliberalism is nowadays often regarded as centrism with Clinton and Macron as its typical political figures. In fact, whether in political history or political theory⁴¹, neoliberalism is a right wing ideology, with the like of Clinton, Blair and Macron being its socially progressive wing while Bush and Fillon represent its socially conservative wing. As Robin notes, "Hayek and the Austrian School of economics reflect certain ideas contained in Burke's writing about the market". (Robin, 2013. p.xvii)

Neoliberalism differs from far right conservatism by its embrace of a cosmopolitan rather than nationalist or ethnocentric variant of the authoritarian top down hierarchical management of society on the model of a corporation⁴² which is a totalitarian model of governance (Chomsky, 1996). Power flowing through orders without resistance from above. Responsibility flowing through obedience from below⁴³. No accountability. Total freedom to the owners; almost none for those selling their labor power to live. Honneth notes that "within

40. And by reversing this serial impotence through collective action (see part III, emancipatory politics), groups and movements concretize freedom by reaching social and political goals impossible to each of their member on their own, and by overcoming the isolation and impotence of the atomized individual.

41. For Robin, neoliberalism is "the most genuinely political theory of capitalism the right has managed to produce." (Robin, 2017. p.133)

42. In 1975, Jimmy Carter helped launch the neoliberal turn in American politics by campaigning on the claim "I ran the Georgia government as well as almost any corporate structure in this country is run." Nowadays a real estate mogul is running the country as he ran his bankrupt businesses. Of course only a symptom. But this focus on the symptom of an underlying festering disease only shows how undemocratic is representative democracy: it has become a one man affair.

43. In so far as a representative democracy is a democracy, it should be the exact opposite of this corporate model. The source of power flows from below. Responsibility and accountability is from those elected representative.

the market economy, freedom consisted in unbridled individualism, which condemned the propertyless classes to poverty and thus contradicted the demand [of the French Revolution] that not only “freedom”, but also “fraternity” and “equality” should be realized.” (Honneth, 2017. p. 77)

Part II. Freedom as commitment.

"Seule la liberté peut rendre compte d'une personne dans sa totalité, faire voir cette liberté aux prises avec le destin, d'abord écrasée par ses fatalités puis se retournant sur elles pour les digérer peu à peu, prouver que le génie n'est pas un don mais l'issue qu'on invente dans les cas désespérés." (Sartre, 1952. p.645)

The Agent and her context:

For Sartre, following Marx, a human being is freedom in possession of its destiny. However, this is so far away from our situation that it could also be seen as the goal of the revolutionary (Sartre, 1949. p.210). In this work, to replace being with political terms, I use the agent and the subject interchangeably. By subject, I do not the legal subject that obeys the laws, but the subject that thinks, acts and creates. We reject the Marxism that is pure objectivity which turns into an economism. We also reject focusing on the structures as in the work of Lévi-Strauss and the structuralists tradition. Without a free subject, we have neither morality nor politics. An agent, in contrast to an individual is defined by being rather than having. An agent is a being capable of determining herself internally through the synthetic unit of the norm or the value through an unconditional rejection of all past and exterior determinations. (Sartre, 2015. p.19) Thus the agent "se constitue par là comme avenir indépendant de tout passé, mieux : comme avenir réclamant de s'instaurer sur les ruines du passé [...] Par là il s'oppose à l'avenir positiviste qui est retour offensif des circonstances extérieures. La norme comme possibilité permanente de me produire sujet d'intériorité apparaît au contraire comme avenir pur, autrement dit avenir sans aucune détermination par le passé."(Sartre, 2015. p.20-21) So the agent is a being through whom freedom creates value which is something lacking in the present situation, because of need, oppression or violence...etc. By bringing freedom into a world of physical constants, regularities and determinism, the agent makes morality possible. For if we were only reacting to the past and external factors and commands we would not be free.

An agent is a being capable of positing a value beyond her facts of existence and transforming the indeterminacy of the present towards the creation of that which does not yet exist. The agent is thus shaped by her context, and made who they are by her milieu. Nevertheless, they are not completely captured or defined by any context: "l'impératif vise en moi la possibilité de me produire comme une autonomie qui s'affirme en dominant les circonstances extérieures au lieu d'être dominée par elles. Et le véritable aspect du normatif apparaît ici : la possibilité inconditionnée s'affirme en effet comme mon avenir *possible quel que soit mon passé*." (Sartre, 2015. p.20). Thus the late Sartre favored definition of freedom precisely underlined this point: "un homme peut toujours faire quelque chose de ce qu'on a fait de lui." (Sartre, 1972. p101) Formulated negatively, in the preface to Fanon's *Les Damnés de la Terre*, Sartre puts this freedom of the indigenous as a reason why colonialism will ultimately fail, no matter how much savagery is used for conditioning the colonized: "nous ne devenons ce que nous sommes que par la négation intime et radicale de ce qu'on a fait de nous". (Fanon, 2002. p.25). What has been done to us is important and must be taken into consideration. Sometimes Sartre called this 'le coefficient d'adversité' (Sartre, 2005. p.387) For they determine the margin of real freedom we have. Sometimes, the circumstance is such that all that remains of what we can do is to assume responsibility of what

has been done to us. A resistant who is taken prisoner and forced to confess about the other members of the resistance has one choice left. To speak and betray his friends or to endure torture. Here the norm is always given as unconditionally possible, provided we put our life on the line.⁴⁴ (Sartre, 2015)

In most circumstances, however, freedom is neither this limited nor an unlimited absolute, but a: "petit mouvement qui fait d'un être social totalement conditionné une personne qui ne restitue pas la totalité de ce qu'elle a reçu de son conditionnement; qui fait de Genet un poète, par exemple, alors qu'il avait été rigoureusement conditionné pour être un voleur. Saint Genet est peut-être le livre où j'ai le mieux expliqué ce que j'entends par la liberté. Car Genet a été fait voleur, il a dit : « Je suis le voleur », et ce minuscule décalage a été le début d'un processus par lequel il est devenu un poète, puis, finalement, un être qui n'est plus vraiment en marge de la société, quelqu'un qui ne sait plus où il est, et qui se tait. Dans un cas comme le sien, la liberté ne peut pas être heureuse. Elle n'est pas un triomphe. Pour Genet, elle a simplement ouvert certaines routes qui ne lui étaient pas offertes au départ." (Sartre, 1972. p.101-102)

Commitment: the ontological and the ethical:

Freedom as an ontological commitment:

The ontological commitment in the early Sartre of *Being and Nothingness* refers to consciousness attempt, in every being, to escape contingency, to ground being's existence into an absolute. To become necessary. To become the cause of herself. This commitment to self grounding is, however, vain from an ethical standpoint. Furthermore, it is condemned to perpetual failure. Because we will never succeed in becoming the cause of the self, which is what religions call 'God'. So Sartre concludes in *Being and Nothingness*:

"Toute réalité humaine est une passion en ce qu'elle projette de se perdre pour fonder l'être et pour constituer de même coup l'en-soi qui échappe à la contingence en étant son propre fondement, ens causa sui que les religions nomment Dieu. Ainsi la passion de l'homme est-elle inverse de celle du Christ, car l'homme se perd en tant qu'homme pour que Dieu naisse. Mais l'idée de Dieu est contradictoire et nous nous perdons en vain: l'homme est une passion inutile." (Sartre, 1943. p.660)

The failure of self-grounding, of ens causa sui, turns Sartre into ethics. The fundamental commitment (passion) is freedom as ontological. It is in the nature of consciousness to be committed to ground the self. So this commitment is necessary, inescapable, ineluctable. It is the agent thrown into history. However, it is ethically

44. Again the aim of morality for late Sartre is a integral humanity which precisely means that we should not have choices that include death among them. On this point, we would mention Sartre's answer to the orthodox communists like those in the PCF (Parti Communiste Français) who reproached him for his saying that humans are free. Since, they said, that if they are already free, why would we need a revolution to emancipate them. Of course, Sartre answer is that the quality of the available choices and their quantity are crucial to what concrete freedom is: "Tel est l'homme que nous concevois: homme total. Totalement engagé et totalement libre. C'est pourtant cet homme libre qu'il faut délivrer, en élargissant ses possibilités de choix. En certaines situations, il n'y a place que pour une alternative dont l'un des termes est la mort. Il faut faire en sorte que l'homme puisse, en toute circonstance, choisir la vie." (Sartre, 1948. p.28) In addition, Sartre would add that if freedom was not intrinsic to humans then why liberate them? If freedom was not the defining core of humans, why would they *feel* oppression? Why would they make a revolution? "Nous concevons sans difficulté qu'un homme, encore que sa situation le conditionne totalement, puisse être un centre d'indétermination irréductible." (Sartre, 1948. p.26) Furthermore, there are many dimensions of freedom, as we discuss in this thesis. (ontological, political, economic, social, and so on).

meaningless since it involves no agency exercising a choice. There is no will acting here. It is merely the given of human reality. The situation we find ourselves in as humans by the mere fact of our existence. To make this a little less abstract, we can make an analogy with the situation of the proletariat described by Marx. Oppression and alienation is their condition. It is so by birth. Ethical freedom is not involved yet here. This question comes when a choice, a decision is made by the proletariat: Will he submit to oppression to survive or try to change his situation which is impossible unless he takes on the whole system of capitalism?

Only through commitment (praxis, resistance, revolution...) will the proletariat exercise his freedom in situation within the historical conjecture in which he finds himself. This freedom exercised in situation brings the question of morality. If morality content is not determined by any doctrine or religion but varies historically, then what distinguishes morality is that despite all the social conditioning of the agent, the power of the situation and the weight of history, there is still no determinism, rather there is invention or at least its possibility: "Ce qu'il y a de commun entre l'art et la morale, c'est que, dans les deux cas, nous avons création et invention. Nous ne pouvons pas décider a priori ce qu'il y a à faire" (Sartre, 1946. p.77).

This is important for the thesis defended here. And it is a central point of Sartrean conception of freedom and his morality of history. Morality is freedom exercised in a particular, contingent, historical situation. It is not a set of intangible values we attempt to live by. There is no moral value or rule applies to all situations: "Le normatif comme sens de l'histoire à faire se manifeste à travers la lutte de l'homme historique contre l'homme de la répétition. C'est-à-dire de l'homme historique contre lui-même en tant qu'il est, par l'aliénation même, complice de cette répétition et produit de son propre produit." (Sartre, 2015. p.45)

"Cette responsabilité totale dans la solitude totale, n'est ce pas le dévoilement même de notre liberté?" (Sartre, 1949. p.13)

Freedom as an ethical commitment:

The ethical plan of freedom should be distinguished from its ontological plan, even though both share failure as result. Freedom becomes ethical once we realize the fundamental divisions in history, take a position regarding this fact by rejecting inequality as constitutive of the human situation. Thus joining the oppressed, against all forms of unjustified authority, ultimately seeking the destruction of such authority, and of the power of a human over another, with an ideal of emancipation of all humanity. One failure, in the ontological commitment, happens as one tries to save oneself. The other failure, in the ethical commitment, happens as one participates in the emancipation of all humanity. In Unamuno's words: 'the victorious are those who adapt to the world; the defeated are those who demand that the world adapt to them. Therefore, the entire progress of humanity rests on the shoulders of the defeated.'⁴⁵ It is a failure in the sense that the agent will not witness the goal of emancipation of humanity within her biographical time, although as a result of this failure, there is often a success in self-construction or self-transformation. This commitment is ethical because the agent desires freedom and in desiring it for the self, she desires it for all. So in its action, she takes the freedom of others as an essential condition for the realization of her freedom. And since the victims of racism, imperialism, economic exploitation lack this freedom, in struggling for it with them, she is struggling as well for her own freedom:

45. Unamuno was cited by Unger in his 2017 conference *Inclusive Vanguardism*.

"Lorsque je déclare que la liberté, à travers chaque circonstance concrète, ne peut avoir d'autre but que de se vouloir elle-même, si une fois l'homme a reconnu qu'il pose des valeurs dans le délaissement, il ne peut plus vouloir qu'une chose, c'est la liberté comme fondement de toutes les valeurs. Cela ne signifie pas qu'il la veut dans l'abstrait. Cela veut dire simplement que les actes des hommes de bonne foi ont comme ultime signification la recherche de la liberté en tant que telle. Un homme qui adhère à tel syndicat, communiste ou révolutionnaire, veut des buts concrets ; ces buts impliquent une volonté abstraite de liberté ; mais cette liberté se veut dans le concret. Nous voulons la liberté pour la liberté et à travers chaque circonstance particulière. Et en voulant la liberté, nous découvrons qu'elle dépend entièrement de la liberté des autres, et que la liberté des autres dépend de la nôtre. Certes, la liberté comme définition de l'homme ne dépend pas d'autrui, mais dès qu'il y a engagement, je suis obligé de vouloir en même temps que ma liberté la liberté des autres, je ne puis prendre ma liberté pour but que si je prends également celle des autres pour but. En conséquence, lorsque, sur le plan d'authenticité totale, j'ai reconnu que l'homme est un être chez qui l'essence est précédée par l'existence, qu'il est un être libre qui ne peut, dans des circonstances diverses, que vouloir sa liberté, j'ai reconnu en même temps que je ne peux vouloir que la liberté des autres." (Sartre, 1946. p.84) Therefore, the agent does not renounce struggling for their freedom because of the uncertainty, dangers and almost certain failure of a project of emancipation for all. We find this conception in the common saying: 'il n'est pas nécessaire d'espérer pour entreprendre ni de réussir pour persévérer.' This is how we understand Gramsci's pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the will. The facts point to our historical conjecture verging on the catastrophic. But the will acts despite or perhaps even because of this extremely bad state of affairs. Because without action there surely will not be any change for the better or even hope of change. But with action comes hope, unforeseen possibilities, and perhaps radical change. Even though it is possible that even doing the best we can in the situation, we still fail. What is important is to avoid seeing a radically unjust world and do nothing about it.

This latter conception of failure as a basis of revolutionary morality is found throughout Sartre's life and work: "I assumed that evolution through action would be a series of failures from which something unforeseen and positive would emerge, something implicit in the failure unbeknownst to those who had wanted to succeed. And these are the partial, local successes, hard to decipher by the people who did the work and who, moving from failure to failure, would achieve progress. This is how I have always understood history." (Sartre, 1996. p.66.) His life embodies this maxim. From a series of commitments that mostly failed, he ultimately, in our view, made progress in his as well as our search for what freedom, morality and the good and meaningful life might be.

The point of departure is therefore the present existing conflict; the division within humanity: "The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggles." (Marx, Engels, 2008. P.6).

We are thrown into history; this pool of blood and dirt, were we discover ourselves in violence; floundering in this pool like everyone else. On est 'embarqué', 'nous sommes dedans jusqu'aux cheveux.'?

Freedom as ethical commitment starts with a crushed, humiliated and mutilated humanity, and tries to situate the self within this humanity and with regard to a vision for the emancipation of this humanity as a whole. In so far as the praxis of the exploited -against their inhuman treatment- contains the seeds of a more human future of integral humanity. An ethical commitment starts with the refugee, the orphan, the victim, the

undesired, the deported, the sick, the lonely, the tortured, the dying. It starts with Eric Garner's last words 'I can't breath', while being murdered by the police. So Sartre tells Camus:

"je ne vois autour de moi que des libertés déjà asservies et qui tentent de s'arracher à la servitude natale. Notre liberté aujourd'hui n'est rien d'autre que le libre choix de lutter pour devenir libres. Et l'aspect paradoxal de cette formule exprime simplement le paradoxe de notre condition historique. Il ne s'agit pas, vous le voyez, d'encager mes contemporains ils sont déjà dans la cage; il s'agit au contraire de nous unir à eux pour briser les barreaux. Car nous aussi, Camus, nous sommes encagés, et si vous voulez vraiment empêcher qu'un mouvement populaire ne dégénère en tyrannie, ne commencez pas par le condamner sans recours et par menacer de vous retirer au désert, d'autant que vos déserts ne sont jamais qu'une partie un peu moins fréquentée de notre cage; pour mériter le droit d'influencer des hommes qui luttent, il faut d'abord participer à leur combat; il faut d'abord accepter beaucoup de choses, si l'on veut essayer d'en changer quelques-unes." (Sartre, 1964. p.110)

Freedom as ethical commitment thus starts down to earth. What is this conflict around me is all about? Which side is the oppressed? What do I do about it?

In other words, the good is not to be found by the moral subject in an intangible heaven then an attempt is made to change the world based on this conception of the good. But rather, the good is to be searched together through personal commitment and collective praxis; the good is to be explored and tried and discovered and changed and created in common. The good -creation, love, friendship, art, prosperity- is to be conquered intersubjectively every day. As a consequence, morality, or at any rate the moral project here, must abandon any transcendental values such as good or just as a starting point for a better society. It must learn what they mean in the dirt and blood and confusion of history.

Instead of starting with any such ideals, we start with a realization of the violence, repression, oppression and hierarchy resulting from the arbitrary and unjust but very real divisions within humanity. The world into which we have been thrown functions through these divisions. Internalizing them, and committing to end such violence is the basis of this realist morality of history.

This realization brings a deeper understanding of freedom (as the ontological nature of being) in chains (scarcity, conflict, oppression). Commitment brings a praxis process of freedom involved in resistance and towards emancipation, and understanding itself, and the other through such involvement. Starting from the social and political situation into which we are thrown instead of ideals is precisely what Sartre, Negri, and Badiou have done. Truth being inaccessible or impossible for us is a part of the human condition. But there are truths to be discovered in the facts around us. That our world is radically unjust, that a very small number of people have amassed extreme wealth while the majority of humanity barely survives. Such little truths are the point of departure. It for this reason that Alain Badiou insists that philosophy cannot abandon the search for truth because if it does then human existence will continue to be enslaved by consumerism: "On ne peut s'opposer [...] à l'infini chatoiment de la circulation marchande, à cette espèce de pluralité flexible auquel le désir se trouve enchaîné [...] que si on a un point d'arrêt d'une exigence qui serait inconditionnelle." (Badiou, 2015. p.22-23.) Each of us should find for herself what makes this unconditional point because "tout ce qui, dans ce monde, est sous condition tombe sous la loi de la circulation des objets, des monnaies et des images." (Badiou, 2015. p.22-23). This unconditional point is for everyone to define for themselves through their freedom

as commitment.

Freedom as an ethical commitment finds its source in an ontological intersubjectivity (1) and the agent feeling of the fundamental contradictions in her particular circumstance(2) as well as in the human condition (3).

Freedom as commitment acknowledges our human situation and aspires to overcome these 2 sets of contradictions, the personal and the human, as well as the sterile ontological freedom of being, separateness, scarcity, and death. It seeks to achieve this overcoming through commitment; ultimately belonging to a group. It is still at the level of the subject or at most dyadic.

Let us first see what this means.

1. Ontological intersubjectivity:

As we have seen, in Sartre's early philosophy consciousness was absolutely free. But as early as the immediate post war period, he changed his mind. And near the end of his life, in *Hope Now*, his conception has become one of intersubjective consciousness which forms the core of a moral being: "Aujourd'hui, je considère que tout ce qui se passe pour une conscience dans un moment donné est nécessairement lié, souvent même engendré par [...] l'existence de l'autre. Autrement dit, toute conscience me paraît actuellement, à la fois comme se constituant elle-même comme conscience et, dans le même temps, comme conscience de l'autre et comme conscience pour l'autre. Et c'est cette réalité-là, ce soi-même se considérant comme soi-même pour l'autre, que j'appelle la conscience morale." (Sartre, 1991. p.39-40). The other is constitutive of my own consciousness. For instance, everything around me, and anything I am using now to type this, the place, the software, the laptop, electricity, internet...etc. But also the ideas, the inspiration, and experiences written, even the language itself...etc. All of these are indebted, dependent on, related to, and reminders of the other. The same goes for what is to become of this work. Hence: "Toujours autrui est là et me conditionne", de sorte qu'il y a "dépendance de chaque individu par rapport à tous les individus". (Sartre, 1991. p.40). Our conception of freedom as ethical commitment is grounded in this intersubjective nature of consciousness. "cette dépendance elle-même est libre. [being constitutive, as we have just seen, of my own consciousness]. Ce qu'il y a de caractéristique dans la morale, c'est que l'action, en même temps qu'elle apparaît comme subtilement contrainte, se donne aussi comme pouvant ne pas être faite. Et que donc, quand on la fait, on fait un choix et un choix libre." (Sartre, 1991. p.41) So the point of departure is in intersubjectivity rather than in the ontological (but ethically vain) commitment of consciousness, i.e. ontological freedom. From the most basic ascertainable truth, that of the cogito, I come to realize that even my consciousness is engendered by and for and through the other.

If I have no thesis to submit, I may not be writing this now or perhaps ever. And even if I would write, I will not write it in this format within the specific rules of the department and according to a deadline. Neither will I be taking into account the reader, their background.

Thus the others, including my audience, condition my actions here. It is a form of constraint. But I am still free. Because I have freely chosen to do this work and can still always choose not to do it. But precisely, the idea of freedom here is that I will do it not because of an external constraint, but because of a commitment⁴⁶. And in a

46. That is the freedom in situation, in constraint, choosing to undertake a social action which aims as freedom as an end.

commitment, there is an internal constraint that goes back to the intersubjective nature of my consciousness: "Dans chaque moment [...] où je fais quoi que ce soit, il y a une sorte de réquisition qui va au-delà du réel, et qui fait que l'action que je veux faire comporte une sorte de contrainte intérieure qui est une dimension de ma conscience[...] c'est le départ de la morale" (Sartre, 1991. p.38).

The antagonism is not between individual freedom and social solidarity, but inside each of us, between the individualistic selfish impulse and sociable cooperative impulse. The particular circumstance including education and community determine to a large degree which of these impulses, which side of the antagonism, will prevail.

Freedom is just as central to liberalism. What distinguishes the first dimension of the conception of freedom defended here from the (negative) freedom of liberalism is *how to make it concrete*. Liberalism attempts to do so by enshrining it in charters, constitutions and laws; by protecting it through the justice system and the police. In short, the state and international treaties and law. In such a system, the individual has little role to play beyond perhaps reporting unlawful or unjust behaviors.

In our conception of freedom as commitment, however, we say regardless of whether we have a state or not, freedom is (or at least should be) everyone's task. Enlarging and protecting freedom is everyone's task. In other words, to live in a truly free society, it is not enough to reject and condemn injustice while letting it happen; leaving for others the task of setting free and bringing justice. It simply is not enough to disapprove of injustice. After all, if I was not free (to act), I could still disapprove of it. So being free changes nothing in how I react to injustice?

There is little to no value for me to condemn slavery if I just let it happen. Those affected by it are hardly affected let alone liberated, and neither myself (since I would still remain as I am before condemning it; totally ignorant of what it means to live as a slave). What matters is not my rejection of it, but rather -and here is the conception of freedom as a commitment- what do I do in practice to abolish it. In its most blatant form, but also in its more hidden and subtle ones, like wage slavery. But the point is that I cannot begin to understand this without intervention in concrete situations where my freedom is on the line engaged with other freedoms. Certainly, my own action as one person may have little or probably no effect at all, but it is only in acting that my rejection of slavery has any meaning, that I come to understand better what I am really fighting for and against, and why, and who I am. It is only in acting -in our random example, to fight slavery- that I come to connect to others who are acting with me for a similar goal, and have that intense and infinite freedom of the *groupe-en-fusion* (we discuss later). It is only in acting that I come to know my degree of freedom as an agent, because I come to see what and how and where my freedom is limited. And only when I know that that it becomes possible for me to act in ways to enlarge my freedom, and discover that to enlarge it often means to share it with others, and to enlarge others' freedoms.

Only in actions, that I come in contact with those who accept slavery or even defend it, and engage with them. And above all come in contact with those who are enslaved, their situation, their feelings, their thoughts, their needs. It is only in this commitment that I am free.

What we said for slavery goes for rape, inequality, repression...etc. Do I prevent it or try to change it (with others)? Or do I simply disapprove of it when I see it?

Answering this question for oneself is fundamental to what it means to be free.

2. The agent's realizing the fundamental contradictions in her individual circumstance⁴⁷:

This comes from the realization of the arbitrariness of existing divisions within humanity and the impossibility of justifying them. As a result, the subject rejects these divisions, and aims to overcome them. But while rejecting them, the agent realizes that, no matter what, they have already been taking part in these injustices. Either because they were at a disadvantage and had no other way to claim their due, but to fight. And since the powerful has taken all the precautions to destitute him from any legal or even moral means to fight, he resorts to violence. Or by virtue of their accident of birth, which makes any privileges they may have acquired as a result of this accident unjustified, and how these are not deserved any more than for the majority of humanity that actually lacks them. But since they *are* these privileges, they cannot renounce them unless they renounce life. Hardly possible, when the instinct to live is so profound in human beings.

A theoretician of multiculturalism for instance feels the contradiction between the universal principles of freedom and equality she seeks and the neoliberal situation that has effectively decimated them. Between the universal principle that every human being -particularly in a democracy, every denizen- has an equal right to be heard and to be recognized and to find a place in society. That who she is has no effect whatsoever on evaluating the coherence or veracity of her argument. And the fact that such universal principles are almost never applied in practice. In fact, your voice, your argument are not only affected by who you are (which approximately means what you own), but pretty much determined by it. You could be the most idiotic, least articulate person, and even lie all the time. But if you are rich, your opinion will be heard and will have an influence even on policy. You could even become the president of the most powerful country in history, and have the largest megaphone to voice more obscenities. However, if you are a Muslim refugee escaping Syria to survive. Then no matter your goodness of character, intelligence or knowledge, and your ability to articulate your views, you are likely to have no influence whatsoever. In fact, your argument will hardly be heard at all; you may just as well be singing the national anthem of Andorra.

Furthermore, our political theorist lives not only discovers these contradictions -between the universal principles and the neoliberal structures- outside, but also within herself. Since that refugee -who is most affected if her argument for the universal principles of freedom, equality and democracy are successful- is unlikely to ever read her. While those who actually read her arguments are precisely those who have no personal stake in it. And those who already have an influential voice in practical politics; who can resolve the contradictions she feels are unlikely to take the time to read and think and debate her contribution. And even if they did, her arguments may be sound, logical, coherent, and moral. But they may not be good electoral arguments. They are not ambiguous to help a politician win different constituencies that believe different

47. By fundamental contradiction in an individual's circumstance, I mean the contradiction between the universality of love, human rights, UN charter, morality, and of scientific laws...etc. on one hand and the arbitrary divisions and sectarianism of human into classes, ethnicities, nationalities, religions...etc. on the other hand.

things.⁴⁸ not the empty and easy slogans that will help win an election in a western democracy. Thus the very universal principles she defends and which are supposed to be the basis⁴⁹ of a modern western democracy are precisely why it is impossible for them to be concretized, to become policy.

In short, her work will reach neither those in power, nor those whose life is on the line, on the border, in a concentration camp⁵⁰ somewhere or in a Libyan torture cell. It will remain behind the paywalls of professional journals. And the chasm in the contradictions between the universality of the principles she argues and the neoliberal maelstrom will remain as vast as ever. How she deals with this contradiction, however, may open a way for freedom. So let us now take a concrete case of how one could use these contradictions, making them the source of freedom as a commitment.

Sartre's life exemplifies the commitment of an intellectual. We will take his discussion of it since this dimension of freedom is something political theorists, philosophers, students and professors must reckon with.

Sartre defines the intellectual as a technician of practical knowledge that originated from the needs of the bourgeoisie. This includes teachers, writers, engineers, doctors, scientists, professors, and so on. The practice of one of these professions is a necessary but not sufficient condition to be an intellectual. The technician becomes an intellectual when she discovers outside herself, suffers within herself, and contests the contradictions between the universality she seeks in her work and the laws governing the structures of a neoliberal world. These technicians learn, think, experiment, write and create in universal terms then stumbles in a world where such universality remains a fiction. For her research has universal methods and leads to a universal knowledge (i.e. A physical law or a theorem applies universally, to everyone equally. The truth that all human life is equally precious. A vaccine or a drug is makes no distinction between humans on the basis of their particular identity...etc.). But her situation as a privileged as well as the effective use of her discovery is not universal. It is restricted to those who can afford it: " En bien des cas, avec la complicité du technicien du savoir pratique, les couches sociales privilégiées volent l'utilité sociale de leurs découvertes et la transforment en utilité pour le petit nombre aux dépens du grand. Pour cette raison, les inventions nouvelles demeurent longtemps des instruments de frustration pour la majorité : c'est ce qu'on nomme paupérisation relative. Ainsi le technicien qui invente pour tous n'est finalement — au moins pour une durée rarement prévisible — qu'un agent de paupérisation pour les classes travailleuses. C'est ce qu'on comprend mieux encore lorsqu'il s'agit d'une amélioration notable d'un produit industriel : celle-ci, en effet, n'est utilisée par la bourgeoisie que pour accroître son profit." (Sartre, 1972. p.35). When the technician realizes, furthermore, that they contribute to this

48. The politician argument, being ambiguous, helps him win a maximum of votes because people can interpret it in different ways, compatible with their goals, and vote for him accordingly.

49. The multiculturalist lives this contradiction more so because, in fact, no such universal principles are even possible within the (unquestioned) statist framework of political theory and practical politics. Because governing a contemporary society (again within this framework) requires a bureaucracy. Now, as personal experience and many of the works cited here (and beyond) show, nothing is democratic or egalitarian in an administration. A state bureaucracy is inherently hierarchical and authoritarian. Furthermore, it is not accurate that pluralism or tolerance is found in the West (though it is even worse elsewhere —Eastern Europe, Russia, the Middle East). Because mostly people tolerate others as long as they are just like them. Real tolerance requires difference. Tolerant people would not be having the discourse of integration but rather mutual recognition towards those who are different from them, like Muslims in the West. Plurality through recognition of the other is still extremely rare. Because to recognize the other in this way, I must recognize in her something universal that I share. Otherwise, my pluralism would not be a universal value but an irreducible difference. No society was more pluralistic (in this latter sense) than the Apartheid state in Palestine or the former apartheid South Africa; for them, Arabs and blacks are difference, otherness..

50. What American politicians and mainstream media call detention centers.

situation and that the universal ethics of bourgeois humanism that has been inculcated to them is not universal but remains a form of class humanism; she is constantly struck by the contradictions in the world. If she denounces these contradictions, she becomes an intellectual. It is only through her work that she discovers these contradictions, and so as long as she continues doing this work, she goes on living these contradictions.

Thus she is constantly torn apart inside by her own contradictions; seeing herself as a monster which is to say a being created by societies to serve purposes other than their own:

"Ainsi les techniciens du savoir sont produits par la classe dominante avec une contradiction qui les déchire : d'une part, en tant que salariés et fonctionnaires mineurs des superstructures, ils dépendent directement des dirigeants (organismes « privés » ou État) et se situent nécessairement dans la particularité, comme un certain groupe de secteur tertiaire, d'autre part en tant que leur spécialité est toujours l'universel, ces spécialistes sont la contestation même des particularismes qu'on leur a injectés et qu'ils ne peuvent contester sans se contester eux-mêmes. Ils affirment qu'il n'y a pas de « science bourgeoise » et pourtant leur science est bourgeoise par ses limites et ils le savent. Il est vrai, cependant, qu'au moment précis de la recherche, ils travaillent dans la liberté, ce qui rend plus amer encore le retour à leur condition réelle." (Sartre, 1972. p35-36).

Sartre gives the example of nuclear scientists whose work has been used or abused by politicians to make the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and use it to annihilate the populations of entire cities. As scientists, the practice of universality is everyday in nuclear physics, and in its discoveries. As scientists, they create, but do not reflect on the use of their creation. However, when these very scientists, horrified by the destructive power of what they have made, get together and sign a manifesto to warn the public against the use of the bomb, they become intellectuals. This is an instance of freedom as commitment. They feel the contradictions between the universality of knowledge and the sectarianism of ideology inside them and realize these contradictions are their world. They overstep all the limits of their profession by taking a moral position on the use of their work; creating nuclear technology is one thing, deciding how to use is another. They even use their notoriety or their skill to steer and violent the public opinion; as if their political intervention on the use of the discovery was not separated by an unbridgeable chasm from scientific knowledge. Third, they do not contest the use of the bomb because of any technical defects in it, but rather "au nom d'un système de valeurs éminemment contestable qui prend pour norme suprême la vie humaine."⁵¹ (Sartre, 1972. p.13-14).

51. Is Sartre right that human life is so contestable a norm? Certainly in wars and at the height of the cold war when intellectuals, worried about the prospects of nuclear Armageddon, have gathered to sign the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. But is it the supreme value in today's 'peace'? We think it still is not, because we do not consider our times peaceful, if peace is not merely the absence of world embracing conflicts, though there is that too for instance in the 1% war against the 99%. The point is that even outside of war zones, and beyond intense social and political upheavals in (materially) poorer countries, there is extreme violence: "L'ordre humain n'est qu'un désordre encore, il est injuste, précaire, on y tue, on y meurt de faim" (Sartre, 1964. p.128) Even in the ordered, relatively peaceful societies, their very fabric is torn apart by their inability to attend to the needs of the many inside and outside them, and to reach out across -class, ethnic, gender, religious, national and supranational- dividing lines. Their 'peace' has been and still is the result of the subjugation and oppression of the worldwide 'énorme masse des démunis' through colonialism and the 'nouvelles pratiques impériales' (Badiou, 2016b. p.25-29) including the dispossessed within these western societies: 'les ouvrières de provenance étrangère, leurs enfants, les réfugiés, les habitants des sombres cités, les musulmans fanatiques.' (Badiou, 2016b. p.41) This is a major operation of the ruling elites in Western states which has always been a winning electoral strategy since the National Socialists have perfected it in Germany nine decades ago. It consists at acknowledging the problems and worries of the middle class, the basis of 'democracy' in these states. But then instead of taking responsibility that these problems result from their policies, they create an enemy onto which to shift the fear of destitution of the middle class. That enemy must be so weak and undefended and so it is found in the most vulnerable strata of the population, and promise that, if elected, they will do all they can (more violence, police, prisons, surveillance, military, deportations, deals with dictators...etc.) to stop these dangerous masses. Conservative thinks tanks, a collection of identity obsessed public figures, and the 'free' corporate media follow with a commentary that parrots these arguments

Such a norm should be not be so contestable, but it is. We think that this particular norm belongs to an important categories of norms that are "doubly universal" in that it is "virtually always professed", but simultaneously "almost universally rejected in practice". (Chomsky, 2015. p. 60)

For in setting public policies, -whether for nuclear disarmament, gun control, healthcare, the environment, you name it- states have shown it. That not only for non-citizens, but even for their own disenfranchised majority, the supreme values remain profit and love of power.

We have seen in the situation of the intellectual freedom as commitment unfolding from the motive of contradictions. The realization of grave injustice, and her participation in it, powerless to stop it but nevertheless revolting against this abuse of her work, contesting authority, affirming the universality by claiming the freedom of all in order to be herself free. That is not being alienated from the product of her work that is used to ends contrary to the universality she pursues and through which she explores and discovers.

"That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." (Russell, 1993. P.67)

3. The agent becoming aware of the fundamental contradictions in the human condition:

These are the contradictions between our finite circumstances and our longing to the infinite.

That "everything in our existence points beyond itself. We must nevertheless die." (Unger, 2014. p.1). The contradictions between our inevitable death and the fecundity of our possibilities, creations and ideas. Between our capacity to learn and to know and our ignorance of the ultimate reasons.

For Unger the agent is a paragon of contradictions: "The human agent, shaped and manacled by context and tradition, by established arrangements and enacted dogma, fastened to a decaying body, surrounded in birth and death by enigmas he cannot dispel, desperately wanting he know not what, confusing the unlimited for

reflexively in the name of covering the elections or, when honest, because covering the spectacles of clowns bring them profits (some CEO like NBC's have admitted that Trump is bad for the country bad has been really good for them). This operation repeated ad nauseum has been called democracy. After all isn't it free speech, free media, free debates, free and fair elections? In fact what this 'democracy' amounts to is the creation of a "guerre civile rampante, dont nous observons de plus en plus les sinistres effets" (Badiou, 2016b. p.41), witness the white supremacists series of mass murders, as just one example. This is why it is precisely the task of intellectuals today -if their goal is freedom- to focus on uncovering and exposing these particular forms of extreme violence: the hidden violence of hate speech, the less obvious one, the less spectacular (than open warfare with tanks and fighter jets) violence of manipulative and deceitful political discourse, and the violence of homelessness, of isolation, and debt, of exclusion, discrimination and marginalization. It is not because it is hidden that it is any less cruel or destructive to the lives of those who are affected by it. And they are millions. Political theory is well placed in its interests, its scope and methods to play a role here.

which he longs with an endless series of paltry tokens, demanding assurance from other people, yet hiding within himself and using things as shields against others, somnambulant most of the time yet sometimes charged and always inexhaustible, recognizing his fate and struggling with it even as he appears to accept it, trying to reconcile his contradictory ambitions but acknowledging in the end or, deep down, all the time that no such reconciliation is possible or if possible not lasting." (Unger, 2007. p.37)

This is the idea of personal freedom; we are the beings who cannot be defined or contained by any existing structure; we spill over. As Unger notes, the structures are finite in relation to us. And we are infinite with regard to them. (Unger, 2014. p.2) We can see more and do more and make more than any structure can accommodate or predict. But we cannot understand this personal freedom, let alone practice it (and there is a dialectic between understanding and practice) without starting first from current problems in our societies, from our current historical conjecture. Because if we do start from the self as a separate standalone unit, we are likely to arrive at a distorted conception of freedom.

Unger notes, there is always more in us, in each of us individually, as well as in all of us collectively, the human race, than there is or ever can be in them. We cannot only defy the contexts and the structures, but we can seek to transform their character so that they are no longer just there beyond the reach of challenge, but come to respect and to nourish our structure-revising freedom.

A third way to state the project, is that by realizing how little we have advanced in the political realm, the personal project of a meaningful life has been extremely difficult to live.

Because personal freedom, as it will be argued develops in a collective; work, projects, relationships...etc. Just as a person happiness, be it intellectual, material, affective or spiritual is a collective enterprise. Its conditions of possibility are laid down and enhanced through the work, ideas and affections of others. Similarly freedom is not an isolated free conscious in an indifferent universe. The status of others' freedom and the relationships between the agent and the collective is primordial for the freedom of that agent. For instance, if the realms of work and politics are too ossified into a hegemonic system -what Badiou, for instance, calls *capitalo-parlementarisme*⁵² (Badiou, 2012)- then the cost of any deviation, of non-conformity from an individual is too high to bear alone. This is why the second dimension of freedom I discuss here, in groups and social movements is important. Emancipatory or revolutionary politics could act as a buffer between a rigid state with too little flexibility in its structure and an individual living, in a non orthodox way, her project of self-invention. Because a meaningful life cannot be constructed as a concept let alone lived or realized through an individual moral psychology alone.

A conception of freedom, as at once commitment, praxis, emancipatory/revolutionary politics, and the common will be my focus. Such conception will show that understanding or living freedom at one level requires the others as well. If this is right then this conception will challenge the division commonly agreed upon, and even

52. It designates the fusion of a 'free' market economy with a governing oligarchy.

the irreconcilability seen between private life and public life, means and ends, morality and politics.

We have seen how the nature of consciousness as intersubjectivity, the realization of the contradictions of one's situation and of the human condition all contribute to a move towards commitment. Nevertheless, we are not just our conscious, we carry the burdens of our stories and experiences, of traditions and cultures, of biases, stereotypes and prejudices. In short, we are dragged down we are not yet those beings who can recognize one another as context transcending agents. So what do we do in the meantime?

"The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles. Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes." Marx and Engels, 2008.

III. The group and movement dimension. Freedom as praxis⁵³.

A social freedom independent of the corporate state.

A materialist conception of freedom is concrete. It assumes that freedom includes fulfilling our basic needs and at least some of our desires and aspirations. Therefore, to be free, we are bound to live in societies because of most of our needs, desires and hopes cannot be fulfilled in isolation. But what we gain through society in access to the conditions of possibility for freedom, we lose by accepting what has been termed the social contract. We surrender to the rule of the dead over the living.

But what if we could only have the gains of a life in society without the losses?

My argument here is that this is possible if we transform the social order or the model of social organization we have, and replace social fetters with social bonds: "the whole tenor of the ideas and arguments unfolded in this essay might fairly be reduced to this, that while they would break all fetters in human society, they would attempt to find as many new social bonds as possible. The isolated man is no more able to develop than the one who is fettered." (Humboldt, 1969. p.98). In this part, I will try to show how we can move from freedom as a commitment of an agent to the group and the movement. And in the next part to more durable (in space-time) freedom in the Common without loss of individual freedom. In this part, we deal with the difficult problem of how and when a group of people can still enjoy, and even expand, the freedom that each had on their own as an agent .

Freedom is most often thought of as an individual concept, but this is only its simplest form. We may know this dimension best because we live in a system that values this particular one, and only this one. However, other dimensions exist. We refer to them here and there when we say freedom of assembly or a free society. But even then, it is only a reference to their negative form, that is even collective freedom is only conceived as absence of interference or repression from the state upon individuals. Other aspects are forgotten. So when a group of people come together to help each others, to build something or share an idea that benefits everyone, there is a form of social freedom here. We become freer not through isolation within private property and the accumulation of things to replace our need for each other, but rather through openness to others and to the new, through social solidarity, cooperation, and the creation as well as the development of our passions and capabilities. All of this depends on the others. So for Bakunin, the "liberty of everyone which, far from finding itself checked by the freedom of others, is, on the contrary, confirmed by it and extended to infinity." (Bakunin, 1953. p.270). We become freer in a society where agents are solidaristic, where they care for, cooperate, create and

53. For Sartre, praxis is human action in a historical context. Praxis is dialectical; it proceeds through clashes of contradictions which it overcomes. It partially negates what is in order to make what is not yet, the situation to change, the goal to reach and ultimately the reproduction of life. "La praxis comporte le moment du savoir pratique qui révèle, dépasse, conserve et déjà modifie la réalité." (Sartre, 1972. p.14-15). In his morality of history, Sartre defines the normative as praxis by which he means "le faire se subordonnant le connaître et l'avoir et découvrant son but comme l'unité de son travail et de sa peine." (Sartre, 2015. p.51)

develop with others, because almost nobody would then need to see life as a zero sum game of competition for survival, and hurt others for fear of getting hurt by them.

If the corporate-state power constrains free agency, as we will argue, then collective freedom is necessary to defend and enhance individual freedom. We become freer not through begging an almighty state to grant us liberties, police and protect our neighborhoods, institute and guarantee individual rights, enforce contracts, and obedience through judiciary system with pecuniary and penitentiary threats. Because freedom cannot be given from an outside authority. It cannot be based on exclusion of the majority of the poor, on the preservation of inequalities, on equal rules and laws applying to unequal persons. It cannot be protected by fear, threats, penalties, violence, punishment and prisons.

Social freedom is a process that requires understanding and sensibility, a change of consciousness. It is a constructive project. It is conquered through actions such as civil disobedience. As practiced for example by the US Civil Rights Movement and nowadays by Extinction Rebellion. It is built on the field; communicating openly, working together, solving problems, experimenting and learning. It requires inclusion, diversity, and adaptation to the difference in each of us. It requires an interest in the other. It requires the flowering of plurality. It grows in the efforts and investment of time in relationships. Freedom requires practice, and this practice happens collectively. And it carries risks that a police state with a closed unfree society may be able to avoid. But if we decide we want a free society then there is no shortcut to the millennium. I would argue that there is no way for a free society to develop unless individuals are given freedom, despite the problems, mistakes and conflicts that may arise from misusing or abusing it. Everyone acquires its taste through the practice and experiments of what it means to be free with others. The usual arguments of many politicians and others who justify authority, domination, hierarchy and oppression with expressions of deception like these: "The people are not yet ready for freedom. They need guidance. They need representation. They cannot make such important decisions. They still do not know what is best for them. We must use force and severe punishment or we will have high crimes and anarchy." All this is designed to keep power indefinitely concentrated in their hands, in the hands of the few. Rousseau had already seen these arguments and denounced those politicians who "indulge in the same sophistry about the love of liberty as philosophers about the state of nature. They judge, by what they see, of very different things, which they have not seen; and attribute to man a natural propensity to servitude, because the slaves within their observation are seen to bear the yoke with patience; they fail to reflect that it is with liberty as with innocence and virtue; the value is known only to those who possess them, and the taste for them is forfeited when they are forfeited themselves." (Rousseau, 2005. P. 83). The practice of freedom will be fruitful if the milieu and education are inclusive, cooperative and solidaristic rather than exclusive, selfish and greedy. This is because freedom is an essential attribute of the human condition, and only its corruption makes us surrender freedom, seek the little material security of the corporate-state, and sing in our chains: "We cannot therefore, from the servility of nations already enslaved, judge of the natural disposition of mankind for or against slavery; we should go by the prodigious efforts of every free people to save itself from oppression. I know that the former are for ever holding forth in praise of the tranquility they enjoy in their chains [...]. But when I observe the latter sacrificing pleasure, peace, wealth, power and life itself to the preservation of that one

treasure, which is so disdained by those who have lost it; when I see free-born animals dash their brains out against the bars of their cage, from an innate impatience of captivity; when I behold numbers of naked savages, that despise European pleasures, braving hunger, fire, the sword and death, to preserve nothing but their independence, I feel that it is not for slaves to argue about liberty.”(Rousseau, 2005, p.83-84). One can think of many contemporary examples here.

One of the founding thinkers of liberalism, Wilhem von Humboldt, expressed this very same idea, that freedom, being the core of human nature, is the “indispensable condition”, the “true end of man” which is the “highest and most harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.” (Humboldt, 1969. p.16) Humboldt explicitly notes that the “most important duty” for the revolutionary is that “he must make men [...] ripe for freedom by every possible means”. For Humboldt, it is also the “simplest” duty because “nothing promotes this ripeness for freedom so much as freedom itself”. So here we have a confluence of the means and ends of an emancipatory political project. And again, like we have seen in Rousseau, a warning against those who reject this truth, using “unripeness for freedom as an excuse for continuing repression”. For Humboldt, as for Rousseau, this truth follows “unquestionably from the very nature of man. The incapacity for freedom can only arise from a want of moral and intellectual power. To heighten this power is the only way to supply the want, but to do so presupposes the freedom which awakens spontaneous activity.” (Humboldt, 1969. P.136) It is the task of an education that presupposes freedom in the natural constitution of every human being to heighten these moral and intellectual powers; to empower. It is no wonder that Humboldt was a theorist of education, as were many liberals who shared his view, like Mill, Dewey, and Russell.

In our era, neoliberals and authoritarians justify restrictions on freedom by arguing that this is the price to pay for a market society which provides humans the little comforts and enjoyments they crave and prefer to a larger life. But is freedom really only or mainly that of possessing, of having? Or is it of being and doing, of connecting and developing? The problem is even starker when having leaves no time and energy for being and developing, and self-government. Humboldt criticizes those of his time who espoused such views “may justly be suspected of misunderstanding human nature, and wishing to make men into machines.” (Humboldt, 1969. p. 24). Similarly, in his defense of the French revolution despite its violence aspect, Kant wrote that “Freedom is the precondition for acquiring the maturity for freedom, not a gift to be granted when such maturity is achieved.” He rejected the proposition that violence shows that people are not ripe for freedom. Because “if one accepts this assumption, freedom will never be achieved; for one can not arrive at the maturity for freedom without having already acquired it; one must be free to learn how to make use of one’s powers freely and usefully. The first attempts will surely be brutal and will lead to a state of affairs more painful and dangerous than the former condition under the dominance but also the protection of an external authority. However, one can achieve reason only through one’s own experiences and one must be free to be able to undertake them... To accept the principle that freedom is worthless for those under one’s control and that one has the right to refuse it to them forever, is an infringement on the rights of God himself, who has created man to be free.”⁵⁴ This defense of freedom happened in the context of the violent episodes in the French revolution which lead some to reject it.

54. Kant citation comes from the editor's note 50 in Bakunin, 1967. p.426.

Humboldt concurs: “We cannot call it giving freedom, when bonds are relaxed which are not felt as such by him who wears them. But of no man on earth -however neglected by nature and however degraded by circumstances- is this true of all bonds which oppress him. Let us undo them one by one, as the feeling of freedom awakens in men's hearts, and we shall hasten progress as every step.” (Humboldt, 1969. p. 136)

The late Sartre goes so far as to affirm that freedom is only possible in a group. But a free group is certainly not made of clones, but of individualities. So not only should it tolerate and accommodate the extreme diversity of humans, but value it, encourage and help develop, as a universal singularity⁵⁵, to its own ideal. So much so that the supreme moral task of each member within a group would be to enlarge the other's freedom, to recognize, and give it more depth and scope. In a sense, we do this all the time, but in a very restricted social role or station and generally towards a small number of people. The task is to generalize it. For example, in the case of an educator and his pupil: to the extent the educational task of the educator is successful, the pupil is free; that means that through this education her future is no longer determined by her past. The point is extending each other's freedom independent of our roles, and beyond the social station we occupy.

Conservatives who have been -since the origins of conservatism- preoccupied with fear of loss have a different conception of freedom. Fearing the loss of freedom where it has been achieved, conservatives have tried to limit its extension in order not to risk losing the negative freedom they have. (Jones, 2017) This is the opposite of the anarchists' (as well as the Sartrean) conception of freedom who risk their own freedoms through engagement, activism and politics in order to enlarge and extend freedom to those who lack it. The oppressed and exploited for instance.

In general, idealistic conceptions of freedom are so focused on inner freedom, barely going beyond the feelings of the individual. The stoics, for instance, on this basis said even a slave is free. The dimensions of freedom we defend here are all, on the contrary, concrete and affected by circumstance and the situation. They relate to behavior and action as well as attitudes.

Individualistic conceptions of freedom are dominant, and tend to result in a split between morality and politics. In fact they see politics as necessary precisely because we cannot rely on human morality or the world will fall apart. As such, these individualistic conceptions of freedom often lead to reactionary attitudes in politics. (see our discussion of Hayek and Friedman). Social freedom recognizes our dependence on each other to develop in every realm (intellectual, spiritual, material...), that it is impossible to be truly free surrounded by others who are not. It is concrete as it takes the form of "indignation about a particular event, the will to change a particular institution"...etc. (Sartre, 1998. p.33) It takes the form of solidarity, cooperation, and the social and political struggle for the emancipation of all humanity. One essential aspect of this conception of freedom is that it frees the self from the burdens of the accident of birth; preference to those similar, cultural bias, tribal loyalties. Thus extending the circle of sympathy, solidarity and cooperation outside of its original limited circle of friends and family selfishness. Such freedom which Sartre called engagement cultivates the field of emancipatory politics.

55. The universal singularity attempts to overcome both individualist and collective subjectivities. The former, as C.B. MacPherson (1985) has shown is the basis of neoliberal dogma. And this is the pathological freedom we find in the works of Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan...etc. The latter is based on an inherited identity (such as class or ethnicity). They both assign a fate to subjectivity, and are counter to the basic idea (we defend here) that a defining attribute of freedom is that humans are projects. That they can and should become what they choose. That we are always in process of creating the self. (Existence precedes essence...etc.)

Freedom in this sense bridges politics and morality: "lorsque nous combattons pour quelque chose, il y a une manière de vouloir cette chose qui est une façon de vouloir implicitement la liberté. On peut lutter simplement pour élever le niveau intellectuel d'un group de gens, pour revendiquer pour ces gens ou pour d'autres des droits précis, et c'est en faisant cela qu'on perpétue et qu'on affirme la liberté humaine." (Sartre, 1998. p.32) and again: "La liberté se fait au jour le jour et concrètement dans des actions concrètes où elle est impliquée." (Sartre, 1998. p. 33)

The Multitude as an emancipatory and revolutionary subjectivity.

Beyond the dyadic relationship, the social freedom we just discussed requires a form of organization, of decision making and self-government that does not denature it. Without treasuries and armies, organization is the only form of power the Multitude possesses to resist, to transform, and to create. A constituent power, For Hardt and Negri, the Multitude are singularities that act in common. (Negri, Hardt, 2004. p.105). It is an immanent 'biopolitical self-organization' (Negri, Hardt, 2000. p.41) where biopolitics is the 'power of life' (Negri, Hardt, 2009. p.57-58) rather than the power over life (which is biopower, a Foucauldian Concept). Singularity and commonality are the conditions of the possibility of the Multitude. In addition to these conditions, a political project is needed to bring the Multitude into existence. (Negri, Hardt, 2004. p.212). This project is the Common. The Multitude is a class concept that updates the revolutionary subjectivity of the working class, the former proletariat, to the 21st century society. (Negri, Hardt, 2004. p.104). The metropolis is to the Multitude what the factory was for the working class. (Negri, Hardt, 2009. p. 250). Such shift of the exploitation -and thus of the struggle from freedom- from the industry or even the economic sphere in general to the whole of social life has already been observed by Negri in the 1970s in Italy. Similarly, the political concept of class results from "collective acts of resistance", from "struggles in common" against exploitation and domination. (Negri, Hardt, 2004. p.104) The Multitude attempts to capture the complexity of these changes. Multitude is "latent and implicit" (Negri, Hardt, 2004. p.112) in "all of those whose labour is directly or indirectly exploited by and subject to capitalist modes of production and reproduction". (Negri, Hardt, 2000. p.52). Because one fundamental problem in social struggles is the prioritization or the ranking of struggles. There is no agreed upon answer to the question of which is more urgent or which is more important among those involved in these struggles (the anti-racist, the feminist, the environmentalist, the class struggle...etc.). Furthermore, it has always been the case that the dominant against which any of these struggles aim attempts to divide and rule. In addition, it seems that the insistence on one struggle may alienate some, rightly or wrongly, against all other struggles. For instance, in the past decades, many in the rural areas or the working classes have not recognized themselves in the environmentalist movement, because they are not enough informed or just too worried about their living necessities to care for anything else. As a consequence, these people may switch to somewhere from the center to far right. So instead of insisting on the environment with them, we should start from where they are, their daily problems, and join them in their own class or whatever struggle before asking them to join ours (environmentalism, anti-racism, feminism...etc.). Examples along these lines can be multiplied. Indeed, in the life of one person, a struggle may become more or less prioritized depending on where they live, and how, their relationships, their work...etc. In high school, as a good old liberal, I was not much aware of how crucial feminist

and environmentalist struggles are in this world. Having lived in a military dictatorship, civil rights were mostly what was meant by freedom. In any case, one should always seek to enlarge their perspective and put their own struggle in relation with and in dialogue with others'. So Hardt and Negri would say the question is not which axe of domination and corresponding struggle is more important, but rather where are the points of intersection and communication -and we would add reconciliation- between the subjectivities engaged in various and occasionally conflicting struggles. The Multitude attempts to fill this role in the organization of a project of liberation. We agree with them in general, though we add that in some places, some particular struggles may be more important or more urgent than others.

What is interesting in the concept of the Multitude, and the reason for adopting it in my work is its inclusiveness and its international emphasis. It is no longer fixed on the industrial working class; thus adapting to our current situation. The Multitude includes those who work in the service industry, in the caring economy as well as part time workers, the precariat, the so-called illegal workers...etc. But it goes beyond oppression and exploitation at work. It includes the homeless, the unemployed, the disabled, single parents families, students, migrants, and so on. In short, it is the 99% rather than the proletariat which becomes the potential revolutionary force in politics. However, being potentially within the Multitude does not mean having this subjectivity yet. So in *Commonwealth*, the insistence is on making the Multitude rather than being it. (Negri, Hardt, 2009. p.169)

Yet one problem with the idea of the Multitude as revolutionary subjectivity is that Negri and Hardt do not deal with the reactionary subjectivities⁵⁶ which may just as well result from the current neoliberal vicissitudes. Such counter-revolutionary subjectivities would not be antagonistic to neoliberalism, they may oppose their emancipatory politics or even engage in struggles against any progressive moves. What do we do with them? One of our tasks as militants-thinkers is precisely to analyze how and why, under what conditions the suffering from a given situation, like wage slavery, may lead to the development a reactionary subjectivity in a group (kick out all the foreigners, small state so cut taxes, medicare, education subsidies...etc.) and a revolutionary one in another group (seeking to free all labor from wage slavery). Offering a real alternative to neoliberalism is one proposition of this work; in the form of freedom in the Common and in the subjectivity of the Multitude in its praxis of emancipation and revolution. Because if no alternative is available to the vast majority of humanity

56. Indeed, contrary to Hardt and Negri's revolutionary Multitude, Badiou only sees 3 typical existing subjectivities that are all reactionary: 'occidentale', 'désir d'occident' and 'nihiliste'. By typical subjectivity, he means psychological forms of convictions and of affect produced by the structures of the contemporary neoliberal world order. The first is that of the 40% middle class that shares 14% of the wealth (the world oligarchy of 10% concentrating 86% of the wealth while 50% of the world population owns nothing). It is torn by the contradiction of arrogance and pretension of civilization on the one hand and the brutal fear of "se voir balancer, à partir des 14% qu'on partage, du côté des 50% qui n'ont rien". As the repository of the 'capitalo-parlementarisme' its identity is that of 'salié-consommateur.' It must sell its labor for Capital, receive its due crumbs, and spend it on the endless products of Capital. The second and third subjectivities are those of people whose world has been devastated by Capital exploitation, but are fascinated by the life of that middle class (concentrated in the West). So they desire to get there but when they cannot get, they try to copy the neoliberal society of consumption where they live (2nd subjectivity). Or, some in their frustration, attempt revenge by destroying that (model) which is so desired and so inaccessible. This is the nihilism of 'celui dont la vie est comptée pour rien' who knows that if he does not destroy that which he so desires (through mass murder, including suicide bombing), he will be unable to escape succumbing to it. For the ruling oligarchy, a large part of people with these 2 subjectivities (Badiou estimates that part at over 2 billion) are nonexistent in their calculus for taking over lands, extracting resources, profits and deal-making with the local puppet rulers (or the mafia they would put in place in case of the ruler disobedience. See under Qadafi) in these countries. Since these 2 billions cannot buy any of the products of Capital (because they have no access to its labor market), they should not even exist. (Badiou, 2016b. p.39-44)

which is excluded from neoliberal gains, some will definitely join the various forms of fascism, be they Western or Islamist. In fact, we think this is what is happening. For Badiou, since these reactionary subjectivities are the result of capitalism alliance either with modernity in the West or with tradition in other societies, his proposition is to break capitalism monopoly on modernity. To develop through emancipatory politics an alternative modernity to the only modernity available now (the capitalistic). And through this same move to affirm that the main contradiction should no longer be between modernity and tradition, but rather between capitalism and communism. (Badiou, 2016a. Ch.8)

Reform or revolution?

We live in a counter-revolutionary moment after a long period of upheavals in the XIX and XX centuries. In such reactionary times, any such project radical transformation appears as a fantasy or a danger. If we add the postmodern rejection of truths, meta-narratives, transcendence and progress, then what is remaining?

The reform versus revolution is an old leftist debate, but also a real conflict between various figures, and movements. Some have switched sides, not always because of a moral conviction. For instance, revolutionary communist William Morris fell back to parliamentary reformism after the 1887 bloody Sunday when the state violently repressed a mass demonstration in Trafalgar Square. (Prichard, et al. 2012. p.41). Without getting into this false binary choice -reform versus revolution- that has long haunted leftists, it is worthwhile explicating the difference simply as follows. We cannot totally reject reform, but we should relegate it to a secondary order. We must not reject it a priori, because there are emergencies which have to be addressed now with whatever inadequate instruments we currently have such as the courts and the legislation of political representatives. Nevertheless, even then, we should bend and stretch these instruments, using them incongruously; to the end of transforming them for our purposes, rather than adapting our goals to their limits. Yet reform is surely not enough since it exists and is enacted through the oppressor. In its dynamic it acknowledges this imbalance, and often times legitimates the forces of reaction. Because reform involves submitting a demand from a group or a movement to their so-called representatives in order to effect this or that change like raising the minimum wage, and the process at best resulting in a policy change.

Freedom as emancipatory and revolutionary politics.

Emancipatory politics is a globalization of democratic struggles and aspirations. It redefines globalization as it redefines democracy so that both are popular, horizontal, bottom-up movements of constructive and creative solidarity. The aim is to end power as a form of coercion, exploitation and domination of class or a group or an agent over an other while simultaneously increasing their power over their material world and circumstance. But precisely, how can you those who are emancipated do not become the oppressors of tomorrow? This is problem we are trying to deal with in this study by thinking of freedom in other ways in other settings:

"Si un homme est libre, ça signifie qu'il a un pouvoir, mais ce pouvoir ne doit absolument pas être un pouvoir de contrainte. Dans une société où les membres seront tous hors d'état d'exercer une contrainte les uns sur les autres, puisqu'ils sont tous également libres, nous aurons des formes de pouvoir qui ne seront plus le pouvoir politique, bourgeois ou socialiste, tel que nous le connaissons. Impossible alors qu'il y ait dans les institutions, quelque chose qui soit contre les individus." (Sartre, 1974. p.345). In other words, some conception of freedom

that is multi-dimensional may help us deal with the problem of the relationship between freedom and power. In fact, Negri built on his interpretation of Spinoza's two conceptions of power: 'potestas' versus 'potentia' or 'pouvoir' versus 'puissance' where the first means the "centralized, mediating, transcendental force of command" while the second means "local, immediate, actual force of constitution" power. This distinction marks "two fundamentally different forms of authority and organization that stand opposed in both conceptual and material terms, in metaphysics as in politics-in the organization of being as in the organization of society." (Negri, 1991. p.xiii) Potentia is thus as Hardt notes in his forward: "an effective "other" to Power: a radically distinct, sustainable, and irrecoverable alternative for the organization of society." (Negri, 1991. p.xi). In the context of our study, freedom would be at once be the destruction of potestas at its sources of concentrated private and state power, and the conquering of potentia for ordinary humanity. Or, as Negri puts it, "in Hobbes, freedom yields to power. In Spinoza, power yields to freedom." (Negri, 1991. p.20) For Negri, this makes Spinoza's thought the "birthplace of modern and contemporary revolutionary materialism", "an enormous anomaly" that attaches itself permanently to "the revolutionary contents of the humanistic proposal." (Negri, 1991. p.20)

Unlike revolutionary politics, emancipatory politics may happen in countries where it is not a priority to get ride of the state. Emancipation can aim for radical and antagonistic reforms and resistances as subsidiary goals to the one outlined above in relation to power. Therefore its actions against and outside the state are -in so far as it is necessary to pay any attention to the state- unfortunate. To the extent that the state is more democratic than the corporation, it is possible for the political subjects to exert some influence (however marginal) on its decisions and policies. For this reason it is coherent that emancipatory politics should support reinforcing some state sectors (e.g. health care, education, research and development) while simultaneously attempting to shut down others (e.g. military-prison complex), and ultimately aiming at abolishing the state if required. In other words, the primary enemy is not the state, but what all that it represents which is the aberrant form of human relations. It is that form -cold, conformist, hierarchical, unequal and oppressive-- that we shall be most concerned about. As for the state, it is merely the symptom (albeit a monstrous one at that!) of that deeper illness. This is why anarchists had no illusion that the mere absence of state does not mean more freedom; public censure or social control could be just as intrusive and oppressive. (Godwin, 1842. p.163; Kropotkin, 2008. p.74 & p.86)

The primary aim of revolutionary politics is the becoming of a humane society of free and equal beings. Its aim is thus still revolutionary since we start from where we are. The goals of such revolution would be the transformation of consciousness, the overthrow of the established order, and the institutional reconstruction of society.

Every revolutionary movement has its own constituency. Its constituents is not merely the proletariat (as for Marx) or the lumpenproletariats (as for Bakunin); the workers or the unemployed, the migrants or the locals. But rather what Hardt and Negri call the Multitude which is "a radical diversity of social subjectivities that do not spontaneously form together but instead require a political project to organize" (Negri and Hardt, 2017, p.69) Inclusiveness is one of its values. Its perspective is that of the vulnerable, excluded and oppressed. Its

aim is the democracy of the Multitude which is only possible through sharing and participating of all in the Common.

Hardt and Negri develop an ontology of the Multitude which makes them think that, against all odds, the subjugated Multitude holds sway over Empire:

"From one perspective Empire stands clearly over the multitude and subjects it to the rule of its overarching machine, as a new Leviathan. At the same time, however, from the ontological perspective, the hierarchy is reversed. The multitude is the real productive force of our social world, whereas Empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives off the vitality of the multitude—as Marx would say, a vampire regime of accumulated dead labour that survives only by sucking off the blood of the living." (Negri and Hardt, 2000. p.62)

Sartre's discussion of the *pratico-inerte* takes as the example the workers becoming a passive tool of the machine which thus turns from a creative idea of someone to an idea of its own. Thus the exploited new producers no longer enjoy freedom of action despite being the real source of production of all goods: "Les « damnés de la terre » ce sont précisément les seuls qui soient capables de changer la vie, qui la changent chaque jour, qui nourrissent, habillent, logent l'humanité entière." (Sartre, 1985. P. 296)

But precisely, being the producers and creators for all, give them power over their exploiters:

This is an interesting way to restate by that the real power resides in the people, not the dominant class, and this remains true no matter how exploited they are.

In *Commonwealth*, Hardt and Negri use the concept of biopolitical to emphasize our times blurred boundaries between labor and life, and between production and reproduction. The result is that exploitation no longer resides in the factory, rather the pillage of Capital extends to our very bodies.

Hardt and Negri attempt to show how bioproduction, despite being a source of even more exploitation, could be turned around, in the transition for revolution, as a way for liberation. This is because -they argue- Capital pursues its interests less through material production than immaterial production. But the latter requires Capital to educate and train its subjects in cooperation, communication, and the organization of social events. And these very skills which are needed for power and autonomy could be also be used for revolution. Thus in its blind quest for ever more profits, Capital is producing its gravediggers. (Hardt and Negri, 2009) From the perspective of the Multitude, therefore, it is *Qui perd gagne*.

This may sound a far fetched or at least too optimistic an analysis. But it may very well be possible. The first example that came to my mind reading this was Snowden. To extrapolate Hardt and Negri's idea to the an arm of Capital; the mammoth surveillance state: in its attempt to gather so much information on everyone on this planet has given freedom, skills, and top secret access to many contractors. They included this young man whose conscious was not dead. The result may not have been exactly a revolution, but highly significant with repercussions to this day. Perhaps, here too, by ever increasing the exploitation of its subjects, the surveillance-state, one of the many ugly faces of Capital is sowing the seeds for its own destruction. (Greenwald, 2014) But then one could argue that Snowden is precisely an exception. Among the armies of contractors, very few take the side of the people rather than that of private or state powers.

Still, there is a lack of concrete focus on the material basis of revolution in Hardt and Negri works. The Sartrean notions of need and scarcity attempt to mop up this deficit.

The Multitude counterpart for Sartre is the *groupe-en-fusion*; each for each, all for each, each for all, instead of independent individual as a norm.

In the *groupe-en-fusion* we find social freedom. Because inorganic matter no longer mediates between subjectivities, the praxis of each is no longer a hindrance to the other(s)⁵⁷. That is, each member of the group does not experience the *pratico-inerte* as a result of others' actions. Instead, within the *groupe-en-fusion*, common praxis leads to reciprocal relations whereby the freedom of each is equivalent and supportive to that of the other.

How to seek the common good of a group while keeping each subject belonging to that group free?*

This seem impossible to achieve in society, and yet it happens in all sorts of ways. If you think of Liverpool winning the Champions League Final; before, during, and after the match the condition of freedom for each were the freedom of all. In seeking the common good (the league cup, fame, money...etc.), the team was able to reconcile their collective freedom with the freedom of each. So much so that the concretization of the common good was only possible through such reconciliation.

So why are we not able to have this in society? One important difference is that the system (outside the group or society) in one case make it possible, and in the other hinders it. In the case of Liverpool, cooperation and solidarity are encouraged by the government, owners, coach and fans. In other words, the well being and success of each (scoring a goal, avoiding injury, feeling well, enjoying good relations with others members) makes it more likely that other members of the team become successful.

In the case of a society under the neoliberalism, as we have seen in our discussion of scarcity, it is the opposite. So the answer for many theorists to the question above* is the contract through which all delegate their will to a representative. Each group member sacrifices a part of their freedom for the common good. For Sartre, who rejects all forms of representation, for who only direct democracy is a democracy, the delegation, the mediation, indeed all intermediaries between the subject and her project, this is not a solution. For him, the subject original unbounded impetus joins or fuses with those of others sharing the same goal. In a spontaneous revolutionary movement crossing all the individual projects of the members and uniting them into a common project where the freedom of each becomes equivalent to that of the other: "le caractère essentiel du groupe en fusion, c'est la brusque résurrection de la liberté. Non qu'elle ait jamais cessé d'être la condition même de l'acte et le masque qui dissimule l'aliénation, mais nous avons vu qu'elle est devenue, dans le champ *pratico-inerte*, le mode sur lequel l'homme aliéné doit vivre à perpétuité son baigne et, finalement la seule manière qu'il ait de découvrir la nécessité de ses aliénations et de ses impuissances. L'explosion de la révolte comme liquidation du collectif ne tire pas directement ses sources de l'aliénation dévoilée par la liberté ni de la liberté soufferte comme impuissance; il faut un concours de circonstances historiques, un changement daté dans la situation, un risque de mort, la violence." (Sartre, 1985. p. 425). Freedom here is neither a being nor status, but an act unfolding. The group is leaderless, and everyone feels rejuvenated by what they offer to the group. The problem is that

57. For instance, the machines, buildings or tools, being used for the same purpose are not felt as obstacles, as frozen praxis, towards which we react as is the case when serial individuals use inorganic matter for opposite goals.

such fusion is only possible in exceptionally difficult circumstance. Granted, we are in such circumstance now. But still, it is only possible in the a negative sense, which is to say against a given external enemy for example. It is therefore unstable; not durable since what constitutes it one day is what will fragment it in later, once the objective is achieved: "c'est que leur unité pratique exige, tout ensemble, et rend impossible leur unité ontologique. Ainsi le groupe se fait pour faire et se défait en se faisant." (Sartre, 1985, p.573). Just like the subject freedom is alienated through the practico-inert, the group freedom faces the inertia of an objective achieved that had united what could not be united without it.

The groupe-en-fusion reaches a pinnacle of freedom, where all members are acting spontaneously. As if embodied spirits, their creative freedom seem to transcend all institutional oppression, before reaching its goal then dwindling and breaking down. Unger refers to this as the Sartrean heresy. By which he means that we are only truly free at those interluding moments of resistance to structures. (Unger, 2014, p.162-7). A temporary interlude between our long oppression and the ultimate reaffirmation of the structures as the hands of mighty, crushing the spirit. In fact, Sartre has not stopped at the groupe-en-fusion, and has tried to figure out a solution through the pledge. That is when the groupe-en-fusion attains its goal, and still tries to maintain its unity. But with the pledge, it succeeds in keeping its unity only through the threat of extreme force towards any defector. Its unity is then called 'fraternité-terreur': "l'assermenté a usé de la médiation par le groupe pour transformer entièrement le libre rapport spontané que nous avons découvert au début de notre expérience. Dès le serment, la réciprocité est *centrifuge* : au lieu d'être un lien vécu, concret, produit par la présence de deux hommes (qu'il y ait ou non médiation), elle devient *le lien de leur absence* : chacun dans sa solitude ou au milieu du sous-groupe tire ses garanties et ses impératifs de la qualification en inertie d'individus communs qu'il ne voit plus." (Sartre, 1985, p.479) So the purpose of the next part, freedom in the Common, is to avoid such fraternité-terreur. To find a way keep that kind of freedom we have found in the groupe-en-fusion without resorting to threat and fear. While making that freedom stable across space-time not only without the ossification resulting from the bureaucratic and hierarchical institutions. Sartre had recognized this problem in the Critique, but never really solved it. As Sartre's collaborator Gorz explicates in a film, "La Critique de la Raison dialectique apporte les fondements théoriques de la ligne politique qui preconise la démocratie révolutionnaire de masse. Et repousse toutes les formes d'organisation des appareils de contrôle, de direction, comme étant déjà des rechutes de libération collective en train de se faire dans des formes inertes institutionnalisées qui vont se retournées contre les agents de la praxis collective." Contat et Astruc, (*Sartre par lui même*. 2007)

In taking revolutionary politics as a form of freedom in praxis, we do not mean that revolution is necessary for freedom. Only that in some cases, it is. So while it in Switzerland, reforms and emancipatory politics may suffice, this is not the case in societies where no such politics is even allowed as in dictatorships. What characterizes the revolutionary is being in situation in which it is impossible to share the privileges of her oppressors. Precisely because these privileges are based on her oppression. They are not secondary to, but constitutive of the social order. Therefore, the revolutionary can obtain what she desires only by the destruction of this social order. (Sartre, 1949, p.178). If within a given situation, none of the possible paths proposed by those in power is taken. Instead, the impossible is invented, we have a revolution. Impossible from the

perspective of those in power. The consequences are so great though not all known, and will have to be assumed for a while by freedom as they change the ordinary course of history.

We distinguish revolutionary change from reform not only by the profundity of change in the social and political structure, but also by the agency of the subject enacting change (rather than the structure acting from the top) as well as by its the universality of its aspirations.

Revolution therefore involves:

1. A negative element that contests, resists, and destroys the foundation of the corporate-state and the very principles of neoliberalism. For this element, we take Skocpol definition of revolution which involve: "basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion. And these changes occur through intense sociopolitical conflicts in which class struggle play a a key role." (Skocpol, 1979. p.5). The result is abolishing wage slavery, contractual relations, monopolies, private property and the violent, coercive and repressive surveillance-police-military state apparatus. This must be international otherwise any small island of freedom (such as a libertarian ecovillage) will face pressure and may not be able to resist absorption into neoliberalism (although some can resist). It also must be global so that no part of humanity is excluded or pitted against one another⁵⁸. This means establishing connection, coordination, communication and solidarity between the local struggles and experiments. For instance, with the deindustrialization of the West, the industrial working classes are now mostly in Asia. Therefore, a global revolution must include the emancipation of the workers in Bangladesh, India, China...etc.
2. A reconstruction of the basic structures of political and social life and a transformation of consciousness. This positive element starts from within the current system, using it to destroy it. This positive element must vary according to the local, regional situation, all the differences and particularities between countries, societies, cultures...etc. A change of consciousness would be reflected in the change to the dominant modes of expression and of relationships from domination, hierarchy, oppression and repression to sympathy, sensibility, solidarity, cooperation, and a form of tenderness: "Those who realize the harm that can be done to others by any use of force against them, and the worthlessness of the goods that can be acquired by force, will be very full of respect for the liberty of others; they will not try to bind them or fetter them; they will be slow to judge and swift to sympathize; they will treat every human being with a kind of tenderness, because the principle of good in him is at once fragile and infinitely precious. They will not condemn those who are unlike themselves; they will know and feel that individuality brings differences and uniformity means death. They will wish each human being to be as much a living thing and as little a mechanical product as it is possible to be; they will cherish in each one just those things which the harsh usage of a ruthless world would destroy. In one word, all their dealings with others will be inspired by a deep impulse of reverence." (Russell, 2006. p.14)

The second part of the positive element, though central to revolution as we understand it, is often ignored by revolutionaries. Only a minority does attend to it. One anarchist, Landaeur, goes so far as to make it the central element of transformation, so he writes: "The state is a condition, a certain relationship between human

58. For instance, when a factory shuts down in a rich country only to open in a developing country so that the plus value is larger. The result is unemployment for the workers in the rich country, and exploitation for those in the poor one.

beings, a mode of behavior; we destroy it by behaving differently."⁵⁹ Following this prepares everyone for the great changes a revolution involves and leads to a smoother transition, rather than abrupt ruptures. It minimizes violence. It leads to the coherence between the ideals of the future for which we struggle and the our way of life in the present. Like all the alternatives -we will mention in the part on Freedom in the Common- such as social and temporary property. They aim at the coincidence of means and ends or the moral with the political as they attempt to 'build the new within the shell of the old'. In anarchism, this is called prefiguration.

This second positive element of revolutionary politics is thus just an early stage of Freedom in the Common. The working of a university department is a good place to start since (some) are far closer to a real democracy than states. Faculty departments lack of rigid hierarchy between the graduates students, nontenured, tenured faculty, administrative personnel, and the dean. There is a cooperation in research and teaching, independence of thought, opinion, choices for work. There is deliberation about decisions, what needs to be changed, and so on. People generally are passionate or at least interested in what they are doing, rather than the work being imposed on them or taking their job to survive. These elements are prefigurative; being from a new social order yet to be within the current unjust social order.

Revolution in this sense need not involve major violence, because unlike the XX century revolutions, the goal here does not involve taking over state power. It does, however, involve a radical transformation of power structures, of the distribution of power, and of our conception of power. This transformation ultimately aims at the destruction of the power of a human being over another (managers, landlords, patriarchy...etc) and the power of structures over human beings (corporate-states). The strategy should not be, as in classic revolutions, around armed confrontations, which is what these elites and structures excel at, and are prepared for to defend their privileges. Instead, in addition to resistance and struggles, the strategy should focus on the politics of emancipation, outside and against these structures. Through alternative models of sociability, of organization, of work, solidarity and problem solving like the Common and the other models I refer to later. By marginalizing the current abusive powers, demonstrating their ineffectiveness and making them obsolete, they lose most of their support before any shots are fired. Over time, the momentum of such bottom up processes may lead to the disappearance of these repressive structures. International, and intersectional revolution, wider in scope and time: "La révolution qui vient sera très différente des précédentes, elle durera beaucoup plus longtemps, elle sera beaucoup plus dure, plus profonde [...] il faudra au moins cinquante ans de luttes pour des conquêtes partielles de pouvoir populaire sur le pouvoir bourgeois, avec des avancées et des reculs, des succès limités et ,des échecs réversibles, pour arriver finalement à la réalisation d'une nouvelle société où tous les pouvoirs seront supprimés parce que chaque individu aura une pleine possession de lui-même. La révolution n'est pas un moment de renversement d'un pouvoir par un autre, elle est un long mouvement de *déprise du pouvoir*. Rien ne nous en garantit la réussite, rien non plus ne peut nous convaincre rationnellement que l'échec est fatal. Mais l'alternative est bien : socialisme ou barbarie." (Sartre, 1976. p.217-218)

It will be longer because it demands more than replacing a class by another or a group by another, but the end of this form of power in human relations. And this requires a revolution in consciousness so that each comes to

59. Cited in Gordon, 2008. p.38.

think and to feel that their praxis finds expression in others': "l'opération se définit à chacun comme la découverte urgente d'une terrible liberté commune" (Sartre, 1985. p.394). So the revolutionary moment crystallizes when the majorities of the exploited and oppressed become so conscious of their situation in the face of their oppressors that the power they hold as a collective is clear in their minds: "contre le danger commun, la liberté s'arrache à l'aliénation et s'affirme comme efficacité commune. Or, c'est précisément ce caractère de liberté qui fait naître en chaque tiers la saisie de l'Autre (de l'ancien Autre) comme le même : la liberté est à la fois ma singularité et mon ubiquité. Dans l'Autre, qui agit avec moi, ma liberté ne peut se reconnaître que comme la même, c'est-à-dire comme singularité et ubiquité." (Sartre, 1985. p.426)

These questions about revolution are still relevant today since we have recently witnessed in many countries revolutionary aspirations that has defied expectations and even managed to blow away heavily entrenched military regimes or police states. But then only for a moment. The revolution goal is the 'making of the human' (Sartre, 2005, 2015) This is the unconditioned end of its pursuit. Sartre morality of history aims at the creation of a society where human relations are humane, that is from one being to another. And no longer from an image to an image or a mask to a mask. In such process, relations are discoveries by the being involves, adaptable to their internal beings rather than dictated or imitated or constrained by rigid roles, hierarchies or institutions. The means for that end, that is the praxis is almost indistinguishable from that end since it is merely the everyday unfolding, little by little, step by step, bringing into society of that kingdom of ends.

In other words this is the idea of prefigurative politics which consists in embodying the vision, personally and collectively, in the building of the transformative movement and its praxis. To take just one concrete example. If a given subject (or a collective movement) is concerned about the rights of refugees, their dignity, and they sign petitions and militate for the end of oppression or wars that has made them refugees, this would be based on a vision of how human life should be. Now, what is defended here is a position that consists in combining such vision, awareness, ideals with prefigurative politics (the combination of both being the seeds of) which in this case, for instance, would be welcoming some of those refugees at their homes, communities, helping them find work, learn the language and so on.

"Communauté est ce par quoi la philosophie entend la proposition socialiste puis communiste." Badiou, 1992.
 "In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in

which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." Marx and Engels, 2008.

III. Freedom in the Common

Can the multitude create durable structures that are then administered or governed by it rather than from above it? How can these alternatives to private property and state work?

In what follows, and due to the limited scope of this thesis, we will deal only briefly with the first question. As for the second question, a detailed answer on a global scale is still largely unknown; on a local scale, it should contain general principles, but not be detailed to adapt to the particular situation of geography, needs, culture...etc.

The persistence of the initial personal constraint:

There is a dimension of constraint that is inherent in freedom. We have seen it from the beginning in intersubjective consciousness. The Common attempts to sustain revolutionary politics in space-time. This means that a commitment to a collective project is essential. Because once a decision is made, we have to try to carry it out. Certainly, some changes or revision are possible in light of the evolving situation, but some form of collective commitment to the consequences of a collective decision is necessary to overcome the inevitable obstacles and hardships required to transform a decision into reality. And attempting to change it (or abandon it) too soon⁶⁰ makes it impossible to live in a free society. Because the alternative to such collective commitment is to have a higher power (police, judge, prosecutor...etc.) impose that the decision is applied; akin to the system we have now.

On the possibility of a society beyond neoliberalism:

The first issue is whether such community is possible since the objection raised immediately is that any social life without the corporate-state is an utopia since none has ever existed before. However, in thinking about such community, we find a wealth of contemporary and historical experiments. Anthropologists, however, have studied many such societies. (Graeber, 2004, p. 20). Even in modern industrial countries, libertarian communities have existed, the most famous of which are the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Spanish revolution of 1936-1939. (Dolgoft, 1974) They were brutally crushed by the state since the worst nightmare of the ruling classes is that people make them obsolete through self-organization, decision making by consensus, managing everything according to the common good, the interest of the community and direct democracy.

As for current alternatives to neoliberalism, there are vast and diverse. And we find them everywhere.

Some alternatives are for now just ideas, some are whole existing societies, many are in various experimental phases in between a mere idea and a whole society. So the idea of the Common as a possible way out of our current neoliberal predicament is only just one of these alternatives. Some individuals would find it too demanding a conception of freedom to ascent to. Others would object that it is too far away from what exist. Others would wonder about what the individuals who are not interested to live in the Common do. These are all legitimate critique. However, the conception of the Common neither pushes nor even attempts to convince anyone to live in a particular way. Nor does any individual who is in the Common pressured to stay. The idea of

60. Unless there are very serious reasons to do so, as when the collective has initially gotten that decision wrong.

the Common presents just one affirmative path to a more humane work, relationships, leisure for all. It is a positive alternative to the current social order. And variations of this idea are possible; that is, it can and in fact should be deployed at different forms. Furthermore, the idea of the Common is neither an utopia nor a fixed unchanging system. Other than the Common, many interesting alternatives models of social organization exist. They include Thomas Piketty's recent work where he notably proposes temporary and social property (Piketty, 2019), and Michael Albert's participatory economics that can start within capitalism but replaces it (Albert, 2003). Also, Janet Biehl and Murray Bookchin libertarian municipalism and social ecology (Bookchin, 1996, 2005, 2014. Biel, 2014.). These approaches could start and, in fact, do in local projects where municipalities gain more independence and more funds to attend to the precise needs and circumstance of those directly affected. It extends beyond villages though; some large cities like Napoli, Barcelona and Madrid practice forms of municipalism. This can develop further to combine social anarchism on their small scale with ecology. In Asia, an anthropologist has studied Zomia where a hundred million people live stateless (Scott, 2010). They are not living in a Hobbesian state of nature, but are doing pretty well.

In the US, Gar Alperovitz has extensively documented cooperatives, and has done in field studies of real workers-owned industries and community land trusts (Alperovitz, 2011, 2013). The former finance minister of Greece at the height of the 2015 crisis, economics professor Varoufakis has joined a young philosopher to found Democracy in Europe Movement 2025⁶¹. Contrasting their movement with the EU shows what should be evident; how the latter democracy⁶² has ossified into a bureaucracy. But the idea of social freedom cannot be realized if the earth becomes uninhabitable. Thus whatever progressive changes or transformation we hope to see should take into account the natural environment. Just as in Scandinavia, there are no green parties. Because any political party, whatever its orientation, must have the green element. Socialism and anarchism should not be thought independent of ecology. Along these lines, in addition to Bookchin work we mentioned, Michael Löwy, who visited us early this year discussed his work on ecosocialism (Löwy, 2015). One of Sartre students, André Gorz, has founded Political Ecology (Gorz, 1975, 1977, 1991, 2008) which relates to ecosocialism. Other alternatives focusing on political economy include those of Seymour Melman who has done interesting work on democracy in the workplace, and on alternative economies to the US military oriented and war driven economy. (Melman, 1970, 1974, 1988, 2001.). Also, Cole's Guild socialism (Cole, 1980) whereby workers control their industries is a part of any democratic society. A step lower tan workers-managed industries is found at the federation of workers cooperative in Mondragon (Whyte, 1991) where tens of thousands of workers are the owners. These alternatives to neoliberalism (among many others) could all be developed and pursued simultaneously to reinforce each others thus, as Hardt and Negri note, "expanding networks of productive social cooperation, inside and outside the capitalist economy" (Negri, Hardt, 2017. p.60) The choice of the Common rather than any of these other alternatives is due to the space limits of this work. And because the common, in practice, goes much further than these alternatives. It either include (i.e, is more general) them or is compatible or synergistic with them. Also, in theory, the concept of the Common helps us develop a new way of thinking and living -for instance devoid of the concepts of property and of domination in human relations- and thus better understand and practice these other alternatives.

61. www.diem25.org

62. Which should rather be called representation.

Two main obstacles on the way to the Common: private property and the corporate-state.

Le premier qui, ayant enclos un terrain, s'avisa de dire: Ceci est à moi, et trouva des gens assez simples pour le croire, fut le vrai fondateur de la société civile. Que de crimes, de guerres, de meurtres, que de misères et d'horreurs n'eût point épargnés au genre humain celui qui, arrachant les pieux ou comblant le fossé, eût crié à ses semblables: «Gardez-vous d'écouter cet imposteur; vous êtes perdus, si vous oubliez que les fruits sont à tous, et que la terre n'est à personne». Rousseau, 2005.

Abolishing private property

This forgotten idea has been at the heart of all the emancipatory projects of the XIX century. Private property is probably the greatest obstacle to freedom. It is extremely entrenched, and it is almost an invisible violence. Most progressives do not even question it. Since we are not against possession, it is important to distinguish private property from mere possession. For anarchists, the difference between them is in usage. Private property is a possession that is used to exploit others. (Walter, 1949. p.40) If you own a tool that you personally use, this is a possession. If you own this same tool, and offer others to a job to use it lend it so that someone who cannot afford having one use it, your tool becomes private property. This is because that person can no longer benefit from the tool for the own purpose exchange for money. Similarly, Marx and Engels note that they are not for abolishing property in general, but only bourgeois property by which they mean, exactly like the anarchists, property based on "the exploitation of the many by the few". For them, this is primordial, so much so that "the theory of the communists may be summed up in a single sentence: Abolition of private property." (Marx & Engels, 2008. p.30). A number of objections are often raised against abolishing private property. One is that the Common will not be attended to, everyone will use it and abuse it as they wish, and it will end up being destroyed. This is the so-called tragedy of the common. However, as Elinor Ostrom has shown, the fallacy in Garrett Hardin's argument is that he does not consider that the common can be managed. For him, only private and public property can thus be used effectively and maintained. For Ostrom, the "common-pool resources" can and must be managed collectively through systems of democratic participation as she has shown in her field research: "self-governed common property arrangement in which the rules have been devised and modified by the participants themselves and also are monitored and enforced by them." (Negri, Hardt, 2017. p. 99). While Ostrom maintains the possibility of the Common only in smaller communities with strict boundaries, Hardt and Negri seek to go beyond this to a full democracy. In *Assembly*, they demonstrate the possibility of an expansive Common. Arguments we cannot discuss here because of our study limits⁶³; suffice to say that for them the Common for them is not only the fruits of the soil and all nature's bounty that is referred to in classical European texts as the inheritance of humanity as a whole. The Common also "is dynamic, involving both the product of labor and the means of future production. This common is not only the earth we share but also the languages we create, the social practices we establish, the modes of sociality that define our relationships, and so forth. This form of the common does not lend itself to a logic of scarcity as does the first."⁶⁴ (Negri, Hardt, 2009.

63. though we will take just 3 more objections to abolishing private property they discuss.

64. This second notion of the Common has some similarity to what Russell refers to as mental and spiritual goods; and which define

p.139). Hardt and Negri show that even though this Common that "that blurs the division between nature and culture" is not subject to scarcity, it is still expropriated. And this defines for them the "new forms of exploitation of the biopolitical labor." (Negri, Hardt, 2009. p.139)

"Tous coururent au-devant de leurs fers croyant assurer leur liberté." Rousseau, 2005.

The withering away of the state

As the frozen residual result of long conflicts, containments and interruptions, the state is merely, as Marx and Engels noted, a "committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" (Marx and Engels, 2008. p.9) The main enemy remains Capital, particularly in its current neoliberal form with profit, deregulation, financialization, militarization and imperialism. The state role remains to defend Capital, to obfuscate the true holders of power, to serialize resistance through the vote, to pacify through redistribution, and to terrorize⁶⁵ those whose dare to oppose its objectives.

Drunk on state power in USSR, considered a huge victory after the massacres of the 19th century, the party melted with the state. The USSR has been an experience in the corruption of the communist idea by statism. It is an experience that has shown it is impossible to accomplish a revolutionary program with state apparatus, but rather that the revolutionary transformation of society is a work of the movement, of the multitude, as we emphasized in the previous part, freedom as praxis. Marx thought has come to be in an agreement with the anarchists on this point, namely the withering away of the State once the revolution is won⁶⁶. So in commenting on the Paris Commune, he writes: "if you look up the last chapter of my Eighteenth Brumaire, you will find that I declare that the next attempt of the French Revolution will be no longer, as before, to transfer the bureaucratic-military machine from one hand to another, but to smash it, and this is the precondition for every real people's revolution on the Continent. And this is what our heroic Party comrades in Paris are attempting" (Marx and Engels, 1989. p.131). Therefore, a change in position is reflected from their earlier insistence on taking power of the state and having a transition phase of a proletarian dictatorship. Such change can be seen in the preface to the German edition of the Communist Manifesto, the last one signed by Marx and Engels in 1872. In it, they write that the program of the Communist Manifesto "has in some details become out-of-date," because the events of the Paris Commune proved that "the working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and wield it for its own purposes." (Negri, 2004. p.286)

We should remember that nation-states are a modern and an artificial creation, built through conquests and violence. In place of the present states, there use to be various peoples, tribes, groups, nations or communities that share a common language and had lived for long together. Like the Basque in France/Spain or the Kurds in Turkey/Syria. All these peoples were being wiped out to force a centralized and united state on all.

Now political theorists refer to the wide diversity of beliefs, identities, languages, religions, cultures, and ethnicities within modern states to defend a neutral state and different multicultural socio-political arrangements. Politicians prefer integration of minorities to the dominant culture. But both the theorists and

for him a better life since these goods can be shared without affecting their quantity, unlike material goods. (Russell, 2006. p.11)

65. While the terminology has reserved terrorism for the weaker side that does violence to cause fear, states have, by far, done more terrorism than non-state actors. See Blakeley, 2009. Note that most 'leaders' who justify repression in the name of fighting terrorism have carried out more terrorism than those they claim to fight.

66. In an agreement with the anarchists.

the politicians never question that the problem may be the state and not the diverse conceptions of the good within it. In doing so, they ignore the lion in the room; they never question the state as an anti-human institution by which I mean it shapes people to fit its purpose, forcing them into conformity and making those who do not want to live together to be a people. And in its attempt to do so uses all means available from the charismatic leader, to propaganda and lies, to making new enemies to the ethnic cleansing and extermination of those who do not fall within the scope defined by that state.

Whatever arrangements theorists propose, they have little chance to work if the population of a state have not chosen to live together, but are forced to by the artificial border and laws making where they live a unitary state: "que l'unité présente soit, somme toute, l'effet du projet séculaire de la classe actuellement dominante et que celle-ci ait tenté de produire partout, de la Bidassoa à la frontière belge, le même type d'homme abstrait, défini par les mêmes droits formels - on est en démocratie! - et les mêmes obligations réelles sans tenir compte de ses besoins concrets, personne aujourd'hui n'en a cure: c'est ainsi, voilà tout, on n'y touchera point." (Sartre, 1976. p.10)

Thus opposition to the state is motivated more for what it does with its power over people; being a concentration of hierarchy, violence, authority rather than for any dogma of a necessity to get rid away with the state. To illustrate this point one may take the Palestine case. Here, supporting the Palestinians to have a state is not a support of hierarchy, authority and violence of a state. But simply a support of another idea of the state, in this case, civil rights. For, if having civil rights –and one may be able to make a good argument for this in the case of Palestinians- requires them having a state then one should support a state. It may be an unfortunate but necessary step –in this particular case-- in the direction of emancipation from all forms of authority including the state's. So the Palestinians, once they have it, this argument goes, would attempt to make it work against itself. Another reason, in this case, for why a state maybe justified is the popular desire for one. For no democrat political theorist, particularly of libertarian tendencies, could claim to know what is best for a people and to speak for them. The popular desire maybe mistaken, but it is rooted in a historical context, in a story, and it has to take its time course. That is, if an anarchist society is best for all, any particular people have to discover that on their own. The political theorist may hope his work contribute to the conditions for which such research and discovery maybe possible. But she can determine neither the path nor the outcome a particular path of people may take on their own journey for emancipation.

The problem of organization:

One of the main objection to social anarchism is that once the state is gone there will be no law and order. The powerful (physically or otherwise, or in alliance) will be able to oppress the weak. We will have theft, violent crimes and perhaps sabotage to the very principles of a libertarian community. There are 2 parts here from anarchists' point of view; the law and the order. Anarchists do not deal adequately with the question of law except to say the following. One, that law enforcement does not play a major role in peoples' day to day interactions, but only intervenes in case of problems. This is true, but then some critics would say that it is precisely because the law, and the consequences of breaking it, is in the background of people's mind that law

enforcement is not necessary most of the time. (Wilson, 2014. Ch.2) I agree, but that the law presence in the background is dissuasive in the present society, but not that it does not follow that its absence in a radically different society will cause the disappearance of the inhibitory effect of the fear of punishment. Because in a society where basic needs are met, where inequalities of circumstance, opportunity and outcome are not so great, where scarcity is not dominant, people are not as likely to steal and commit violent crimes. Human nature as it is conceived now by those who think that the law is indispensable cannot be the same in a totally different situation as we have argued earlier in our critique of neoliberalism. Two, that pathological cases will remain, but they need to be treated and helped, reeducated and reintegrated rather than punished and excluded from society. As for the question of order, anarchism could offer several theories of organization. One such theory developed by Colin Ward is based on the social ideas of anarchism. Namely autonomous groups, spontaneous order, worker's control and the federative principle. For the latter, he gives the example of how the Swiss system where the federation is not dominated by one or a few powerful cantons, and where the union cuts across ethnic and linguistic boundaries. By spontaneous order, Ward refers to Kropotkin idea in *Mutual Aid*, whereby people will develop by trial and error and experiments a more durable order that matches more closely with their needs than any imposed order from the outside. This theory is based on observations from social biology, human ad hoc organizations, in revolutionary situations, and after catastrophes. In general, anarchists aim for a free social order is based on associations that are voluntary, functional, small and temporary. (Perry & Krimerman, 1966. p386-396).

"So now everything must be reinvented: the purpose of work as well as the modalities of social life, rights as well as freedoms." Guattari and Negri, 1990.

From the idea of the Common to concrete collective freedom:

What is interesting in Hardt and Negri argument for the Common is that it is multilayered. It is not simply a moral argument for equality or ending the exploitation that private property causes. It is also an argument for productivity. So they are using also the arguments for a pragmatist liberal. For they are saying that the transformation of labor from material to immaterial has made production a social process. Therefore, individual private property fetters the productive capacities of society: "when labor is socialized and the whole society becomes a terrain of valorization, when the intelligence, corporeal activity, cultural creativity, and inventive powers of all are engaged cooperatively and together produce and reproduce society, then the common becomes the key to productivity." (Negri, Hardt, 2017. p.97)

Earlier we have quoted Sartre about how once scarcity is internalized the reciprocity is destroyed such that the other represents famine and a death menace, even when there is no need or competition, when the conditions of are not precarious. The idea of the Common is precious in our view precisely as a possible solution to this problem of internalized scarcity. The Common would then represent a way of trust, reassurance; an escape from the fear of famine or destitution for the poor; and lose or theft for the rich. Such fear is an important factor of conflict, of seeing the other, especially the large majority of the poor as a menace.

Having dealt with it briefly while discussing neoliberalism, the main question remains what is the non

authoritarian alternative to the state? Is such an alternative possible? What kind of structures and institutions enhance individual freedom and sustain in space-time group solidarity and political movement praxis?

For this question, we need to find a community where means and ends fuse. Where the ideals of what a good life may be are reflected in its structures and in the institutions. And where these in turn protect these ideals. In his essay *Philosophie et Politique*, Badiou contrast his idea of community with the communitarian idea of communities which are, for him, with their fragmented identities (as in French, Jewish, Arab communities) the exact opposite of the ideal of community. Similarly Capital, technocracy, the free market and the management of the affairs of the state make the ideal of community impossible in today's real world. (Badiou, 1992)

The Common is an affirmative alternative model of social order. It is a positive proposition that could be adapted to the different geopolitical and cultural realities of contemporary societies. Communism relates to the Common. What Badiou calls the Communist hypothesis comes down to⁶⁷:

1. An idea of equality. A rejection of the dominant idea that there exist an inherent inequality constitutive of human nature.
2. Politics as a popular action of emancipation outside or against the constraints of state representation and centralized power.
3. Seeking polymorphic human work as a basis for undoing all class divisions and social hierarchies.

Notice these 3 principles approximate equality, freedom and fraternity.

The emphasis on the community as a fundamental locus of freedom here may seem paradoxical or even an oxymoron. However, this is because only in a free society can we individually free. We could all recall or imagine experiences where we were in danger precisely because our individual freedom stood in opposition to or in tension with another freedom. For instance, a middle class person walking at night in a poor neighborhood, where its inhabitants' freedoms (what they can actually do in the world), unlike his, are severely restricted. That richer person can avoid going there, avoid contact altogether; try to forget that these people even exist. Or share the neighborhood with precautions and protections against the others. Living in such a way, however, makes life hellish; 'l'enfer c'est les autres' (Sartre, 2017), unlike in a situation where everyone else around is freer.

Furthermore, this dimension of freedom is possible assuming the individual has a fundamental, even absolute, right to escape her birth community if they wanted, and join another that of like minded people. In addition, it values community not like the communitarians on the basis of keeping or protecting inherited and traditional customs not on the basis of a shared identity of religion/ethnicity/culture but on the basis of the of the creation of the new through the coming together of diversity. A free community is not closed on itself to protect and keep its particularities, rather its principles are openness and exploration, the seeking novelty and experimenting alternatives.

We can see why only through life in a free community can an individual be free. Because in a free community, the habits and values and structures that freely chosen, that are made and imagined by its members come to define who they are. Who I am is what I have freely chosen, created and lived by rather than what has been assigned, forced upon me from outside which has no value whatsoever in identification. In fact, the greatest

67. Badiou, 2016a. p. 9-10

crime, the most common and least acknowledged is precisely the identification of an individual with what they have not chosen, be it their birth religion, class, values, sexual orientation or nationality.

In the Common, libertarians converge with communists. There is no surprise since communism is neither a state nor party, but 'a movement to abolish the current state of things'. (Marx, Engels, 1970) If, following Gordon, we take the 3 markers of anarchism as [non]domination, prefiguration, and diversity/open endedness, (Gordon, 2008) we find a convergence with Badiou's 4 principles of communism:

Il est possible d'organiser la vie collective sur d'autres principes que le profit et la propriété privée. Il est possible d'organiser la production en se passant des principes de spécialisation, division du travail entre tâches d'exécution et de commande, entre travail manuel et intellectuel. Il est possible d'organiser la vie collective sur une base autre que les identités fermés. Et enfin il est possible de se passer de l'état vers une société d'association libre. (Badiou, 2016a) Badiou does not develop how this is possible. He does not get into the details of propositions for alternatives.

Freedom in the Common is not an agenda, a political program, a theory or even the outline of one. But it contains elements through which we can historically evaluate whether our actions, social mode of organization, institutions and policies are hospitable to freedom.

Conclusion:

Two serious objections -among many- may be raised to the conception of freedom which I have proposed and defended. I will try to address them here. First, one may ask whether by making this concept of freedom

encompassing of all the political, is there not a risk for a return to totalitarian politics?

We think not. Because by political we do not mean the management of the affairs of the state through representatives (as l'ENA and its graduates in France believe). We rather mean the multitude in their movement, ascent, horizontal decisions, and creation or invention of the new to the end of a general transformation of global society. Thus it is not the state, but the group or the movement that is the heart of politics¹. It is what makes the free agents action effective. Concerned subjects joining others on a voluntary basis in a non hierarchical, bottom up or widening circles forms of organization. Deliberating, seeking a solution to a problem or pursuing a common good, taking decisions through a consensual process, and sharing the burdens of implementing them without a division between executive and manual work. This is politics as a laboratory of social, economic, educational and environmental experimentation for the creation of the new and the appropriation of the destiny of the collectivity. Defined this way, freedom is inherently political⁶⁸ since politics involves choices of how to live together. Choices and decisions that lead us to inquire about who we are and what we want to be. So politics is not about leaders, charisma, authority, popularity, polls, parties, finances, mutual attacks, ads and election campaigns. It is about the destiny of a collectivity of human beings. There is nothing above and beyond it than the improvement of the everyday life and realizing the unfulfilled potential of humankind. Neither is it about professional politicians or technocrats, but the multitude of universal singularities that makes history. It is not about the elections of representatives that neither represent nor even respond to the vast majority then quiescence for years while these representatives (of the elites they are) payback the corporations and the powerful who supported and financed their campaigns through legislation that concentrate wealth and power even more. We should leave behind the political economy that poses the alternatives as either privatizing or nationalizing, and look forward to the creation of the Common. It is not whether the market or the state should have the upper hand or some synthesis of the two, but individual and group initiatives, voluntary organization, civil society. Only such politics can be truly democratic⁶⁹.

A second objection is whether humans today really want to get involved that much in self-determination and self-government?

It is true that a prior question to freedom as praxis, to emancipatory politics, and freedom in the Common is whether people -not in their own personal private lives, but as a collective, as a society- want this kind of freedom. Do people want to make the decisions pertaining to their collective life, to govern themselves? Or do people prefer to escape the burdens of responsibility that comes with this freedom and hand over the political and strategic decisions to leaders, to representatives, to an executive?⁷⁰

This is a question about human nature; and the answer to it depends more on where you want to put your hopes than on any empirical proof. I would like to believe that most people want to be free in the sense of contributing to governing their own affairs, organizing their own community rather than being dominated by a ruler or a class. But I cannot prove it. There is some evidence for it and some against it. I attribute the latter more to the system in which people find themselves, grow up with and to their education rather than to any inherent

68. In a sense that goes far beyond political freedoms or rights.

69. Where democracy can be thought as a collective process of exploration, experimentation, and organization with the aim of expanding social freedom.

70. Either case, we have to also inquire if the mechanisms (of the so-called representative democracy) are the best.

tendencies for servitude as I have tried to show also through an excursion into the thought of Kant, Humboldt, and Rousseau.

When I have started this project, I was looking for an ontology. A conception of human nature on which to ground a normative political theory. I have come to lean to the position that the human condition precludes a nature, if by it we mean something unchanging. Attempting to ground a libertarian community or a free society on a conception of human nature is attractive though impossible. Because human nature is nothing more than what we are right now; its very definition is dependent on the structures of social life. It could always change through a transformation of the structures of society; making human nature itself not a constant or a basis on which to imagine what a better society⁷¹ looks like. In addition, our knowledge of such nature is so incomplete to be of much help. Because to know what is human nature, we must be able to find some properly human attributes that are permanent or eternal and universal. But as soon as we try to find something with these traits, we either fall into the lowest common denominator, something so ephemeral or we mistake something trivial or transient, temporal in space or time for something eternal or universal. This is disappointing for the theorist who wishes to know though exhilarating to the agent, because it means that there is nothing determined once and for all; everything human is on the line in history. Even our most intimate thoughts, feelings, attitudes, perceptions, experiences and connections are subject to change through social and cultural transformation. On the other hand, we are not a blank slate or a malleable clay that is empty or so malleable to be remolded at whim. We are resistant to radical transformation, recalcitrant to revolution. Thus, a political project, however great, should neither require nor expect any fast or sudden transformation of what we are right now. At best, what we could hope for is some changes at the margins, that through their cumulative character in space-time and their synergy, may lead to revolutionary change. Second, a project of emancipation can tinker with our recalcitrance to change, thus increasing the likelihood of radical change without eliciting an antagonistic reaction to such change. Third, uncovering the social arrangements that pretend to be neutral. Since no social regimes can be neutral to the conceptions of the good, despite what many political theorists claim. Every mode of social organization favors some norms and some kind of experience while discouraging others, even when this is left untold or hidden. And this non neutrality of regimes does affect what we are right now, and thus makes it easier or harder (depending on the regime) for a transformation to operate in a particular direction.

I used to find Guess's realism (Guess, 2008), a view that politics is not applied ethics, convincing. This position has so much been radicalized. It seems there is almost no morality that does not take wings within the social, political, economic, and historical situation. A morality of history is 'agonistique' (Sartre, 2015) and all traces of casuistic are being thoroughly eliminated. This is neither historicism à la Rorty, nor postmodernism. I could not be more opposed to both. Rather I mean that morality is born, develops, and lives on through the attitudes, thoughts feelings, positions, and engagements I take on what is happening in our world; be it the Saudi massacres and starvation in Yemen, the Israeli Apartheid, the struggles of environmentalists, anti-racists, feminists, refugees...etc. In other words, morality has no existence outside of how we relate to these concrete

71. i.e. A society that is less harsh and alienating, more hospitable to this human nature.

situations of discrimination, war, deprivation, oppression, exploitation, starvation and all forms of hierarchy and domination that concrete persons in this world have to face everyday. If, as many good people say, I merely try to be good, to treat those around me with the utmost kindness without such commitment, then I am contributing to the continuation of oppression. Because the system will not be brought down this way: in order to respect others, I must disrespect the structures through which I enter into contact and relations with them⁷². To treat every human as an end, I have to tear down the structures because treating everyone as an end in themselves is impossible in this world. So I have to fight the structures to make any moral relation possible. Here's how Sartre expresses this moral difficulty: "il nous appartient donc de convertir la cité des fins en société concrète et ouverte [...]. Si la cité des fins demeure une abstraction languissante, c'est qu'elle n'est pas réalisable sans une modification objective de la situation historique. Kant l'avait fort bien vu, je crois : mais il comptait tantôt sur une transformation purement subjective du sujet moral et tantôt il désespérait de rencontrer jamais une bonne volonté sur cette terre. En fait la contemplation de la beauté peut bien susciter en nous l'intention purement formelle de traiter les hommes comme des fins, mais cette intention se révélerait vaine à la pratique puisque les structures fondamentales de notre société sont encore oppressives. Tel est le paradoxe actuel de la morale : si je m'absorbe à traiter comme fins absolues quelques personnes choisies, ma femme, mon fils, mes amis, le nécessaire que je rencontrerai sur ma route, si je m'acharne à remplir tous mes devoirs envers eux, j'y consumerai ma vie, je serai amené à passer sous silence les injustices de l'époque, lutte des classes, colonialisme, antisémitisme, etc., et finalement, à profiter de l'oppression pour faire le bien. Comme d'ailleurs celle-ci se retrouvera dans les rapports de personne à personne et, plus subtilement, dans mes intentions mêmes, le bien que je tente de faire sera vicié à la base, il se tournera en mal radical. Mais, réciproquement, si je me jette dans l'entreprise révolutionnaire, je risque de n'avoir plus de loisirs pour les relations personnelles, pis encore d'être amené par la logique de l'action à traiter la plupart des hommes et mes camarades mêmes comme des moyens. Mais si nous débutons par l'exigence morale qu'enveloppe à son insu le sentiment esthétique, nous prenons le bon départ : il faut historialiser la bonne volonté [...] c'est-à-dire provoquer, s'il se peut, par l'agencement formel de notre oeuvre [l'] intention de traiter en tout cas l'homme comme fin absolue, et diriger [l']intention sur [les] voisins, c'est-à-dire sur les opprimés de notre monde. Mais nous n'aurons rien fait si nous ne [...] montrons en outre, [...] qu'il est précisément impossible de traiter les hommes concrets comme des fins dans la société contemporaine. Ainsi [...] ce qu'[on] veut en effet c'est abolir l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme et que la cité des fins qu'[on] a posée d'un coup dans l'intuition esthétique n'est qu'un idéal dont nous ne nous rapprocherons qu'au terme d'une longue évolution historique. En d'autres termes nous devons transformer [notre] bonne volonté formelle en une volonté concrète et matérielle de changer *ce monde-ci* par des moyens déterminés, pour contribuer à l'avènement futur de la société concrète des fins. Car en ce temps-ci une bonne volonté n'est pas possible ou plutôt elle n'est et ne peut être que le dessein de rendre la bonne volonté possible." (Sartre, 1948. p.296-7)

Theorizing seeks patterns and principles, goals and a vision that links the focal, particular, local struggles

72 .This may seem unrealistic. But suppose you are in India, will you treat individuals there according to their caste? I think that if you aim at respecting the humanity of each, you must disrespect the structure (i.e. the caste system). What I am saying only carries this limited (because extreme example) much further, attempting to be consistent all the way; in keeping with Sartre's two principles of the left; radicalism and fraternity. (Sartre, 1991. p.49)

worldwide. Many activists on the ground are keenly aware of that. One of the best recent examples is the indigenous water protectors in the US, struggling to protect their environment and the Common, against the corporate-state. They have very much identified their struggle with and expressed deep solidarity with the Palestinians living under the brutal occupation of a de facto Apartheid State. Furthermore, the Water protectors of Standing Rock defended their territory not on the basis of private property, but on the basis of the idea of Common.

The ideas I have defended are about a vision of the world that is neither necessary nor impossible.

In political theory, we have the freedom of not being in a survival situation; of not being in the storm of political and social emergencies. We can plunge into them as activists and militants, but then step back to reflect on our experiences and larger patterns. A reflection with the aim of pushing our ideas to the limit of the abyss, with a hope that the result will not to destroy them completely, but to produce something greater and higher and truer.

We have seen how freedom as ethical commitment is grounded in an intersubjective consciousness. And how this commitment leads to the formation of groups and movements, and the Multitude that pursue emancipatory and revolutionary politics. In the emanation of the multitude from the current neoliberal situation, we have seen how this revolutionary subjectivity leads to the creation of a new situation, the Common where the Multitude may escape counter-finality, and freedom may not get ossified into the practico-inert.

I never would have thought that my own intense solitary longing for freedom would open me up to a whole new world. This longing has developed in me extremely strong feelings of pain, anger and revolt witnessing the sufferings of others from exploitation and all forms of domination. I have come to understand and interpret this pain, revolt and sympathy as my own original longing for freedom that has come to be affirmed within me as the mutilated freedom of others. How to even contemplate realizing freedom for all when one could hardly do it for oneself? Is there a way to live with this impotence of witnessing mutilated freedom all around and being unable to do much about it?

"Whenever the transformative experiences of faith, hope, and love take a strictly secular form, their common ground becomes this expanded sense of opportunity in association. Nobody rescues himself; the path to those experiences necessarily passes through situations of aggravated risk in the life of the passions, and success in this pursuit requires that others not attack you at your moment of increased defenselessness; that is to say, it requires acts of grace by other people. If these acts are lacking or deficient, another grace would be needed to make up for their absence.' (Unger, 1984. p. 99). Even though powerless regarding mutilated freedom all around us, we are still free to perform these act of grace. Perhaps in each act, and beyond, each contact, each engagement, every relationship, I could try to make the other feel as free as they want to be -if only we come to understand with them what they mean by freedom.

Bibliography of cited works:

Albert M., 2003. *Parecon: Life after Capitalism*. Verso.

Alperovitz G., 2011. *America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy*.

- Democracy Collaborative Press / Dollars and Sense, 2nd ed.
- Alperovitz G., 2013. *What Then Must We Do?: Straight Talk about the Next American Revolution*. Chelsea Green Publishing.
- Aronson R., 2004. *Camus and Sartre: The story of a friendship and the quarrel that ended it*. University of Chicago Press.
- Badiou A., 1992. *Conditions*. Éditions du Seuil.
- Badiou A., 2011. *Le Réveil de l'histoire*. Éditions Ligne.
- Badiou A., 2012. *La relation énigmatique entre philosophie et politique*. Germina.
- Badiou A., 2015. *Métaphysique du bonheur réel*. Presses Universitaires de France.
- Badiou A., 2016a. *Un Parcours Grec*. Éditions Ligne.
- Badiou A., 2016b. *Notre mal vient de plus loin: Penser les tueries du 13 novembre*. Fayard.
- Badiou A., 2017. *Éloge de la politique*. Flammarion.
- Badiou A., 2019. *Méfiez-vous des blancs, habitants du rivage !*. Fayard.
- Bakunin M., 1953. *The Political Philosophy of Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism*. Edited by Maximoff G.P. Free Press.
- Bakunin M., 1967. *Étatisme et Anarchie*. Edited by Lehning A., Brill, Leiden.
- Beauvoir S. de, 1981. *La Cérémonie des Adieux suivi de Entretiens avec Jean-Paul Sartre: Août-Septembre 1974*. Gallimard.
- Biebricher T., 2018. *The Political Theory of Neoliberalism*. Stanford University Press.
- Biehl J., 1997. *The Politics of Social Ecology: Libertarian Municipalism*. Black Rose Books.
- Blakeley R., 2009. *State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South*. Routledge.
- Bookchin M., 1996. *Toward an Ecological Society*. Black Rose Books.
- Bookchin M., 2005. *The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy*. AK Press.
- Bookchin M., 2014. *The Next Revolution: Popular Assemblies and the Promise of Direct Democracy*. Verso.
- Brown W., 2015. *Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism Stealth Revolution*. Zone Books.
- Cassegrain, B., 2015. *Prendre l'anarchisme au sérieux: Une théorie de l'autorité*. PhD. University of Geneva. Available at: <<https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:76149>> [Accessed 30.08.2019].
- Chomsky N., 1996. *Class Warfare: Interviews With David Barsamian*. Monroe, ME: Common Courage.
- Chomsky N., 1999. *Profit over People: Neoliberalism & Global Order*. Seven Stories Press.
- Chomsky N., 2015. *What Kind of Creatures Are We?*. Columbia University Press.
- Cole G.D.H., 1980. *Guild Socialism Restated*. Social Science Classics.
- Dewey J., 1963. *Liberalism and Social Action*. Capricorn Books, New York.
- Dolhoff S., 1974. *The Anarchist Collectives: Workers' self management in the Spanish Revolution 1936-1939*. Free Life Editions.
- Duménil G., Lévy D., 2004. *Capital Resurgent: Roots of the Neoliberal Revolution*. Harvard University Press.
- Duménil G., Lévy D., 2011. *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*. Harvard University Press.
- Engels F., 1976. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy*. Foreign Languages Press.
- Fanon F., 2002. *Les Damnés de la Terre. Préface de Jean-Paul Sartre (1961)*. La Découverte.
- Foucault M., Chomsky N., 2006. *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on Human Nature*. The New Press.
- Freeden M., 1998. *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach*. Oxford University Press.
- Freeden M., 2005. What should the 'political' in political theory explore. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 13(2), p.113-134.
- Friedman M., 2002. *Capitalism and Freedom*. Fortieth anniversary edition, University of Chicago Press.
- Godwin W., 1842. *Inquiry concerning Political Justice and its influence on Morals and Happiness*. 4th ed. J. Watson, London.
- Gordon U., 2008. *Anarchy Alive! Anti-Authoritarian Politics from Practice to Theory*. Pluto Press.
- Gorz A., 1975. *Écologie et Politique*. Éditions Galilée.
- Gorz A., 1977. *Écologie et Liberté*. Éditions Galilée.
- Gorz A., 1991. *Capitalisme, Socialisme, Écologie*. Éditions Galilée.
- Gorz A., 2008. *Écologica*. Éditions Galilée.
- Guess R., 2008. *Philosophy and Real Politics*. Princeton University Press.

- Graeber D., 2004. *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*. Prickly Paradigm Press, Chicago.
- Graeber D., 2014. *The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement*. Penguin Books.
- Greenwald G., 2014. *No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the US Surveillance State*. Metropolitan Books.
- Harvey D., 2007. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Hewlett, N., 2006. Politics as Thought? The Paradoxes of Alain Badiou's Theory of Politics. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 5, p.371-404
- Hewlett, N., 2007. *Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Rethinking Emancipation*. Continuum, London.
- Hayek F., 2001. *The Road to Serfdom*. Routledge.
- Honneth A., 2017. *The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal*. Polity.
- Howells C., 1988. *Sartre: The Necessity of Freedom*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hugo V., 1880-1889. *Oeuvres Complètes de Victor Hugo*. Vol. 24, J. Hetzel et Cie / A. Quentin, Paris.
- Humboldt W., 1969. *The Limits of State Action*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jones E., 2017. *Edmund Burke and the Invention of Modern Conservatism 1830-1914: An Intellectual History*. Oxford University Press.
- Kinna R., Prichard A., 2019. Anarchism and non-domination. *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 2, Vol. 24, No. 3, p.221-240.
- Klein N., 2007. *The shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. Metropolitan Books.
- Kropotkin P., 2008. *Mutual Aid*. Forgotten Books.
- Lawson et al., 2019. *Public Good or Private Wealth?* [Online] Oxfam Annual Report 2019. Available at <<https://oxfamlibrary.openrepository.com/bitstream/handle/10546/620599/bp-public-good-or-private-wealth-210119-en.pdf>> (Last accessed on 9 September 2019)
- Leopold D., Stears M., 2008. *Political Theory: Methods and approaches*. Oxford University Press.
- Löwy M., 2015. *Ecosocialism: A Radical Alternative to Capitalist Catastrophe*. Haymarket Books.
- Macpherson C.B., 1985. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford University Press.
- Marshall P., 2008. *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism*. Harper Collins.
- Marx K., 1847. *Misère de la Philosophie: Réponse à la Philosophie de la Misère de M. Proudhon*. A. Frank, Paris.
- Marx K., Engels F., 1970. *The German Ideology*. International Publishers.
- Marx K., Engels F., 1989. *Marx and Engels Collected Works: 1870-1873 letters*. Vol. 44. International Publishers, New York.
- Marx K., Engels F., 2008. *The Communist Manifesto*. The Floating Press.
- McKay I., 2014. *Direct Struggle Against Capital: A Peter Kropotkin Anthology*. AK Press.
- Melman S., 1970. *Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War*. McGraw-hill.
- Melman S., 1974. *The Permanent War Economy*. Simon & Schuster.
- Melman S., 1988. *The Demilitarized Society*. Spokesman, for the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.
- Melman S., 2001. *After Capitalism: From Managerialism to Workplace Democracy*. Knopf.
- Mirowski P., Plehwe D., 2009. *The Road from Mont Pelerin: The Making of the Neoliberal Thought Collective*. Harvard University Press.
- Negri A., Guattari F., 1990. *Communists like us: New Spaces of Liberty, New Lines of Alliance*. Semioitext.
- Negri A., 1991. *The Savage Anomaly: The power of Spinoza's metaphysics and politics*. University of Minnesota Press.
- Negri A., Hardt M., 2000. *Empire*. Harvard University Press.
- Negri A., 2004. *Factory of Strategy: Thirty-three Lessons on Lenin*. Columbia University Press.
- Negri A., Hardt M., 2004. *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*. Penguin Press, New York.
- Negri A., Hardt M., 2009. *Commonwealth*. The Belknap Press of Harvard University.
- Negri A., Hardt M., 2017. *Assembly*. Oxford University Press.
- Perry L., Krimerman L. (eds.), 1966. *Patterns of Anarchy: A collection of writings on the Anarchist Tradition*.

- Anchor Books, New York.
- Piketty T., 2019. *Capital et Idéologie*. Éditions du Seuil.
- Prichard A., Kinna R., Pinta S., Berry D., (Eds.), 2012. *Libertarian Socialism: Politics in Red and Black*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Robin C., 2017. *The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin*. Oxford University Press.
- Rocker R., 1998. *Anarcho-Syndicalism*. 2nd Ed., Pluto Press.
- Ross K., 2002 *May'1968 and its Afterlives*. University of Chicago Press.
- Rousseau J.-J., 2005. *On The Origin of Inequality*, second part. Cosimo Classics, New York.
- Russell B., 1992. *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*, Routledge.
- Russell B., 1993. *The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Contemplation and Action 1902-14*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Russell B., 2006. *Political Ideals*. Cosimo Classics, New York.
- Russell B., 2009. *Why Men Fight?*. Routledge.
- Sartre J.-P., 1943. *L'être et le néant: Essai d'ontologie phénoménologique*. Gallimard, Paris.
- Sartre J.-P., 1946. *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, Nagel.
- Sartre J.-P., 1948. *Situations, II: Littérature et Engagement*. Éditions Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., 1949. *Situations, III: Lendemain de Guerre*. Éditions Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., 1952. *Saint Genet, Comédien et Martyr*. Gallimard, Paris.
- Sartre J.-P. 1964. *Situations, IV: Portraits*. Éditions Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., 1972. *Situations, IX: Mélanges*. Editions Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., 1972. *Plaidoyer pour les Intellectuels*. Éditions Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., Gavi. P., Victor P., 1974. *On a raison de se révolter*. Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., 1976. *Situations, X: Politique et Autobiographie*. Éditions Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., 1985. *Critique de la raison dialectique I : Théorie des ensembles pratiques précédé de Questions de méthode*. Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., Lévy B., 1991. *L'Espoir maintenant. Les entretiens de 1980*. Verdier, Lagrasse.
- Sartre J.-P., 1995. *Carnets de la drôle de Guerre*. Gallimard.
- Sartre J.-P., Benny Levy, 1996. *Hope Now: The 1980s interviews*. University of Chicago Press.
- Sartre, J.-P., 1998. *La responsabilité de l'écrivain*. Verdier.
- Sartre, J.-P., 2005. Morale et Histoire. *Les Temps Modernes*, 4,5,6 (632-633-634). p. 268-414.
- Sartre par lui même*. 2007. [DVD]. Directed by Astruc A., Contat M. Paris: Editions Montparnasse.
- Sartre, J.-P., 2015. Sartre Inédit. Les racines de l'éthique. *Études Sartriennes*, 2(19). p.11-118.
- Sartre, J.-P., 2017. *Huis Clos suivi de Les Mouches*. Gallimard.
- Sandel M., 2013. *What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets*. Penguin Press.
- Skocpol T., 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A comparative analysis of France, Russia and China*. Cambridge University Press.
- Scott J.C., 2010. *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. Yale University Press.
- Smith A., 1857. *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Unger R. M., 1984. *Passion: An essay on personality*. The Free Press.
- Unger R. M., West C., 1998. *The Future of American Progressivism: An Initiative for Political and Economic Reform*. Beacon Press.
- Unger R. M., 2001. *False Necessity: Anti-necessitarian social theory in the service of radical democracy*. Verso.
- Unger R. M., 2007. *The Self Awakened: Pragmatism Unbound*. Harvard University Press.
- Unger R. M., 2014. *The Religion of the Future*. Harvard University Press.
- Unger R. M., 2017. *Inclusive Vanguardism: The Alternative Futures of the Knowledge Economy*. OECD, Paris, on 5th of May, 2017. Paris: OECD.
- Varoufakis Y., 2016. *And the Weak Suffer What They Must?: Europe's Crisis and America's Economic Future*. Bold

Type Books.

Varoufakis Y., 2017. *Adults In The Room: My Battle With Europe's Deep Establishment*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Walter N., 2002. *About Anarchism* . Freedom Press, London.

Werhane P. H., 2006. Adam Smith's Legacy for Ethics and Economics. *Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management*. LI (2). p.199-212.

Whyte W., 1991. *Making Mondragon: The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex*. Cornell University Press.

Wilson M., 2014. *Rules without Rules: The Possibilities and limits of anarchism*. Zero Books.

Wolin S., 2004. *Politics and Vision*. Princeton University Press.

Wolin S., 2008. *Democracy Incorporated: Managed democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*. Princeton University Press.

Appendix

Authors:

The choice of the authors was solely guided by the questions pursued. The particular traits or characteristics of the authors matter, but they were identified later on, rather than being the reason for their choice.

Praxis or revolutionary activity is one such trait. If the goal is to change the world then we need to understand how it works. And we cannot understand much without acting in the world; being on the ground with those most affected by forms of concentrated power. On the other hand, writing to defend an abstract ideal of freedom is contributing to oppression.

Theory and practice inseparable. Philosophy and public intervention pursued in parallel.

With the exception of Sartre's *Critique*, the philosophical works have been deliberately avoided, in favor of political and social theory. Sartre has always looked for trouble; getting involved in many revolutions (e.g. Cuba), and for many years in the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles against the French and American imperialists avoiding jail only through his stature. Negri was not that lucky, he was arrested, falsely charged and spent over 13 years in prison and many others in exile (Paris). The theoretical works of the authors chosen reflect their understanding (of freedom, democracy, politics and society) from the participation of struggles on the ground. What they have learned from emancipatory politics over the years has changed their work. And their ideas were tested in the movements and struggles in which they were actively involved.

In addition, Sartre and Negri share a metaphysical thirst for the absolute while knowing they will not achieve it. These thinkers-militants show a left surviving in a desolate landscape. A great problem of the left is organization. The theories they work, and the ideas I try to focus on here try to show that organization need not be detrimental to personal freedom.

The theorist must touch the wound, the suffering, the emergencies. He must be there. But that is not enough. He must communicate the message of those who cannot, in their own voice, and makes it resonate in the world outside. Better, the intellectual, should only give the word to the people as Sartre insisted. This communication should ideally be in the form of exemplary action the theorist embodies in the world. For instance in the case of Negri with the Italian workers and for Sartre with societies torn to shreds by Capital imperial wars and struggling for justice and independence. Hardt and Badiou as well have also been thinkers-militants throughout their lives. For instance, Badiou through his Organisation Politique, and Hardt recently contributing to a rescue boat in the Mediterranean. Hardt and Negri bring postmodernism to this work. Today, it cannot be ignored. However, being unfamiliar with it and unable to include it in this brief work, including them offer a postmodern dimension seen from their perspective of radical transformation.

With the exception of Hardt, these thinkers-militants are systemic philosophers with a whole system developed that is not discussed here; but only their politics. They are hybrid. That is, they cannot be labeled and they reject labels with the exception of Badiou with communism. They have never belonged to one ideology, but changed over time, and have come from cross pollination. Finally, these authors look at the world from an interdisciplinary perspective rather than from a single political or economic one to avoid having a partial view in dealing with global issues and fundamental human questions.